Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance - Centre for Migration Studies

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PROLOGUE TO NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS AND GOVERNANCE

Emeka Xris Obiezu & Ike Odimegwu

“And so the Nigerian migration conversation has come full cycle. All the stakeholders are here: the government, the civil society organizations, the private sector, the international partners, the migrants both intending and returned; and now the academia enters the stage at the institutional level, not just as an invitee but as a convener and collaborator joyfully, proudly and inclusively hosting the discourse”

With those exultant words, the Vice Chancellor of Nnamdi Azikiwe University welcomed the participants at the migration sensitization event that heralded the official commissioning of the first Nigerian University Centre for Migration Studies at Nnamdi Azikiwe University on 28^th August, 2018 at the main auditorium of the University. And with even more exultant spirit has the pioneering team of the Centre embarked on the mission of realizing the vision: to create a centre of excellence for migration studies from the scratch without grant or endowment save the grant of their natural talents and the endowment of their unwavering commitment. This mission of vision-realization has seen the Centre innovating on academic programmes in migration studies, creating new platforms for dynamic interactions and interface among the major players in the Nigerian migration field and participating in the programmes and activities of the Technical Working Group on Migration and Development with the zest of an ardent student and the proficiency of an avid scholar.

This participation exposed the Centre to the varied dynamics of Nigerian migration; the themes and issues making the dialogues, conversations and diverse involvements. It also provided an aperture into Nigerian migration governance: its architecture and operations, its strengths and weaknesses, its achievements and the lacunae thereof. The book, Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance, is necessitated therefore by the foregoing and comes as a forerunner in the series of responses and engagements from the Centre to tell, in narrative and thematic styles, the story and stories of Nigerian and African migration dynamics and governance; to extol the strengths and provide for the weaknesses; to announce the achievements and fill the gaps, and ultimately to understand the dynamics and proffer recommendations for the improvement of our migration governance.

Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance is the first volume in the African Migration Studies series (AMS). African Migration Studies is the first from the stable of the Project and Research Department (PRD) of Centre for Migration Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University (CMS-NAU). The Series is designed to provide forum for scholars and actors working on the African migration field to publish their research findings, policy articulations and field experiences. It will also provide opportunity and platform for the development of partnerships for greater collaborations among the actors on the African migration field, and navigate the currents and channels of interface between African migration and global migration dynamics.

This first volume is focused on Nigerian migration. As a major player in the global migration dynamics, Nigeria shares in the abounding gains and numerous challenges of migration. Like most other countries of the world, Nigeria’s perception and response to migration have evolved in three significant phases: In the first phase, migration is perceived as a problem to be solved; in the second phase, migration is seen as a challenge to be addressed; and in the third phase, migration is understood as a potential to be harnessed. This evolutionary process however manifests a convolution of the phases. A mix of perceptions and attitudes may be gleaned in the various responses and policies of various countries and nations to migration and migrants. Nigeria is an active participant in the international cooperation that is geared towards ensuring human-person-centered, human-rights-based and sustainable-development-oriented approach to migration and migrants of all kinds. This international current recognizes the need to maintain the sovereign rights of states to determine the protocols of migration regarding their territories. This recognition places on sovereign states the duty to manage migration effectively for human development. While these are the expectations and avowals, the actual practices of nations, including Nigeria, have not always struck the mark.

Migration management in Nigeria has enjoyed tremendous inputs and commitments, experienced enormous challenges and recorded significant successes. These efforts, challenges and successes are evident in the level of institutionalization of the migration management process with evolving governance architecture. A major milestone was achieved in 2015 with the adoption of the National Migration Policy (NMP) and the various activities for its implementation. The Nigerian migration mechanism consists of various ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) of government, civil society organizations (CSOs), academia, the private sector and other partners. This mechanism has assured efforts in the direction of better management of migration for the wellbeing of individual migrants and their families as well as the development of the country and her migration partners. The organizing structure of the Nigerian migration mechanism includes a national technical working group (TWG) coordinated by the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI). Much of the success story of Nigerian migration governance is due to the decentralization of the governance mechanism and migration dialogue to the grassroots using the existing platform of geopolitical zoning system in the country as well as the strong partnership with relevant stakeholders and collaborators especially international organizations and allies.

Even though cases of irregular migration may have gained more media attention internally, or even more internationally, Nigeria’s progress in migration governance is not limited to addressing this form of migration. Indeed, the secret of this success story can be found in the holistic approach to migration issues; an approach that strives to hold together, at times in dialectic confrontation, but more often in dialogical embrace, all the aspects of the migration phenomenon.

However, with all the giant strides taken, the enormity of the challenges facing Nigeria in its determination to accelerate the momentum of effective and homegrown migration management point to a difficult and daunting undertaking and reveal many gray areas yet to be addressed. Major areas of challenge include finance, political will, and coordination between the national and local systems and structures. Lack of adequate fiscal provision in the national budget or any alternative local sources is obviously one of the major problems plaguing effective, home-driven and independent migration governance in Nigeria. Thus, most of the activities of migration governance are donor-driven. The consequence of this is that most times the migration discourse agenda may not be set by the country but by the donors. This is the case of he who pays the piper dictating the tune. The resulting scenario is that wherever and whenever the will to generate a home-grown migration discourse agenda has been asserted, tensions and disagreements have ensued, at times resulting in an impasse or defunding, or a total breakdown of negotiations or collaborations.

Moreover, different strata of government rarely muster the political will to take on issues that impinge on Nigerian development and effective migration governance: issues axed on remote and immediate causes of mass migration such as failure in leadership, poor governance, massive unemployment, and the multidimensional phenomenon of poverty. While lack of synergy between the different organs and agencies of government adversely affect efficient management at the national level, lack of synergy between federal, state and local government levels hinders moving migration governance to the grassroots as envisaged by the policy and the decentralization programmes.

However, it must be noted that efforts are growing in addressing these problems and challenges at the various levels of migration management and governance in Nigeria. And what is more, notwithstanding the problems and challenges noted above, the future of migration governance in Nigeria holds out encouraging prospects. The enlargement of the TWG and inclusion of new actors such as academia and private sector are positive developments. These developments promise significant opportunities especially in the areas of critical investigation, conceptual interrogation and theoretical articulation of issues affecting migration, creating dynamic platforms for open conversations, and availing funding from local sources. These developments must be vigorously pursued for the balance of conversation and growth of mutual respects in the forums of migration engagements and dialogues in Nigeria as well as for Nigerians in the diaspora. The recognition Nigeria is enjoying today in the international migration arena offers a good opportunity for improved capacity for national migration governance. Improved collaboration among relevant MDAs and enhanced coordination by NCFRMI are further beacons of hope for better relationship with partners both in project management and bilateral agreements.

Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance is driven by the growing commitment to improving on the existing migration governance in Nigeria. This commitment can be read from the rare enthusiasm of the different actors involved in this migration governance process ensuring that the national and global goals are achieved. To sustain this enthusiasm and ensure the process is kept on track, there is the need to evaluate the entire process, strengthen its achievements, address the challenges and draw lessons from the problematic as projections for more fruitful engagement in the future. It is within this overarching need that this volume aims to articulate the various aspects of the Nigerian migration governance process, highlight the successes, distill the lessons learned, engage the challenges and appraise and channel the prospects. The volume showcases how conceptual tools and normative frameworks on the one hand and field experiences and historical resources mesh to provide insight into Nigerian migration governance. Not much literatures have undertaken a systematic study of Nigerian migration dynamics and governance process. Thus, this volume will be a valuable contribution to scholarship, policy development, review and implementation. It is expected also to impact positively on the improvement of collaboration for migration management and governance between Nigeria and her partners. And not less important, it is hoped that this volume will evoke further studies on this aspect of migration discourse in Nigeria and beyond.

The structure and chapters are designed to cover the geopolitical perspectives of Nigerian migration dynamics and governance to present them in their uniqueness as well as in their wholeness as interrelating narratives and experiences. The fifteen chapters of the volume are grouped into three parts bounded by the prologue and the epilogue. Parts One and Two are devoted to the migration dynamics of Nigeria. Part One groups the first six chapters that discuss the local space of Nigerian migration dynamics. The six chapters address the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. Each chapter presents the unique perspective of the migration dynamics of a geopolitical zone. In all however, they present an ensemble of the intricate and dynamic web of Nigerian internal migration. In Part Two, we assume the liberty of grouping the world outside Nigeria into four geopolitical zones: Africa, Europe, America and Asia-Pacific. This is Nigerian migration in the global space. Each of the four chapters in this section takes up the dynamics of the migration of Nigerians to one of these regions of the world. It is obvious that what can be achieved in the limited pages discussing these broad categorizations will perforce be panoramic. They merely set the stage for more detailed studies that will be pursued in subsequent volumes of the AMS series. This attention to the global space, notwithstanding its sparse detail, is important because a number of factors that define Nigerian migration can be traced to this external space. Part Three treats the Nigerian migration governance in three chapters and the emerging academic presence in the fourth chapter. The three chapters on governance evolve from search for understanding through the principal actors to the highpoints of Nigerian migration governance.

Contributions to this volume are guided by standards of academic research, professional proficiency and personal experience. The quality of the volume is enhanced by the discipline of research methodology and process, the ethics and sensibilities of professional and humane engagement especially with persons of concern, and by the deep resources of personal experience in migration policy formulation, in field engagement with migrants of all types and in the bilateral and multilateral partnerships that characterize the arena of migration management. The contributions are therefore expectedly of high scholarly quality and expressed in simple language easily accessible to the intended wide audience.

The work draws its strength and appeal from a variety of sources: the currency and need of the topic it addresses; the lack of and need for literature in this area; and not less from the diversity of background of the authors in terms of their academic and professional engagements and experiences as also in terms of their level of acquaintance with migration issues and discourse. While some are founding members of the migration governance project in Nigeria, others are just boarding the train. Some are drawn from government ministries, departments and agencies, others are non-state actors, and yet others are squarely academics whose involvement with migration is primarily from the perspective of research and scholarship. While many are national officers and operators, some are international partners that have impacted significantly on Nigerian migration governance. The volume has also benefitted from interaction with some principal actors and comparative overview of subsisting and emerging issues.

It should not be surprising also that the chapters will throw up a number of critical issues that elicit critical reactions. It is expected that such should generate further conversations for further research and review of policy and improvement of practice in Nigerian migration management and governance. As the first volume devoted to the study of Nigerian migration governance, Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance will certainly come with a number of shortcomings not uncommon with pioneers and pacesetters. One such weakness is the exuberant desire for inclusiveness which may result in the omnibus syndrome.

Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance targets a wide readership: the circle of relevant government agencies, migration policy makers, the civil society organizers, non-governmental organizations, project developers and field workers, local and global actors, and students in higher education institutions, academics, collaborating partners in migration governance, migrants and intending migrants and the general reading public. This wide spectrum of target readership has affected the scope, structure and language of the book and its chapters. In scope, the book focuses on the basics of Nigerian migration that should interest the policy professional, the researcher and the general public. The structure develops an architecture of holistic inclusiveness of the geopolitical space of Nigerian migration. As much as possible, the chapters are presented in simple narrative language that will be sensible to academics and professionals, accessible to the budding migration student and comprehensible to the general reader.

FOREWORDS AND PREFACE

FOREWORD TO AFRICAN MIGRATION STUDIES SERIES

It gives me great pleasure to write this foreword to the African Migration Studies series. A Series “designed to provide forum for scholars and actors working on the African migration field to publish their research findings, policy articulations and field experiences…to provide opportunity and platform for the development of partnerships for greater collaborations among the actors on the African migration field, and to navigate the currents and channels of interface between African migration and global migration dynamics.” My pleasure flows from a number of sources: the idea of a publication series is in itself a noble literary and academic idea of incremental proportions. The publication derives from a collection of researches undertaken by various scholars on the interesting subject of migration. The idea of series is even more enchanting for it conceptualizes continuity and sustainability. This is therefore the university being engaged in its primary business of research and community service. I am also delighted because the series bears testimony to the vibrancy of the Centre for Migration Studies of our University. It demonstrates that the Centre is committed to the pursuit and fulfilment of the goals and objectives of its establishment.

The emergence of CMS-NAU as the first Centre for migration studies in the Nigerian University System was heralded with great ovation by the Nigerian migration management and governance community. The absence of the academia at the institutional level in the Nigerian migration management community had long been decried. This absence constituted a lacuna in the composition of discussants and participants at the various levels of migration engagement in the country and of the country with the international community. Expectedly, such lacuna will impact on output. The heralding ovation nevertheless embraced within itself the potency of great expectations and so constituted a challenge for performance to the Centre and the University. I must state that the Centre has significantly lived up to the many and varied expectations. It has created awareness about migration within the university community and beyond. It has also created awareness about the role and importance of the academia at the various levels of Nigerian migration management and governance. Within the short period of its existence, the impact of the Centre has been felt through its activities in the areas of policy formulation, implementation, analysis and review. Collaborative and critical engagement with the local migration field workers and managers as well as the diaspora as a signature of the Centre has also grown the benefits.

I am informed that this series has been conceived to address the challenge of scarcity of local literature in the area of migration: Nigerian and African migration narratives presented from the perspectives of the Nigerian and African people and yet integrated into the global migration narratives. This challenge arose in the course of development of modules for the newly established postgraduate programmes in migration studies mounted by the Centre. The need for home grown migration literature was also felt in the course of engagement with the diaspora and the processes of policy review.

It is indicative of the global vision of the Centre that the scope of the series is not restricted to the university programmes or even to the Nigerian local migration space but is open to the African and the global migration space. I can only hope that the vision of the series will be sustained and that the volumes of the series, the authors and the volume editors will be so selected as to sustain quality of scholarship and effectively plug the initiating gap in literature. This will not only serve the postgraduate programmes of the Centre and the University but will certainly be a major contribution to the Nigerian, African and global knowledge resource in the burgeoning area of migration.

I wish the African Migration Studies series the very best of flourishing!

Prof. Charles O. Esimone, FAS

Vice Chancellor,

Nnamdi Azikiwe University

FOREWORD TO NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS AND GOVERNANCE

As the Supervising Minister of the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and the Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI), the coordinating agency of all migration-related matters in Nigeria, I am honoured and glad to write the Foreword to this book, Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance, the first volume in the African Migration Studies Series. However, my real delight in writing this Foreword stems from more reasons beginning with my longstanding involvement with the Centre for Migration Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka (CMS-NAU).

It was during my days as the Honourable Federal Commissioner of NCFRMI that the idea of the Centre was hatched following the momentous outcome of the 2017 National Migration Dialogue that recommended more active participation of the academia in the Nigerian migration governance and the inclusion of migration studies in the various levels of educational curricula. Attending the Sensitization programme on the Dangers of irregular migration organized by the Postgraduate School of Nnamdi Azikiwe University in collaboration with NCFRMI and Civil Society Organization Network on Migration and Development (CSOnetMADE) on 28^th August, 2018, I was privileged to perform the ceremonies of the official opening of CMS-NAU.

The trail blazing entry of the CMS-NAU as the first centre for migration studies in the Nigerian University System, the steady and systematic development of academic programmes on migration by the Centre; the continuous interface of the Centre with the government and other actors in the Nigerian migration management field have been a model for collaboration for sustainable progress. The Centre’s participation in the programmes of the NCFRMI such as National Migration Dialogue, migration policy development and review, etc., has enlivened the migration management circle, providing it indeed with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks to anchor its discourses, policies and programmes.

The book itself is another product in this line of trail blazing. It deals with the core of Nigerian migration management: the issue of governance. One of the outstanding qualities of the book is its impressive and inclusive architecture: the division into integrated parts and chapters that recognize and address the geo-political structure and dynamics of Nigerian migration governance as well as the location of this within the global migration governance structure; the spread and distribution of the authors that recognize the excellence in the plurality of the Nigerian state. The quality of scholarship showcases the best of the Nigerian University System interfacing with state and non-state actors in the Nigerian migration field. Considering the continuous expansion of the contemporary humanitarian landscape which has included emerging and diverse issues such as migration, this book’s scope is limitless.

I congratulate and thank Nnamdi Azikiwe University for answering the call to bring the academia at the institutional level into the Nigerian migration discourse. I thank CMS-NAU my baby for making me proud in continuously blazing the trail. I thank the editors and contributors for this rare gift they are bequeathing to the Nigerian and indeed global migration management. I warmly welcome Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance and recommend it to all scholars, professionals, policy-makers, civil society organizations, friends and allies in the migration field.

Hadja Sadiya Umar Farouq

Honourable Minister

Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development

FOREWORD TO NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS AND GOVERNANCE

Esteemed Reader,

The topic of migration has undoubtedly taken a front seat in today’s global political discourse, as the recent adoption of two mobility-related global compacts – one on refugees and one on migration – has shown. Yet migration is by no means a recent phenomenon. Rather, it has been an important part of human history since its very beginning. People have always moved, be it from continent to continent, from country to country, or within the same country. Greatly influencing trade routes, cultures and civilizations, migration has played a crucial role in shaping the world we know today.

Over the past 20 years, the number of international migrants around the world has grown significantly, from roughly 170 million in 2000 to more than 270 million today. While this figure remains a small portion of the global population (3.5%), it does not include the millions of people who are displaced internally and yet already surpasses earlier projections made for the year 2050. As a result of globalization, migration has also become increasingly complex, manifesting itself in mixed population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic and other migrants whose motivations to travel are often diverse and overlapping.

While recent travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic have put a temporary halt to mobility worldwide, we have every reason to believe that migration movements will pick up strongly again once normality has been restored. Meanwhile, as the economic downturn caused by the pandemic is affecting people’s livelihoods around the world, many migrants find themselves among those most severely affected. This exacerbates their often already vulnerable state and increases their risk of falling victim to trafficking in persons or other types of harm.

All these dynamics underline the need for good migration governance. As Africa’s most populous nation and an important origin, transit and destination country of migrants, Nigeria is presented with numerous challenges, but also with many opportunities. Effective migration management seeks to prevent or at least minimize the negative sides of migration while at the same time enhancing its positive aspects and respecting migrants’ rights and dignity. Yet as migration often transcends national borders, none of these tasks can be effectively accomplished by one country alone.

This is why Nigeria and Switzerland decided ten years ago to establish a bilateral migration partnership. Based on mutual respect, trust, and friendship, this joint instrument reflects a comprehensive “win-win-win” approach to migration management that takes into account the interests of both countries as well as the interests of the migrants themselves. Over the past ten years, this partnership has allowed us to deepen our cooperation and mutual understanding by sharing competences and best practices in implementing migration management mechanisms, fighting trafficking in persons, protecting vulnerable migrants, preventing irregular migration, strengthening migration governance structures and national dialogue, facilitating return and reintegration, enabling sustainable labor migration, and promoting other forms of regular migration.

All these forms of cooperation have allowed our countries to better address the challenges and benefit from the opportunities that migration can present. In addition to all relevant federal authorities on both sides, our partnership also includes state governments, civil society organizations, private sector actors as well as international organizations whose expertise and insight have been crucial in implementing many of our migration-related cooperation projects.

While I am very pleased that the publication of the present book coincides with the celebration of the 10^th anniversary of the Nigerian-Swiss migration partnership, I am also convinced that it will be an indispensable contribution to the existing body of knowledge on key factors shaping migration dynamics in Nigeria as well as on the recent progresses, remaining challenges and future prospects of Nigerian migration governance.

The first-ever Africa Migration Report, whose recent publication has been co-funded by Switzerland, underlines the need to challenge some existing misconceptions around African migration. While many reports on African migration have so far focused on displacement and irregular migration, especially to Europe, recent findings indicate that a big majority of Africans thinking about migration have actually no interest in leaving the continent. Indeed, most African migrants are not crossing oceans but instead remain in Africa, with Eastern Africa and Western Africa each hosting around one third of them. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the situation can differ from country to country, depending on the local context.

Given that African migration remains to a big extent an African issue, it is clear that any sensible approach to regional migration governance needs to be essentially African, too. Consequently, African research on these issues has to be strengthened and voices from all over the continent – including Nigeria – need to be heard and taken into account. The establishment of Nigeria’s first University Centre for Migration Studies at Nnamdi Azikiwe University in 2018 marked an important step in amplifying African voices in the academic discourse. I am confident that the newly launched African Migration Studies (AMS) series, the first volume of which you are currently reading, will further strengthen the regional discourse on migration governance and provide relevant actors with pertinent insights to make well-informed decisions.

I hope you will enjoy reading this book, and I am already looking forward to the next volume of the African Migration Studies (AMS) series.

Georg Steiner

Ambassador of Switzerland to Nigeria, Niger, Libya and Chad

Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

PREFACE

Migration is a very complex phenomenon and a fundamentally important issue – more than ever since the dawn of this century. It has now become acknowledged as a significant aspect of international economic management as well as international trade relations, and security concerns.

Nigeria is a country of a variety of migration within, from and into the country. Migration, internal and international, is both pervasive and deep-rooted, fuelled by economic deterioration, poverty, conflicts, and social transformations, and recently, the phenomenon of globalisation. As several authors in this book succinctly indicate, any movement of persons is intertwined with a number of complex factors. As socio-economic situations deteriorate, many more Nigerians are migrating in irregular situations to relatively richer countries within, and increasingly outside, Africa. Trafficking in women and children within and outside the country signals a deepening structural crisis.

Migration is a highly complex process. In Nigeria, as elsewhere in Africa, emigration pressure is fuelled by unstable politics, ethno-religious conflicts, and rapidly growing populations with resulting increases in the labour force, persistent economic decline and environmental deterioration to shape the trends and patterns of internal and international migration, and population displacements.

Yet, in general, limited evidence-based data is collected systematically and regularly on migrants and migration patterns in the country. Thus, our knowledge about the trends and patterns of internal and international migration remains fluid and speculative.

Nigeria, Africa’s demographic and economic ‘giant’, is a country of a variety of migration configurations, including cross-border movements, labour migration, migration of highly skilled workers, irregular migration and human trafficking and internal population displacements. However, information on the stock and flows of Nigerians abroad is not available in statistical organizations within the country but rather in the destination countries than they are in Nigeria. These figures often underestimate the total stock as an unknown number reside in destination countries in irregular situation outside the purview of the Nigerian missions abroad.

This book - Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance - tackles in 15 chapters, and three parts, two salient aspects of migration architecture in Nigeria, namely its dynamics and its governance. The overarching aim is to articulate the various aspects of the governance processes, lessons learnt, challenges and prospects.

In Part 1 of the book, authors discuss the historical evolution and trends of migration as well as the current migratory configurations in each of the six geopolitical zones in the country.

The efforts of authors at historicising migration in various geopolitical regions is laudable, highlighting as it were the specificities and impact of local economy, culture and environment on shaping migration trends and patterns.

The authors in Part Two of the book focus principally on the drivers and networks of migration of Nigerians to America, Asia, Europe and other African countries, in effect, tracing contemporary evolution of the formation of Nigerians in the diaspora which crystallised into the umbrella Nigerians in the Diaspora Organisation NIDO-Europe, NIDO-Asia, NIDO-Americas and NIDO-Africa, headquartered in Nigeria Missions in the respective regions

The Migration Governance Framework, developed by IOM in 2015 offers ‘a concise view of an ideal approach that allows a state to determine what it might need to govern migration well and in a way that suits its circumstances.’ This is the focus of Part Three of the book that catalogues the principal actors in the country’s fledgling migration architecture through the series of national migration dialogues, the challenges encountered, pathways and prospects. The salient aspect that emerged centres on the need and the role of non state actors and academia in advancing the growth and improvements in migration governance regime of the three comprehensive migration policies – National Labour Migration Policy; National Migration Policy; and National Policy on Diaspora. This is also reflected in the structure of many chapters of the book that partners authors from academia and officials.

An innovative approach that assembles scholars from various disciplines centrally and tangentially engaged in migration studies and also pairing academia with officials and NGO practitioners greatly enriched the robustness of the narratives advanced in the book.

A variety of constituencies – students of migration and development studies, policy makers and practitioners, NGO migration and development actors, development partners and indeed anyone interested in Nigeria’s agenda – would find this book very useful.

Aderanti ADEPOJU

CHAPTER 1 - NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS: NORTH-CENTRAL PERSPECTIVE

Member Euginia George-Genyi

Introduction

Migration is considered a complex phenomenon, a fundamental aspect of the structural transformation of societies. This is more so in developing societies and the pattern differs substantially across regions and countries. Contemporary massive population movements in Africa have their roots in colonial imperialism with attendant economic, socio-cultural and political dimensions transformed the nature and character of the various pre-colonial social formations, and progressively fitted them to the dictates of metropolitan capitals. These phenomena became the harbinger of modern day expressions of contradictions and conflicts with attendant consequences on nation building in Africa. This does not negate the pre-colonial, historical and pre-historical accounts of migration of African people. However, the point being made is that the contemporary African migration (international and internal) is linked with the first encounters between Africa and the Western world. Massive migrations in Nigeria can be traced to the era of the slave trade, between 1400 and 1900. It is recorded that over 12million Africans were exported to Europe and America (1). Nigeria particularly lost about 2million forced labor migrants. Trade-related migration took place between Nigeria and other African countries especially Ghana. This chapter examines the migration patterns and dynamics in North-Central Nigeria. This will be done within the framework of some interrelated contexts; historical perspectives and conflicts, migrations and policy implications, migration and state response to the dynamics of conflict or indeed the general contradictions associated and arising from the phenomenon especially in North-Central Nigeria. The impact of these on the development problematic will be analyzed and remedial proposals advanced.

ii) Dynamics and Emerging Issues in Migration in North-Central Nigeria

The North-Central zone of Nigeria is made up of Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Niger states, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) (2). The region is located between latitudes 7⁰ 30” North and 11⁰ 15” North, and longitude 4⁰and 12⁰ East of Prime Meridian. The landmass covers an area of about 342,390km² or 37 percent of the total land area of Nigeria. The region is bounded in the East and West by the Republics of Cameroon and Benin and in the North and South by the Northern and Southern States of Nigeria. This region is also referred to as the Middle Belt and is an area with certain climatic and weather coherence, with two distinct ecological zones, the Savanna and Rain Forest zones.

The North-Central Nigeria is generally known for its endowments in human and natural resources. Despite a number of inter and intra-communal clashes leading to violent conflicts, the zone for years has enjoyed great degree of peace amongst its ethnic nationalities without serious frictions except in few circumstances, especially, from the 1990s, and particularly with the return to democratic rule in 1999 (3). Its endowment has attracted people from both the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria and people from outside the country as well. The states in the region have diverse population figures, as indicated below

Table 1: Population Distribution by States in North Central Nigeria (2006 population and 2016 projected figures)

State	Land Area Square Kilometre	Total Population		Density Person/Km
State	Land Area Square Kilometre	2006	2016	Density Person/Km
Benue	32,910	4,253,641	5,741,815	84
Niger	73,930	3,954,772	5,556,247	33
Kogi	32,440	3,314,043	4,473,490	66
Plateau	58,030	3,206,531	4,200,442	57
Kwara	37,700	2,365,353	3,192,893	41
Nasarawa	58,030	1,869,377	2,523,395	57
FCT	8,000	1,405,201	3,564,126	51

Sources: 2006 Census Figures. Nigeria National Population Commission. National Bureau of Statistics, Demographic Statistics Bulletin, 2017.

The average population of the region put at 50 persons/km is considered low given its huge endowment and this is explained by a combination of historical, environmental and socio-economic factors. The region has historically witnessed an avalanche of inter-group migrations due to conflicts during the 19^th and 20^th centuries. It is an area that enjoys plurality defined by socio-cultural and institutional diversities in terms of ethnic nationalities and religious plurality. These largely offer explanation for the susceptibility of the region to conflicts. North-Central Nigeria has been under pressure since colonial times as a consequence of the expansionist activities of the Sokoto Jihadists and this led to diverse populations settling in the area as could be seen in the presence and activities of Hausa traders, artisans, and displacements and migrations of people into different locations. The result has been contestations over land and other resources.

Generally, population movements in North-Central Nigeria have consequences on the relationship between the people, the frequency of conflicts, attendant displacements and the development of the area. The desire to appropriate arable land both for farming and grazing of livestock profoundly informs the movements of people in the area. A combination of inter-related variables such as population explosion, pressure to expand into sparsely populated areas, accounts for the conflicts and displacements that have occurred. Cases in point abound particularly in the Benue Valley where ethnic groups such as Tiv, Etulo, Jukum, Idoma, Alago, Bassa, have experienced conflicts with attendant consequences. These conflicts include Bassa-Egbuba conflicts in Toto, ethnic conflicts in Obi and Keana local governments in Nasarawa, the Tiv-Jukun crisis, Tiv-Igede conflicts (4). There has also been the political crisis over indigene-settler rights and political representation in Jos and these have caused displacements of people. In all of these, the human cost of the violence has been immense. Human Rights Watch (5) has reported that more than 220,000 people have been displaced since 2001. The bitter struggles between these groups over valued but limited land resources have been a major source of intergroup conflicts and displacements in the region (6). There have also been movements of people considered original inhabitants of the region within the states for farming and commercial/economic reasons.

Another feature of migration dynamics in North-Central Nigeria is the economic factor. This is a major source of population movement into and within the region. There is an explosion of what could be termed economic migrants from other parts of Nigeria into the North-Central zone. There are migrants of largely Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa ethnic extractions whose presence in this area dates back to the pre-colonial times and they have their hold on both formal and informal sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, they are usually targets of attacks in moments of conflicts as can be seen in the major inter-ethnic conflicts that occurred in Jos town, Makurdi, Gboko, Lafia, Lokoja and even the FCT (7).

Another dimension of migration in the North-Central is environmental/climatic changes. This involves changes in the ecology of the area and the implications arising therefrom especially for pastoralists and farmers. While in search of pastures, farmers’ lands and crops have been destroyed by the pastoralists. They both compete for wetland areas and often disagreements and conflicts may occur. The often prolonged nature of these conflicts affects hitherto existing patterns of inter-group relations and the people’s relationship with their environment. It is to be noted that transhumance pastoralism is a dominant livestock production system where cattle herders seek to overcome the constraints of the dry seasons by seasonal and cyclical movements of varying degrees between complementary ecological areas (8). This movement is usually from the Northern part of the country to the wetlands in the South.

The manipulations of self-seeking elites have also contributed to population movements especially during elections. In their attempts to remain relevant, they usually fan embers of discord amongst the people and often disrupt the political process, thus engineering crisis that end up in the loss of lives and destruction of property. The vulnerabilities of the people have been greatly exploited by these elites. It is much the same way that they generate chieftaincy squabbles leading to very violent conflagrations. Posing as opinion leaders and the peoples’ advocates, these elites have been responsible even largely for the prevalence of communal conflicts (9) by fanning the embers of sectionalism as well as chieftaincy disputes in parts of North-Central Nigeria, as a consequence of the contradictions between traditionalism and modernism. The long-held cultural and religious values relating to leadership recruitment are often overcome by new styles that turn to negate and affect just order and stability of the society.

Another specific characteristic of migration pattern in North-Central Nigeria is the increasing numbers of women, children and youth involved in the process. Generally, migrations have been conceptualized to be an adult male activity. In traditional African setting, men moved around in search of means of sustenance while the women stayed at home with their children. Marriage was largely the only thing that took women out of places of origin to new abodes. Experiences not just in North-Central Nigeria but in Nigeria generally are indicative of the fact that the emerging migratory tendencies of these category of people have been informed by the harsh economic realities in Nigeria especially from the mid-1980s with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the attendant economic crisis and hardships (10). Women for instance have steadily moved in search of economic opportunities not just in the agrarian areas but in cities such as the FCT, state capitals and economically vibrant towns. Their resources have supplemented family incomes.

With the establishment of tertiary institutions by the Federal Government of Nigeria in states such as Nasarawa, Kogi, Benue and Kwara, young people with educational qualifications have moved in search of employment and admissions. Another dimension to this is the explosion of other categories of female migrants in the major cities engaging in prostitution and sometimes involving themselves in drugs and child trafficking. This has been explained as fallouts of the Nigerian state’s inability to provide employment opportunities for its citizens particularly in the rural areas and the general crisis in the Nigerian economy and state (11).

As stated earlier, the youth constitute a huge number of migrants both within and outside of Nigeria. A survey by the National Population Commission (12), indicates that migrants and return migrants fall within a youthful age structure of 10-34 years. Those with no formal education rank 27%, primary school leavers (21-3%) and those with postgraduate qualification (0.6%). The FCT along other states rank highest in terms of volume of migration and Plateau state particularly has a great number, 62% of female migrants. The FCT has 75% male return migrants. Generally, the NPC (13) report shows that the North-Central region essentially does have a large number of return migrants. Ikwuyatum (14) corroborates that the North-Central region has become hot bed of migration due to the presence of natural resources, mining opportunities in Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue, Kogi and the administrative function of the FCT and tertiary institutions in the zone.

Generally, therefore, migration dynamics in the North-Central region of Nigeria are characterized largely, and are a product of the contradictions of a non-productive capitalist state that is hugely incapable of addressing the developmental concerns of the people of the region. The state lacks the capacity to protect the people from the push and pull factors and over time these factors have acted as catalyst for population movements. Nevertheless, it is important to capture that migration has been constitutive part of the development of the North-Central zones owing to the contribution of migrants’ population to the socio-economic and cultural development of the states. Migration provides the labour in the agricultural activities and other services of the zones.

An interview with Okpeh Okpeh and others (15) shows that historically conflicts have been the main reason for peoples’ movement and contestations over economic values such as land and better opportunities. Over time religion and ethnicity especially from the 1990s caused the migration of people from Bauchi and Maiduguri into the Middle Belt thus over populating places like Jos, and later Nasarawa communities. This has implications for settlement patterns as Jos North for instance became predominantly Muslim and other areas such as Anglo-Jos, Rayfield are basically Christian. Nasarawa State is largely dominated by Muslims coming from the North-Eastern states who are in the majority and a Christian population that feels threatened by them.

In Benue State the settlement pattern arising from migration is characterized by the overwhelming presence of the indigenes, but there is a settler population in designated areas such as Wadata and some parts of North Bank in Makurdi, Hausawa, (areas occupied by the Hausas in these towns), Gboko and Oturkpo, Katsina-Ala and other towns. In all of these, very often peace is complicated and social relations are cast within the context of contestations. Population movements thus add to the already existing development crisis and become an albatross (16).

Criminal activities such as armed robbery, kidnapping and general insecurity are prevalent. The Boko Haram crisis, farmers/herders conflagration have caused forced migration and the presence of internally displaced people (IDPs) in almost all the states within the North-Central region including the FCT. This has impacted on social relations and available social amenities. The people caught up in the IDP camps live in conditions of lack, disease and insecurity and are largely neglected by the government (16).

As an administrative centre of the nation, the FCT is clearly an attraction to huge population movements because of its urbanized nature and its beauty as opposed to the rural areas with lack of basic amenities. The settlement pattern here is that huge populations reside at the periphery of the city defined by squalor, poverty and underdevelopment. This is the character of dependent capitalist systems where there is a co-existence of two social systems with the powerful few residing in modern urbanized areas and a deliberate design to maintain a rural subset characterized by lawlessness, noise and air pollution and squalor and general underdevelopment. This is the story of the urban FCT and the peripheries such as Nyanya, Karimo, Gwagwalada, Idu, Bwari, Karu and a lot of others.

According to the National Population Commission of Nigeria (NPC) (19), the population of the FCT is 3,564,126. The city of Abuja for instance has a population of 776,298 by the 2006 population census. The FCT consists of 6 different Area Councils namely: Abaji, Abuja Municipal, Bwari, Gwagwalada , Kuje and Kwali. Abuja is alleged to be one of the fastest growing cities in the world with high boroughs or districts such as Asokoro, Maitama, Wuse, Garki, Apo, Gwarimpa and Jabi. These are choice places characterized by modernity. They have fine infrastructural facilities and indeed are a definition of a class divided society with an estimated population of 1,967, 500 (20).

On the other hand, the rural and semi-urban areas and other satellite towns such as Kuje (97,233), Kwali (86,174), Bwari (229,274), Kubwa (776,298), Nyanya (186,399), Gwagwalada (158,618), Karu (2,000,000), one of the local governments in Nasarawa state stretching into the FCT, and Idu (168,359) present a picture of neglect and squalor. Olawale Ajinotokan (21) states that Nyanya and such other areas are downtrodden from years of neglect and lack of basic infrastructure. A sprawling cobweb of rusty and decrepit low-cost quarters. In 2014 scores of people were killed here as a result of the Boko Haram terrorist bombing. These areas have a population that is largely middle and low class workforce who can’t afford high cost of accommodation inside Abuja. They have low standard of living and there is the visible presence of infrastructural decay.

The character of migration in Kwara state is typically rural-urban largely informed by the desire of the rural dwellers for greener pastures in the urban areas. Migration becomes a survival strategy utilized by many for perceived or real opportunity in addressing the rural-urban inequality in wealth and infrastructure (22).

In much the same vein, migration dynamics in Niger state is characteristic of population movements from disadvantaged areas especially rural areas where poverty, inadequate income and absence of basic necessities make life and living burdensome (23). Land remains a crucial factor in explaining migration in Niger state. There is the influx of others into Niger state like the Gobirawa from Sokoto, the Tiv people from Benue, the Yoruba from neighboring Kogi state and so on to the rural areas of Niger for farming and hunting activities. These people live side by side with the rural indigenous population and sometimes resentments and conflicts may occur. The proximity to Abuja, the FCT has necessitated movements into the area especially in the peripheries. These migrants make remittances to their kith and kin back home and this is used in acquiring additional land for cultivation (24). Management of relations in these communities by the traditional institutions and civil authority has led to relative peaceful settlement and integration.

Migration dynamics of the North-Central zone also cover the emigration of the citizens of the zone to other parts of the country and outside Nigeria. Apart from extensive intra-zonal migration, a number of people in the zone migrate into other zones of the country in pursuit of better life. Among those involved in the inter-zonal migration include civil servants whose appointments take them to other states of the country. Others move for businesses, education and family unifications. There is also an increase in domestic workers’ migration from this zone to other parts of the country. Traffickers are beginning to exploit this reality of domestic workers’ migration to engage in trafficking of children and exploitation of vulnerable group like women and the uneducated. Children from this zone especially from Benue, are trafficked into child labour in quarries, mining and farm works in the South-west. North-central zone also presents a significant population of the Nigerian migrants outside Nigeria.

iii) Migration Governance Efforts in North-Central:

The difficulty of the Nigerian state in coordinating the central and state structures and institutions to address migration challenges is expressed in the fall outs arising in the different regions in Nigeria but particularly in the North-Central. In the various states of the region, ad hoc arrangements are usually made only when conflict has erupted, and this is hardly sustained by the governments. Kwaku Arhin-Sam (25) observes that some states are directly active in governance (Edo, Borno, Adamawa, Lagos, Yobe) while others address migration issues indirectly.

In the wake of the farmers/herders conflicts in Benue State, the government for instance, passed into law, the Benue Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017 (26), which has been described by many as a politically expedient move and a good response to pressures from civil society. As elections approached, the government rode on this development to secure support from the electorates. Efforts have not been made to build on this law maybe because of lack of political will so that this could be replicated elsewhere in Nigeria. There still exist conflicts in these areas between the herders and farmers and the IDP Camps are still alive with huge populations of people who can’t even visit their ancestral homes. This is the general situation in most of the states in the North-Central region.

In Plateau State there has been a call for multi-sectorial response to ending violence against children and women as a product of a survey conducted in 2014 by US Center for Disease Control and Prevention, USAID, Together for Girls Group, UNICEF and UNWomen. The survey raised implications for prevention and response strategies and programming for children and women based on all kinds of conflicts including migration induced conflicts. Early in year 2020, the Northern Governors Forum resolved to abolish the almajiris in the region and this was captured in their press releases but there has been no concrete policy or action to that effect. States in the North-Central have signed the Child Rights Law as well as State Action Plan on women, peace and security but no specifics around migration in terms of addressing issues relating to it.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, we note that the process of incorporating Nigeria into the global capitalist system by colonialism created the objective conditions for the social and economic inequality between groups, regions and peoples and consequently sparked off the modern wave of inter-groups migrations and relations that are often conflictual. This is coupled with the increasing inequalities in production and distribution of societal resources: resource allocation, socio-economic opportunities, rural-urban developmental realities, development disparities between regions and places. This reality is exacerbated by natural disasters such as famine, desertification, floods, earthquake, drought, and political instability, conflicts, human trafficking and war. These are the driving forces, the push factors of migration generally, but specifically in the North-Central zone of Nigeria.

The Nigerian State needs to address migrations dynamics as typically a development concern that it truly is. This requires concrete policies that should address the push and pull factors of migration. Clearly, migration has effect on individual well-being and state welfare, as such it should be incorporated into national developmental strategies as well as regional development plans. This requires evidence-based policy making approach such as data on migratory trends and migration characteristics, and information on how migration impacts various socio-economic and environmental factors. Migration governance requires that government strengthens the structures that protect the human, civil and economic rights of its citizens and the strategy remains to address policy coherence and synergy among the ministries, departments and agencies (MDAS) saddled with migration-related issues in the country.

Migrations within the North-Central zone are informed by economic factors, conflicts and natural disasters. The governments of the states within the region need to address issues of unemployment, inter-group relations, identity conflicts, environmental crises, poverty and underdevelopment. These largely are the push and pull factors of migration in the region. There should be conscious efforts to have a census of migrants in the states to ensure that this is incorporated in the development agenda of such states and that such amenities as health, security, accommodation, education and other social services are provided for the people.

End notes

Falola, T. and Afolabi, N. “Introduction: Migration Fantasies, Nightmarish Realities”. The Human Cost of African Migrations’. African Studies History, Politics, Economics and Culture, Routledge, NY, 2007.
Okpeh O. , “Inter-group migrations, conflicts, and displacements in central Nigeria”. in Population movements, conflicts, and Displacements in Nigeria Falola, T. & Okpeh, O. O. Jr (Eds.) Africa World Press, Asmara, Eritrea, 2008.
Ayantunde A. “Environment, Development and Sustainability” 2014, https://r.search./Link.Springer.com (accessed November 2020)
IOM Nigeria. Displacement Tracking Matrix North Central and North West Zones (DTM Round, 2 October 2019) https://r.search./reliefweb.int (accessed November 2020).
Human Rights Watch (HRW), “A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, November, 8, 2011 pp1-2
Okpeh O. Jr, Ukase P., Kwaja C. and -Genyi G. in an in depth interview revealed the history, dynamics and changing patterns of migration in Nigeria and the North-Central region particularly. They indicated that deliberate policy formulation and implementation is required on the part of government to address that fundamental push-pull factors of migration and the development problematic generally, July 25, 2020.
Abdulbarkindo A. & Alupse B. “Migration and violent conflict in Divided Societies. Non-Boko Haram Violence against clashes in the Middle-belt Region of Nigeria. A publication of World Watch Research, Open Doors International, Netherlands, 2015.
Okpeh O. Jr “Inter-group migrations, conflicts, and displacements in central Nigeria”.
Ikwuyatum, G. O. “The Pattern and Characteristics of Inter and Intra-Regional Migration in Nigeria”. In International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 6 (7), July 2016.
Adepoju, A. “Migration and Social Policy in sub-Saharan Africa”, A paper prepared for the UNRISD-IOM-IFS project on social policy and migration in developing countries, February, 2008.
National Population Commission, (NPC) “Internal Migration Survey in Nigeria”, 202.
National Population Commission
Ikwuyatum “The Pattern and Characteristics of Inter and Intra-Regional Migration in Nigeria”, p. 119.
Okpeh O. J Inter-group migrations, conflict, and displacement in central Nigeria.
Abagen, F. “Diffusing Ethno-Religious conflicts: An Analysis of Nigeria’s Ethno-Religious Conflicts and its Resolution”. In North Central Journal of Political and Societal Studies (NCJPS) 1 (1) February (n. d.)
Olawale A. , “Nyanya-Abuja Neglected Slum” in ThisDaylive, 1^st August, (2016) https://thisdaylive.com (accessed November 2020).
Yakubu D. Osinbajo’s Benue Visit – https://www.vanguardngr.com, 2008, (accessed November 2020)
NPC,
Olawale A. “Nyanya-Abuja Neglected Slum”
NPC, 2020
Ajibade T.B, Ajibade, E.T. Ojoko, E.A. Salami, MF Ekundayo, B. V. “Assessment of Migrants’ Remittances among Farming Households in Kwara State in FUDMA Journal of Agriculture and Agricultural Technology 4. (No.1) June, 2018 pp. 1-10.
Muhammad M. G. The Formation of Migrant Communities in Nigeria: A Study of Gobirawa Settlements in Niger State, Nigeria in European Scientific Journal. January, 2014.
Muhammad M. G.
Kwaku A., “The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Nigeria, Arnold-Bergstraesser Institute, Germany Freiburg, 2019.
Adepoju, “Migration and Socila Policy in sub-Saharan Africa”.
The Nigeria Lawyer, The Open Grazing Prohibition Law, May, 2017, https://www.thenigerialawyer.com (accessed November 2020)

Key Informant Interviewees

Okpeh O. Okpeh, Jr. –Historian specialist in inter-group relations
Chris Kwaja-Lawyer and Researcher
George Genyi-Political Scientist and specialist in minority studies
Patrick Ukase-Economic Historian

CHAPTER 2 - NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS: NORTH-EAST PERSPECTIVE

Yusuf Yahaya & Chigozie Nebeife

Introduction

Generally, movement of people from one location to another seems to have become a common phenomenon with regards to relationship within and between most groups and societies across Nigeria. The inherent scarcity of natural resources and quest for survival evident in most Northern Nigeria and particularly in the North-East geopolitical zone tends to have resulted in increase in migration. For instance, the North-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria which comprises of the states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe has experienced rampant insecurity due to series of mind-boggling and unthinkable bloodshed where hundreds of innocent rural dwellers lost their lives to avoidable violent conflicts, insurgency and banditry.[i] Awojobi observed that as at 2014, a total number of 1,934,765 have been forced to migrate from one place to another as a consequence of insurgency in the North Eastern states of Borno, Yobe, Taraba, Gombe, Bauchi and Adamawa states.[ii]

The United Nations report, (2010) noted that conflicts, persecution, human rights violation, and inequality inherent in the North-East Nigeria force people to leave their homes and families with the hope to improve their quality of life.[iii] Since the last decade, North-East Nigeria has been ravaged by all manners of unrest ranging from insurgency, kidnapping for ransom, farmers/herdsmen conflicts, communal conflicts and most recently, banditry. These and many more have made most residents especially those at the remote villages and communities to be left with the only option of migrating to a safer location.

There are indications that the movement of migrants from conflicts-ridden states to the relatively peaceful states result in increase in manpower in these states thereby contributing to agricultural production in the receiving states. This has boosted the economy of the host states. On the other hand, the influx of migrants has led to the overstretching of social amenities, increase in crime and population explosion. However, while the migrants are seeking safe-havens, the host population view such movements as an attempt to dispossess them of their sources of livelihood. In other words, migration in the North-east has both negative and positive consequences and perceptions notwithstanding its causes.

It should be noted however that insecurity created by the conflict between Boko Haram insurgents and government forces remains the major trigger of migration in the North East.[iv] There are also instances where the decision to migrate was a function of other factors such as marriage, educational pursuit, employment, land ownership, the socioeconomic status of the migrants, access to water and land, and wealth. This implies that it was possible for people to live with conflict if they were still able to practice farming or if they had additional sources of income such as small businesses and the decision to migrate was only taken when the practice of such activities was no longer possible and they had nothing to hold on to. As such, migration of people in the North-East, which was supposed to foster integration and development seems to have become the source of worry to all stakeholders.[v]

It is in view of the above that this chapter examines the trajectory and current status of migration dynamics of the North-East. It also pinpoints the major factors causing and affecting migration in the North-East. The chapter looks at the dynamics of gender, children, environment, regular and irregular migration, voluntary and involuntary and other emerging issues in migration while x-raying the nature and characteristics of migration in the North-East geopolitical zone.

The history, development and current status of migration in the North-East

Migration in the north-eastern part of Nigeria can be traced to centuries before the 19th century, prior to the partitioning of Africa, when most of the ethnic groups currently located in Nigeria’s neighbouring francophone countries migrated from the old Borno Empire. Migration in the North-East was essentially determined by the quest for territory, that is, people moving to secure land of their own or for identity.[vi] For example, the Idoma speaking people of the middle belt of Nigeria (presently in the North-Central zone) were said to have migrated from the Kwararafa kingdom in north eastern part of Nigeria between 1535 and 1745 in two phases to their current locations in Benue and Nassarawa States and to the Northern part (Ogoja) of the Cross River State.[vii] The people were said to have acquired their main cultural feature (agrarian) from their interaction with other ethnic groups during the migration process.

Thus, the North-East geopolitical zone has migration pattern which shows that the speakers of Chadian languages in the south inhabiting the upper Benue confluence were from the Lake Chad area in the north. Trade in agricultural products like cereals, livestock, sodium, antimony, salt etc. made the various communities within the zone dependent on each other. Bauchi, Gombe, Fombina and Muri emirates shared the Sokoto Caliphate heritage while up north the Borno Empire occupied the areas of Kanuri, Shuwa and Bedde.

The economic relation seems to be of great significance among the peoples of the North-East Nigeria and thus constitutes a trigger for migration. Also insecurity resulting from communal clashes, Boko Haram attacks and banditry occasioned a new wave of migration in the geopolitical zone. For instance, clashes between the Nigerian military and Boko Haram in December 2018 and January 2019 in the town of Rann, eight kilometres from the border with Cameroon, forced around 40,000 people to flee across the border.8

Nature and characteristics of migration in the North-East geopolitical zone

The nature and characteristics of migration in the North-East exhibit some peculiar trends that indicate major causes of migration in the zone. Some of the fundamental factors are economic differentials, internal political crisis and insecurity. It is crucial to note that migration in North-East Nigeria seems to be mainly rural to urban because urban areas enjoy undue advantages in security, social amenities and infrastructures. These often translate to more job opportunities, clean water, better health care, schools and other social goods in the urban areas than the rural areas.

By extension, the key factors determining migration patterns in North-East Nigeria revolve around access to information, livestock farming, farmland size, quest for better living conditions and household and individual characteristics, insecurity including intra-village conflicts and insurgencies/counterinsurgencies. Let us take brief look at some of these factors and migration patterns:

Livestock farming: This has to do with migratory trends of herders who migrate to the south during the dry season for pastures of their livestock and return to the north during the rainy season. This migration pattern is seasonal and is otherwise known as transhumance.

Farmland Size: When the size of a farmer’s land is not commensurate to the size of his family, the farmer more often than not is encouraged to migrate to areas where there is adequate land to ensure the livelihood and sustenance of his family.

Household and Individual characteristics: This includes age, sex, family size, etc. These are dominant factors for rural to urban migration. Youths that fall into the age bracket of 20-35 (sometimes 40) are more predisposed to venture out due to pull and push factors of migration.

The foregoing tends to suggest that the trend of migration in the North-East is also influenced by social, cultural and economic factors due to search for better wages, education, political and social stability, better technologies, employment and business opportunities.

Insecurity: Currently, the dominant push factor for migration in the North-East is insecurity as occasioned by incessant land-related inter-village or communal conflicts. This is exacerbated by the Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and the farmers-herders conflicts particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.

The North-East has been ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency since 2009. At least 34,000 people have been killed in attacks and counterinsurgency operations in the region; more than 1.9 million people were internally displaced as at January, 2019, and over 230,000 have fled across the borders to Cameroon, Chad and Republic of Niger.[viii]Women and children are usually the primary victims of Boko Haram attacks. The Chibok girls for example were abducted and allegedly married to members of the sect.

This suggests that after the emergence of Boko Haram sect in the North-East Nigeria, the number of migrants has rapidly increased due to the frequent attacks by the sect. These attacks have forced people to move from their place of residence to other areas for security and better life.

Apart from the Boko Haram insurgents, there are also pockets of communal clashes in parts of Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba states which have forced many people to migrate from their homes to take up temporary accommodation in IDP camps and neighboring states. The trends of migration in the various states of the North-East are very similar though with different causative factors and outcomes.

Brief discussion of migration characteristics in the states of North-East follows:

Adamawa: In Adamawa state, an estimated 152,000 (approximately 7,000 households) have been forced to migrate from their homes due to insecurity caused by Boko Haram insurgency and counterinsurgence.[ix] The most affected areas are Michika, Mubi, Mahai, Gombi and other Local Government Areas. The invasion of Tipto, Kisa, Samne, Bangi, Wurke and Gure communities in Lamurde local government area of Adamawa State by herdsmen armed with guns left unconfirmed number of dead and injured persons with over 2,000 rendered homeless due to the destruction of villages by the herdsmen. Apart from insecurity, the quest for better living condition, redeployments of civil servants and educational pursuit have also contributed to the trend of migration in Adamawa state. The major commercial cities of Adamawa state such as Mubi, Jemeta, Yola, have attracted a good number of traders from other parts of the country and the neigbouring countries. Invariably, the insecurity in the state is adversely affecting businesses and the migrants in these areas as many have left to other locations outside the state.

Bauchi: The drivers of migration in Bauchi are similar to those in the neighbouring states of the North-East zone. The state experiences high rate of poverty, unemployment and infant mortality. Bauchi has experienced overall moderate levels of violence, primarily involving Boko Haram militants. These factors have led to displacement and exodus of people particularly from Katagum, Bauchi, Misau, Danbam and Alkaleri LGAs.

Ethno-religious conflicts and inter-communal clashes fuel migration in Bauchi state. On the other hand, some individuals migrate for good in search of personal development, economic wellbeing and safety. As in other states of the zone, women and children suffer most during conflicts that orchestrate migration in Bauchi.

Borno: In Borno state, the sense of insecurity created by the activities of Boko Haram or the counter insurgency by state military forces was the main push factor for migration.[x] However, the responses of communities to the crisis differ. Consequently, the decision to migrate was taken at different stages by different communities. In Marte, Monguno, Guzamala, and Nganzai, this decision was taken very early into the conflict, or before the communities were affected by the conflict. In Gwoza, people stayed longer in the community despite the state of insecurity created by Boko-Haram. This suggests that people from Gwoza being economically stronger resisted the insecurity caused by the insurgency of Boko Haram longer than communities in Guzamala, Nganzai, Marte, and Monguno. Borno state is in the grip of a conflict-driven humanitarian crisis and civilians are caught in the middle.

The conflict continues to displace and re-displace people across the state and into neighbouring countries and hundreds of thousands of people remain entirely dependent on humanitarian aid for survival, both in the state capital, Maiduguri, and in isolated enclaves in the countryside controlled by the military. People are now stranded in these places with little prospect of returning home as long as the conflict continues.[xi]

Gombe: In Gombe state, the effects of migration are prominent in Dadiya and Maitukun communities, Bambam Local Government where about 3,000 IDPs have been forced to migrate for safety. Some of the persons that migrated into Gombe state have made all efforts to return to their communities, their attempts towards restoration of their normal life and farming have suffered setback due to continued insecurity. Most young people have migrated to other places for better opportunities. Also, the Maitatsine movement contributed to the spate of migration in Gombe. This resulted in economic hardship, insecurity and unemployment.

Taraba: The major cause of migration in the state is the communal conflicts involving the Tiv/Jukun, Chamba/Kuteb, as well as Herders/Farmers clashes. Also, Mambilla/Fulani violent clashes resulted in forced migration of people in Taraba state. The State is dominated by tribal crises arising from land disputes, conflict between nomadic and farming communities, and chieftaincy issues. Criminal violence is also common, as is political violence.[xii] In other words, Taraba has witnessed high levels of armed violence in Wukari, Takum, Ibi, Gassol, Lau, Ussa, Donga and Sarduana LGAs. As a result, over 1,000 people have been forced to migrate from their original settlements to presumably safer environments. Apart from the ravaging insecurity, there is high unemployment, particularly among the youths in Taraba state, making them prone to migration.[xiii]On the other hand, the establishment of Federal University Wukari in 2011 triggered another wave of migration of people to Taraba and Wukari in particular. These include staff and students of the University as well as vendors and contractors.

Yobe: Yobe State is located in the tropic with definite wet and dry seasons. The menace of insurgency and Fulani herdsmen and farmers’ conflicts have remained the most predominately driver of migration in Yobe state. The displaced population, returnees and vulnerable segments of the host communities are the people most in need of life-saving assistance in Yobe.

There are currently 131,597 IDPs and 165,155 returnees in Yobe State.[xiv] The trend in migration shows continued increase with new arrivals fleeing conflict-affected areas. There was an increase of about 3,740 displacements into Yobe State, and 19,245 returnees to their respective areas of origin within the State in the reporting period due to the relatively calm security environment.[xv] The return areas include Damaturu, Geidam, Gulani, Gujba, Yunusari and Yusufari LGAs. It is worth noting that as movements have been spontaneous, the stability of the people is hampered. Most of the Fulani herdsmen do not own or possess the rights to land; they therefore depend absolutely on open land to feed their cattle. This results to recycled migration. Additionally, the newly established Federal University at Yobe has contributed to recent surge in migration to Yobe state.

On the over all, observations indicate that most people that are involved in migration are most times confronted with serious challenges especially upon return because they have lost the connections they once had in the area they are returning to.[xvi] These challenges may arise majorly from the need to adjust to the new environment that they left earlier.

The security situation in the North-East has necessitated the need for both farmers and traders to be armed with the relevant information to enable them know areas that are safe for human movement and interaction. Mobile communications in these areas are at an all-time low with service providers unable to render service. Consequently, farmers/traders usually migrate in droves to access information in neigbouring towns on when it is safe for them to return to their farmlands as it is prerequisite to their survival.

The migration dynamics of the North-East geopolitical zone and other emerging issues

Migration in the North-East manifests in different dimensions. Females and children tend to be more vulnerable than the male adults. There is a tendency to view women as victims of migration, especially in relation to human trafficking which is something highly abominable in the terrain.[xvii] In the North-East the tactics take different dimensions as women are active participants in migration for economic reasons, especially labour migration. More so, children are affected by migration in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria when they are left behind by one or both migrating parents, migrating with parents (or born abroad), or migrating alone.[xviii] There are also a lot of cases of unaccompanied and separated migrant children within the various communities as a result of conflict induced migration in the North-East. Due to Boko Haram insurgency, about 32,000 children were reported unaccompanied or separated from their legal custodian. Following UNICEF intense advocacy Nigerian military secured a successful release and return of 1,588 children (962 boys and 626 girls) between September 2016 and December 2018.[xix]The unaccompanied migrant children and the almajiri phenomenon to which the zone contributes add to the over 750,000 stateless children found in West Africa.[xx]

Migration is selective, that is, not everyone has the opportunity, resources, and will to embark on migration. Migrants are noted to be mostly young, within the age of 25-34 years and the gender dichotomy shows that males engage more in migration than females. Among the factors that affect the migration selection will be the challenges of adjusting to the new environment. Moreover, environmental factors such as drought, desertification and erosion in several parts of Africa have been identified as causes of out-migration. North-East is the geopolitical zone of Nigeria much within the Lake basin. With Lake Chad losing 90% of its water since 1963, worsening situations of climate change negatively impact food security and livelihood in the region. This worsening situation of the Lake Chad region and rising desertification of the Sahara region has forced the migration of the pastoralists southward in an unprecedented manner.[xxi]

The impact of migration on children and adolescents manifests in the context of poverty and conflict, and within the perspectives of vulnerability and resilience, gender relations and children’s rights. In Nigeria in general, the youth face a number of challenges that make them soft targets for forced migration. Among these problems are inadequate access to quality education, inadequate access to basic amenities, inadequate parental care, family disintegration, poverty, moral decadence in society, lack of appropriate role models, unemployment and underemployment, religious and cult fanaticism, and political manipulation. Most of these are more prevalent in the North-East.

An increasing number of children, adolescents and youths are migrating independent of their parents, while some migrate with the consent of their parents or guardians. A good number of them migrate irregularly. This situation may worsen unless concerted efforts are made to educate youths about the dangers and risks involved in irregular external migration and in internal migration to urban areas, where living conditions are often worse than in the rural areas they initially fled from.

The growing number of irregular migrants from North East Nigeria is fuelled by a large pool of unemployed youth, poverty, and distorted information on labour market conditions in the destination countries.[xxii] This trend is reinforced by the increasing professionalism of traffickers and bogus travel intermediaries, with scams and promises of passage to greener pastures.

Effects of Migration in the North-East Nigeria

One of the social consequences of migration is the depopulation of the home community. With respect to the host community, the consequences range from overpopulation, over stretching of social amenities, increase in crime rates, cultural pollution, and increased social tension in the form of political, ethnic and sub-ethnic conflicts. For instance, when migrants stay for extended periods they become more assertive of their economic, political, and social rights which may evoke a reaction from the host community.

Migration induces adjustments in the places of origin, transit and destination. These adjustments could be positive or negative as in encouraging more flow from the area of origin or conflicts between the migrants and the host community. In other words, Migration in the North-East Nigeria has both positive and negative effects on the people and the facilities in the area.

There are indications that migrants from states experiencing conflicts to other states in the north east that enjoy relative peace has resulted to an increase in manpower in these states which in turn contributes positively to agricultural production. This has boosted the economy of the host states. On the other hand, the influx of migrants has led to overstretching of social amenities, increase in crime and population explosion.

The overall impact associated with migration peculiarities of the North-East underscoring both challenges and benefits are captured in the table 1.1 below:

Table 1.1: Migration issues and challenges in the North-East

Migration Issues	Challenges	Benefits
Insecurity:-Conflict caused by ethnic, inter-tribal and communal clashes, religious, farmer headers, insurgency and kidnapping.	Displacement from areas of original abode, movement across the borders (Cameroon, Chad and Niger)	Education for children, vocational skill acquisition, Pipe bone water provided by the Cameroon government in Marwa.
Climate change: Natural Disaster, Floods, Drought, Fire outbreaks. Health Issues (Lassa fever, cholera).	Displacement, loss of property.	Durable solutions presented to start a new settlement by the victim gives a sense of security and starting a new life.
Economic factors:-Search of fertile soil, Fishing and Trading.	Over population of the destination State and over stretching of facilities provided by the government of the State.	Boost food production to feed the state and for trading and possible export.
Social Factors:-Urbanization, Marriage and Political	In search of white collar jobs and other social amenities lacking in the area of abode.	City living, electricity, People living in the village are thought urban way of life style. The politician needs to belong to his locality by participating in local policies and understanding their problems.
Border Management	No enough Officers and operational materials for offices of NIS to adequately perform their job and Manage the border post.	Movement of people in and out of towns where the borders is located. Free trade and transaction.
Movement of people as a result of insurgency	Affects the cost of living and inflates rent and makes it expensive and unfavorable	Brought in NGO different field who come to render help to the affected people.

Source: Authors’ compilation from – Capacity building training of North-East state and non-state actors involved in migration issues on “Migration Policy Development and Implementation,” organized by IOM and NCFRMI, under EU-IOM Initiative for Migrants Protection and Reintegration,” Gombe, 4-6, December 2020.

Conclusion

The intensification of attacks by armed groups in North-East Nigeria since 2015 has resulted in prolonged insecurity, exacerbating the plight of vulnerable civilians, and triggered waves of migration. This captures clearly the scenario in Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe, situation in which people are forced to move from their land to other places within Nigeria and even to other countries such as Niger, Cameroon and Chad due to the rampage of Boko Haram attacks. It is indicative that social conflict could be an immediate cause of migration. Thus in the North-East Nigeria, unfavorable conditions in rural areas tend to ‘push’ people away from their original place of living towards favorable conditions that ‘pull’ them into new places of residence with better living conditions.

In the North-East geopolitical zone, people migrate from one place to another because of insecurity that has bedevilled the area. There is no denial of the fact that insecurity causes more social unrest than other unfavourable factors in the geopolitical zone. This has affected mostly children, women and the vulnerable ones. Some were kidnapped, others especially women were held hostage and forced into marriage. Others were forcefully converted to the religious belief of the abductors. Those who refused to change their faith were either killed or held as prisoners of war. Children were made orphans because their parents were killed. There has been cross border migration to the Sahel regions due to Boko Haram activities and refugee returnees.

Implicitly, conflict and the resulting insecurity appear to be the main push factors for displacement in the region, either directly through the threat it poses to human lives and the recorded death tolls, or indirectly through the forced secession of economic activities.

However, migration has also improved, in some respects, the livelihood of the migrants in the River Benue Basin, Nigeria. It is recommended that policy makers should put measures in place to maximize the positive impacts of internal migration in the North-East Nigeria. The government should formulate policies that will ensure security of lives and property, enhance rural and urban development and reduce poverty. This will help to maximize the benefits of migration while minimizing the negative outcomes.

[i] Adeyemi, B. O. (2013). Internal Migration in Nigeria: A positive contribution to human development. Implemented by IOM and with the Financial Support of Switzerland.

[ii]Awojobi. N.O. (2014). The Socio-Economic Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in the

North-East of Nigeria. International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research. vol. 11 no 1

[iii]United Nations (2010). Report on International Migration. United Nations Population Division. New York.

[iv]Sydney. C. and Onwuemele. A. (2019). “Once The Road Is Safe” Displacement and return in north-eastern Nigeria. International displacement monitoring centre.

v Ibid, p. 8

[vi] Adeyemi, B. O. (2013). Internal Migration in Nigeria: A positive contribution to human development. Implemented by IOM and with the Financial Support of Switzerland

[vii] Ibid, pg.3

[viii]Idris, Y. G and Musa Y. Y. (2020). The Impacts of International Migration: A case of United States of America and Nigeria. International Journal of Political Science and Governance Vol.2 No 1. 2020.

[ix] Ibid, p.4

[x]Abdullahi, A. (2019). Rural Banditry, Regional Security and Integration in West Africa. Journal of Social and Political Sciences, 2(3).

[xi] Ibid, p.5

[xii]Okoli, A. C. & Lenshie, E. (2018). Nigeria: Nomadic migrancy and rural violence in Nigeria. Conflict Studies Quarterly, 25, 68-85.

[xiii]Okoli, A. C. & Uhembe, C. A. (2015). Crisis of natural resource governance in Nigeria’s extractive industry:

Examining the phenomenon of artisanal mining/quarrying. Global Journal of HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: [F. Political Science], 15 (7:1.0), 39-48.

[xiv] Ibid, pg.6

[xv]International Organization for Migration, (2020). Harnessing the potential of migration and return to promote development. Migration Research Series. No. 5. Geneva: IOM

[xvi] Sydney. C. and Onwuemele. A. (2019). “Once The Road Is Safe” Displacement and return in north-eastern Nigeria. international displace monitoring centre.

[xvii]Sydney. C. and Onwuemele. A. (2019). “Once The Road Is Safe” Displacement and return in north-eastern Nigeria. International displace monitoring centre.

[xviii] Ibid, p.9

[xix] https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-child-protection-caseload-verification-report-april-2019.

[xx]https://tribuneonlineng.com/nigerian-children-risk-un-declares-750000-stateless-west-africa-wacsof-warns/

[xxi]Ajaero, C.K., A. T. Mozie, I.C. Okeke, J.P. Okpanachi and C.Onyishi. (2015). “The Drought-Migration Nexus: Implications for Socio-Ecological Conflicts in Nigeria” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences. Vol 6 No 2 S1: 470-478.

[xxii]Sydney. C. and Onwuemele. A. (2019). p.9

CHAPTER 3 - NIGERIA MIGRATION DYNAMICS: NORTH-WEST PERSPECTIVES

Abdulateef Usman & Aisha Bawa

Introduction

The North-West geo-political zone of Nigeria was carved out of the old Northern region. The zone comprises seven states Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara. These states share borders with a neighbouring country, Niger Republic. Therefore, there is a lot of trans-border movement between the Zone and the neighbouring country. Thus, various forms of population movements in response to political, economic, religious, and security situations as well as demographic factors have been recorded (1). The population of the North-West region is estimated at 48.9 million people (NBS: 2016). The population is classified as rural, and a large number of migrants originate from, and circulate within, the rural areas. While major internal migration takes place from rural to urban and within urban areas, some rural-rural migrations by farmers, seasonal labourers and pastoralists from resource-poor to resource-rich rural areas persist (2).

It is instructive to note that the North-West zone has a long history of migration dating back to the era of state formations. The process involved conquest to establish Kingdoms and Empires that eventually led to the displacement of people. With the rise of powerful states during the pre-colonial period, slavery and slave trade became institutionalized. The region also served as routes of passage into some West African countries, along with trans-Saharan trade routes from North Africa. The trade was an important means for the movement of wealth in the form of goods, resources and people on a monumental scale between geographical regions (3). The pastoral Fulani nomads also moved their cattle with the seasons from one locality to another within the geographical space that now constitute North-Western Nigeria. Their movements spanned the whole length and breadth of the grassland or Savanna region of West Africa (4). It was observed that there is much evidence of large scale tribal migration in the past of the age-old seasonal wondering herders, in the area, (5).

The arrival of the British in the mid-19^th century provided a framework for large scale migration as the British needed a large labour force for mines, plantations and administrative work. The consequent growth of cities such as Accra, Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Abidjan, Lome, Dakar and Cotonou increased rural-rural and rural-urban migration at the time (6). This development was aptly noted by Abdu etal. (7), that migrants from north of Sokoto were migrating to the south western forest lands of Nigeria and outside the country, for example to Ghana. Although the authors were not specific on the particular period, but they clearly acknowledge the movement of people from the North-West to the South-West.

According to Mortimore (8) the north-south mobility across Nigeria’s borders dates back to the colonial era, its continuation has depended, on the effectiveness of diversification strategies, of the seasonal movements of nomads from the arid region to the relatively green areas of Sokoto and Kano. The migratory flows both internally and internationally increased during the post- independence period. This was motivated by a multiplicity of factors such as socio-economic development, environmental degradation, insecurity, ECOWAS Protocols for free movement within the sub-region, conflicts and wars (9).

In the light of the above, this chapter discussed the dynamics of migration in North-Western Nigeria in three historical epochs (Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial). The dynamics under review focused on the feminization of migration and migration policy in Nigeria.

Migration in the Pre-Colonial Era

The geographical area known as the North-West in Nigeria was formerly dominated by the Hausa Kingdoms before they were conquered and overthrown by the Sokoto Jihad of 1804. The history of human mobility in this region dated back to the era of State formation. Migration has featured prominently in all the processes relating to state formation. The historical invasions of Hausaland by non-Hausa people, particularly the Kanuri and the raiding of the Tuareg reveals that significant migratory dynamics took place during the period. The Bayajidda legend suggests the Kanuri influence in the foundation of Hausa states. The Kanuri influence as pointed out by Smith (10) seems to have developed over a long period culminating in deep military penetration into Hausaland in the 16^th Century.

The introduction of Islam in both Katsina and Kano is traditionally associated with the eastward migration into Hausaland of people called the Wangarawa. Kano in particular, earned a reputation for Islamic scholarship as early as the fifteenth century and became a notable destination for travelling Muslim scholars including North Africans like Muhammed al-Maghili (1425-1504) (11).

The migrants as documented in Palmer’s (12) Kano Chronicle arrived in the fourteenth century from Melle (Mali) during the reign of Sarkin Kano Yaji. They founded several wards in Kano. In a survey of 104 Kano city wards of 1968, it was discovered that almost all the wards owe their origin to a person or group of persons who had travelled from elsewhere to settle in Kano (13). The Wangarawa were the earliest immigrants to Kano. Subsequently, other groups of immigrants came at different times and from various places.

By the sixteenth century, the northern Hausaland witnessed the invasion of the Tuareg. This eventually resulted in the southward flight of the Gobirawa in the direction of the Sokoto river valley. The dynamics of the level of human mobility and/or migration flows in the Sokoto river valley as argued by Kwaire (15) shows that the Sokoto Caliphate was initially populated by Bussawa, Tuaregs, Adarawa and the Zabarma ethnic groups, while the immigrants were mostly Hausa/Fulani.

In addition, international migration occurred across the borders of Hausa kingdoms and empires. The need to exchange products of the different ecological areas led to trade in commodities which crystallized into the famous trans-Saharan trade routes (16). These routes were linked to the major centers of commerce and Islamic learning. Some of the identified routes of the trans-Saharan trade include:

Kano-Ifewan-Ghat-Ghadamer-Tunis route.
Darazo- Gwaram- Birnin Kudu- Kano route.

It is instructive to note that slave trade has played important roles in the history of migration in the region, especially between the sixteenth and late nineteenth centuries. Lovejoy (17), asserts that, between 3,000 and 8,000 slaves per year were moved in each of the main routes across the Sahara. The vast majority of slaves in the region were exported to the north through the trans-Saharan trade. The slaves were utilized in domestic service, as public officers, on farmlands, in metal works and leather goods industries, but most importantly, in the military engagements of the period and for export. The area was also known to have imported slaves from the Benue River basin for many centuries before the Sokoto Jihad of 1804. The main destinations were Kano, Zaria, Yandoto and Katsina (18).

A distinctive subset of migration from Hausaland to other African countries is the movement of pilgrims to Mecca. The overland journey by camel or foot took many years and people either never reached Mecca or never returned staying to settle in Sudan, where many settlements of Nigerian origin have remained till today. Alkali (19) observed that:

Muslims in Hausaland had opened up an early migratory corridor between Western Sudan and the Arab world in the bid to reach Mecca by land. These movements gave rise to a sizeable number of Hausa communities that were established on more permanent basis along the pilgrimage routes within present day Chad and Sudan.

In line with the assertion by Alkali, Afolanya et al. (20) stated that:

Nomadic herding of livestock, and pilgrims to religious places in the Arabian Peninsula, brought diverse human mobility and migration within and across borders of existing empires and kingdoms.

The establishment of Sokoto town as the centre of the Caliphate in 1809 certainly led to huge influx of freemen settlers and slaves. This build-up of population and manpower continued throughout the nineteenth century and created intensively cultivated close-settlement zone. The Caliphate under Sultan Muhammadu Bello and his successors pursued a policy of indiscriminate allocation of land for cultivation and residence to all applicants regardless of one’s ethnic or social background. This policy no doubt encouraged the continued influx of Tuareg migrants into the Sokoto Caliphate. As opined by Abubakar (21) the Air and Adar Tuareg populated no less than 18 out of the 60 wards in Sokoto.

Another pull factor to the area was the existence of surplus land. Until the beginning of the 19^th century, the region which comprised the districts of Gwadabawa, Gada, Wurno, Raba, Achida, Kware, Durbawa, Tangaza, Dundaye and Sokoto was sparsely populated. Sokoto also was located along the trans-Saharan trade routes. The destruction of Alkalawa by the Sokoto forces in 1808 enabled Sokoto to take over its commercial role. One of the Saharan trade routes took off from Tripoli across to Agadez, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto, Ilorin and Ganja (22).

Other major form of migration in the North-Western region during this period was that of the Islamic/Qur’anic teachers who attracted casual and long-term followers, whose migration was referred to as Almajiranci.(23) The clerics and their students are an established feature of Islam throughout Sudan especially among the Fulani and the spread of Islam and the trading diaspora have been mutually reinforcing 24) Pellow (25) described the migration of one Malam Idrissu Nemu, a Hausa Qur’anic teacher from Katsina to Accra. The Islamic cleric was credited with establishing Accra’s (Ghana) first Zango (Strangers’ Quarter). He was also reported to have migrated with his family in the mid-nineteenth century. Subsequent migrants from Hausaland such as the military recruits in the Gold coast, Hausa constabulary migrated with their wives and families.

Migration Pattern in the Colonial Period

One of the first contacts of the area and people that later became Nigeria with the Europeans began with the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century. The trade continued up to the 19^th century when it was replaced with trade in agricultural produce. The Berlin conference of 1884/85 declared the territory of Northern Nigeria a protectorate under the influence of the British. By 1900 Britain had declared her colonial interest in the area that became Nigeria. The first decade of the twentieth century was remarkable in the history of both colonization and migration in the Sokoto Caliphate. The British on one hand successfully defeated the Sokoto Caliphate forces at the battle of Giginya on 15 March 1903. Consequently, Sultan Muhammad Attahiru I embarked on Hijra (migration). He initially planned a migration away from the invaders looking to settle at a new location to the east but unfortunately was killed at Burmi. It was estimated that Muhammad Bello Mai Wurno son of Sultan Attahiru I carried on with the hijra with an estimated 25,000 followers across Chad and central Sudan (26). The famous Hijra (Migration) movement to the east led to the permanent settlements of the Sullubawa (semi-nomadic Fulani) from rural areas of Sokoto, Zamfara, Daura, and Katsina as well as Fulani from eastern emirates of Nigeria into Sudan. In 1929 the total number of families living in the village of Maiurno in Sudan shows that Sokoto had two hundred and seventy-one families (271), Katsina, one hundred and eighty-five (185) Daura and Damagaran, two hundred and eighty-two (282) (27) This migratory flow was influenced by both colonialism and religious belief.

Migration in the area also occurred as a result of drought in 1914. The most affected regions were Hadejia and Katagun Emirates, Borno and Niger in French colony. It was from these regions that Kano, Zaria, Katsina and Zamfara witnessed the influx of internal and international migration (28). The colonial regimes also altered the motivation and composition of migration by introducing and reinforcing various blends of political and economic structures imposing tax regimes and establishing territorial boundaries. The development of rail and road transport system and other infrastructure as well as the growth of cities increased rural-urban migration of skilled and unskilled workers and traders. The Annual report for Sokoto Province for 1936, recorded that there was a large scale seasonal migration to the Gold Coast and elsewhere by men in search of money to pay their tax and support their families. Prothero (29) aptly noted that 257,000 migrants left the North-Western region out of which 28,000 people were mostly from Arewacin (Northern) Sakkwato.

Migration during the colonial period became increasingly permanent in nature. The seasonal (‘yan cin rani) and permanent (Kaura) migrants became organically linked such that seasonal migrants eventually transformed to permanent migrants. In addition, migrant labourers after the construction of Kano rail line in 1911 moved into major cities of Kano, Kaduna, Zaria and Sokoto in search of trade and gainful employment. For example, records of non-indigenous population in Kano as of 1941, show a total of 158 Lebano-Syrian in 12 districts of the Province (30)

With the opening of the road to Zungeru, the Lugard’s administrative capital for Northern Nigeria between 1901 and 1917, peasant farmers took advantage of the security and transportation to engage in dry season migration (31). The pattern and difference in colonial policies between the British and French further influenced movements of people to British colonies especially Nigeria. The British colonial administration was considered less oppressive than the French. French colonial rule was characterized by numerous and varied taxes. These taxes generated emigration. In view of this, an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 Tuaregs from Niger moved into Kano city and its environs between 1914 and 1922. Another 250,000 people moved into the North-Western region of Nigeria between 1931 and 1952 from French West Africa, which extended from the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea (32).

Ecologically induced movements of people to places that offered better means of livelihood also occurred during this period. The drought which occurred during the colonial period in the neighbouring Niger Republic in the early 1930s led to the migration of large-number of people into the North Western region. Kwaire (33) also acknowledged that, in 1931 a large number of Nigeriens immigrated permanently to the emirates of Gwandu and Argungu. The drought was due to human and natural factors such as over-grazing, over-cultivation, irregular rain and locust invasion.

With the movement of the colonial administrative capital of Northern Protectorate to Kaduna in 1912, the city also witnessed large influx of migrant workers. Evidently, from 1931, Kaduna city has had the attributes of a land of many opportunities and as such very attractive to the migrant population from the rural areas.

Other forms of migration took the form of education and scholarship. The area has maintained contact through trade, pilgrimage and scholarly exchange with North Africa before the arrival of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this was intensified during the colonial period especially after 1950. Elite Nigerian Muslims travelled to study at Islamic Universities in Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Since then the Northwestern region maintained close contact with Sudan until the final decade of colonialism (34). This was partly as a result of the fact that the British considered Sudan moderate in terms of radicalization than other educational centers in the Arab world. Consequently, the British sent large number of Muslims to Khartoum and Omdurman to study Arabic and Islamic law.

Migration in the Post-Colonial Era

In August 1963, the Parliament enacted the Immigration Act, which established the Immigration Department as an extra-Ministerial department in the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs. With this development, all citizens of Niger Republic coming to Nigeria for whatever purpose including visits were required by law to possess visas and other travel documents. In 1964, the Balewa regime concluded visa abolition agreement with Niger which undoubtedly eased free movement of immigrants to both countries even though other travel documents were still required (35). With Nigeria closing its borders in 1967 as an attempt to recover money stolen from Benin branch of the Central Bank of Nigeria, the North-Western State Government (then Sokoto and Niger) directed the border security agents at Illela-Amanawa not to include Niger Republic in the closure. Therefore, the factor of porous borders facilitated free movement of people from Niger to Nigeria and vice versa.

The rapid change created by the development of colonial infrastructures, urbanization and industries created demand for seasonal or permanent labour during this period. The major metropolis in the North-West region that attracted migrants include Kano, Kaduna, Zaria, Katsina and Sokoto: The migrants were employed in building, construction and industries. Migrant labourers from the Middle Belt region were employed in the Kano groundnut pyramids.

It is important to state that, the cause of human mobility had not always been economic; civil war and ethnic conflicts had spurred the dislocation of minorities from their destination back to their home region. The Biafra War of 1967-1970 recorded the largest dislocation and dislodging of many ethnic groups from the North-West to the South-Eastern and South-Western parts of the country (36).

In 1973 the influx of the famine destitute population from neighbouring Niger Republic to Sokoto and its environs was very considerable. It was estimated that a total of 1,630 Tuareg refugees were accommodated in 17 camps (37). The migration was caused by drought. The era also witnessed the dispersion of Fulani speaking people across the Sahel Zone and seasonal migration of nomadic herdsmen.

The oil boom in the 1970s created opportunities for migration both internal and international in the North-Western region. It created avenues for exploitation, for international trafficking in women and children, for forced labour and as commercial sex workers. The destination for the trafficked include neighbouring West African countries, Europe, North Africa and the Middle Eastern countries. Primarily, women and girls but also some boys are trafficked for purposes of forced labour and organ harvesting. Poverty is the principal driving force behind this trade propelling vulnerable people into the hands of traffickers who lured their victims to large scale multi-commodity businesses (38).

The formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 affected migration in the region as it expanded migration opportunities. The ECOWAS Protocol of 29^th May 1979 on the Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment changed the face of intra-regional migration (39). Also, from places like Kano and Sokoto there was relatively large number of women that migrated to Saudi Arabia. It is difficult to have the actual number of migrants to Saudi Arabia but the number of Nigerian migrants (9952 women and 1231 unaccompanied children) deported between March 2002 and April 2004, exposes the high level of migration to the Kingdom (40). In 2005, the Saudi Arabian authorities estimated the number of Nigerians residing irregularly in the kingdom to be 27, 000.The Mallam Aminu Kano International Airport is the key transit point for traffickers who disguised as pilgrims to Saudi Arabia. The dominant movement of people to Saudi Arabia is from Kano to Jeddah. This reflects the role of Kano City in trafficking new streams of Africans. It is interesting to note that women, children, and young adults participated in this form of migration. It is an informal, irregular migration of unskilled labour force. Places like Kidiway, Hara Gobirawa, Shar Mansur, Dogon Gida, Mutbaa Mattania, Shar Sittin, have been converted into enclaves of Nigerians and they have become the haven for migrants in Makkah (Saudi Arabia).

The issue of internally displaced persons, forced migration and refugees are all issues of human mobility concerns during the post-colonial or modern era. Forced migration has been assuming new forms and higher rates of occurrence. These are caused by the civil wars that have been rocking countries neighbouring Nigeria. Nigeria recorded 938 asylum-seekers as of 29^th April 2014. The migrants’ countries of origin are; the Democratic Republic of Congo (49.9%), Mali (15.1%), the Central African Republic (9.5%) and Chad (8.8%) (40a).

Banditry violence has affected populations living in the North-West states of Kaduna, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi and Katsina in the last ten years. About 21 million people living in these states have been exposed to insecurity caused by activities of bandits.

According to United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 2019 report, in the North-West Nigeria, inter- communal clashes resulted in the displacement of over 210,300 people across Kastina, Sokoto and Zamfara States, and forced more than 35,000 refugees to flee into Niger Republic (41) It is interesting to note that, migration as a response to armed conflict and insecurity results in large refugee population, exposing the most vulnerable to an array of dangers including sexual violence.

In addition, internal migration caused by armed banditry has created IDP camps within the region. For instance, about 600 IDPs are living on a football field in ATC Katsina, over 4000 IDPs are taking refuge in Mechanic Village in Bebeji, over 360 IDPs are in Yammawa, and more than 1000 are seeking refuge in Tudan Baras. Most of the displaced came from Safana, Kankara and Faskarci Local Government Areas of Katsina State. In May 2020 over 2000 villagers, mostly women from Barebari village, 12 kilometers to Batsari, left en masse to Batsari. In an interview with Jakadiya TV, many of the displaced stated that they were forced out of their communities due to the incessant attacks by bandits.

In Sokoto state, particularly in Sabon Birni Local Government, there is not a single ward in the entire 11 wards that does not have part of it being attacked by bandits at frequent intervals (42).

Migration Policies and Feminization

The North-West region is a major transit and destination for both internal and international migration. The attention of the international community and regional governments have been attracted to the unprecedented migratory activities in the zone which is a matter of international concern. The need for a legal framework to curtail irregular migration and maximize the benefits of migration for national development became the focus of government. A survey by the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other related matters (NAPTIP) (43) shows that the major trafficking routes from Nigeria are: Edo, Kano, Kaduna, Calabar and Lagos. Others used the northern land routes, via the porous borders of the states of Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, Kano and Jigawa in the North-West. Another study by Bawa (44) demonstrated that the whole trafficking cycle is highly gendered, from the root causes that make women and girls more vulnerable, through policy approaches and measures aimed at combating trafficking in human persons. The lack of strict enforcement measures to protect female migrants shows that they still face harassment at borders by national authorities. Especially, female traders engaged in cross-border, often informal trade. These traders are most times subjected to exploitation in terms of the fees and charges levied on their imports and produce. While some measures have been implemented to assist female traders in addressing harassment, such as sensitizing them on their rights in regional migration, there are still several gaps, particularly related to harmonizing procedure for cross-border female traders.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the dynamics of migration in North-Western Nigeria. It has demonstrated the changing and complex nature of migration in three historical epochs (pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial). It revealed that both internal and international migration have undergone significant changes in terms of pattern and process in the periods under review. In the pre-colonial period, migration was motivated by the search for better means of livelihood, by conflict between expanding groups, religious motives and search for knowledge. Subsequent to these movements, many cities such as Kano grew in population and emerged as commercial urban centres. It was further linked to major trans-Saharan trade routes. The major pull factor of migration in the Sokoto Caliphate was its becoming a centre of learning and scholarship. The policies of the Sultan in accommodating migrants and creating employment and economic opportunities were also responsible for the large-scale influx of migrants. The emigration of Muslims from the Sokoto Caliphate under the leadership of Sultan Muhammadu Attahiru I was motivated by religion in so far as Muslim communities tried to avoid rule of ‘infidels’. Economic migration during the early colonial period was motivated by the British colonial policies. Colonial taxation in the neighbouring countries, demand for labour and transportation were also significant factors. The colonial regime provided a lot of opportunities for the seasonal migrants searching for means of livelihood and payment of taxes. Economic opportunities in the cities also attracted many traders and migrants from rural areas looking for jobs or other means of livelihood. The socio-economic factors in the post-colonial period played significant roles in human migration in the North-West. The existing inequality in opportunities between places and regions, political instability, environmental degradation, insecurity and violent conflicts are significant push and pull factors of migration in the region.

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(NAPTIP: 2005)

Bawa, A. B.

CHAPTER 4 - NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS: SOUTH-EAST PERSPECTIVE

Eugene Nweke & Christopher Ogugua

Introduction

While all the zones in Nigeria migrate, the Southeast is identified as the most migratory of the six geopolitical zones (1). This migratory trend supports the common saying in Africa: that for every four Africans you see, one is a Nigerian and, for every four Nigerian migrants you see, one (if not more) is from the Southeast (2). Therefore, the central role the Southeast plays as the home of Nigerian emigrants, makes it an important zone in understanding migration dynamics in the country and in Africa. This unique position also throws up a lot of issues that beg for clarifications. The most important of these includes understanding the motivations, patterns and implications of Southeast migration to human development. The present chapter unpacks these migratory issues.

Southeast Nigeria

Until 1967, when Gen. Yakubu Gowon was forced by military necessity to reorganize Nigeria into 12 states, the country operated four regional governments: the Eastern, Midwestern, Northern and Western Regions. The Southeast was carved out of the Eastern Region. It comprises the states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. Apart from few non-Igbo tribes on the fringes of the zone, the indigenous population of the Southeast are the Igbo. This is the reason the zone is called the home of Igbo people (3). However, Igboland is not limited to the Southeast. According to Slattery, besides the five Southeast states, Igboland also includes northern Delta and Rivers states and small parts of Akwa Ibom state (4). Udenta, et al., also states that: “… there are Igbo (people) in the South-south region as well as in parts of the Middle Belt” (5). While the dichotomy between the Southeast and Igboland is obvious, in literature the two terms are used interchangeably. This practice is adopted here. Thus, Southeast, Igboland or the Igbo are used interchangeably.

The Southeast is the most densely populated part of sub-Saharan Africa (6). In terms of population density, Nwajiuba (7), observes that four states in the Southeast (Anambra, Imo, Abia and Enugu) are among the seven most densely populated states of Nigeria. As a result of this increased human pressure on finite resources, there is intense competition for the available natural resources in the zone leading many Southeasterners to view emigration as a viable option for securing a livelihood.

Migration Trends and Patterns in the Southeast

Literature on migration patterns in the Southeast comes in various forms. However, these can be collapsed into geographical and historical categorizations. Within the historical categorization are three hypotheses, autochthony, internal migration and external migration that link the origin of the Igbo with migration. Autochthony hypothesis asserts that the Igbo are aboriginal and never migrated (8).The Internal Migration hypothesis posits that Igbo people moved from their original homeland of Niger-Benue confluence to other parts of Igboland (9). The External Migration hypothesis links Igbo origin to the Middle East; precisely from the Jewish stock, dating as far back as 1870 BC (10) The discussion in this chapter hybridizes these trends without strictly adopting any one.

Pre-colonial Migration in the Southeast

Traditionally, Southeasterners like most Africans were farmers. According to Isichei, in more densely populated parts of the Southeast, the traditions reflect a constant struggle to balance the unequal elements which often depreciate the fertility of the land and increased the scarcity of water. Thus, when the pressure on land grew too great, a section or village group would migrate a short distance (11). The Southeast migration in the pre-colonial era therefore was due to dense population coupled with the fact that farming was not very lucrative because the soil had been subjected to centuries of surface erosion and leaching (12). There is a consensus according to Adepoju that most moves of this kind were based on the attraction of fertile land for farming (13).

However, farming was not the only means of sustenance the people of Southeast engaged in pre-colonial times, they were also traders. Confirming this, Falola avers that the Igbo were adept traders because they combined trading with farming (14). Some communities were known for their outstanding achievements in trading. The Aro and the Nri were farmers and traders. Trading at this period enhanced migration by bringing many Southeasterners into contact with non-Southeasterners in what is known today as the South-South, South-West zones and the Northern parts of the country.

On another note, Ohadike observed that many Southeasterners migrated in traditional society as a result of offence they committed against the law of the land. Underlining that most people of Anioma or western Igbo traced their origin from towns in Nri and Awka, he explained that most founding fathers of Southeast communities are described as exiled hunters (15). Also, in Afigbo’s view, breaking the law was another serious reason for migration in the pre-colonial Southeastern society. They were forced to abandon their original home for another place where they are expected to begin a new life (16).

The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade added another major dimension to Southeastern migration during the pre-colonial times. The Slave Trade marked the first massive movement of Southeasterners from their homelands to an entirely new territory. Curtin (17) suggests that the bight of Biafra constituted one of the most important and steady sources of slaves during the Tran-Atlantic Slave Trade. Douglas (18) reports further that of the 11.6 million slaves shipped to the New World, 1.7 million were taken from the Bight of Biafra. There was a huge concentration of the people of Southeast in Chesapeake, now known as Virginia and Maryland, and in Jamaica and Trinidad. Following the abolition of slave trade, by 1787, the first group of freed slaves were settled in Sierra Leone, the West Coast of Africa. Here a new consciousness of the people of Southeast emerged as the Igbo were the second largest group among the freed slaves in Sierra Leone. There in Sierra Leone they joined the Church Mission Society and became missionaries.

Southeast Migration during the Colonial Era

Before the turn of the 20th century, missionaries and traders had no access into the Southeast. Lis (19), reports that they had their dealings with traders from the ports in the bight, and middle men from those ports handled the trade with the inland areas. Moreover, mortality among the Europeans was very high, to the point that the hinterland was known as “The white man’s grave”. This terrified many and according to Isichei (20), led to the importation of Sierra Leonean missionaries who were of Igbo descent to Southeast.

With the advent of missionaries came schools and the rapid expansion of educational possibilities for the people of Southeast who were beginning to be educated at various levels and preparing them to take up responsibilities as teachers, clerks, managers, skilled labourers, artisans, etc. They therefore worked for Western trading companies, missionary organizations and the colonial administration. Through this, the people of Southeast moved to different parts of Nigeria and became major minorities in cities and urban centres across the country.

The provision of adequate road system facilitated by the colonial administration increased migratory propensity in the Southeast. Previously, migration in this zone was mainly rural-rural until the 1950s when it turned more to rural-urban movement as many communities developed into townships (21). Adepoju (22), summarises the factors that influence colonial migration thus:

…the introduction of international currencies, the development of transport and communications systems, and of internecine warfare, and labour conscription encouraged labour migration. Also the development of tracks, roads and railways to link the hinterland to the capital cities and ports further contributed to the process. By opening up large tracts of land, they reduced the physical efforts hitherto necessary for long-distance travel, accelerated the pace of existing migration, provided employment and quick transmission of messages and information about the range of opportunities in the different areas, and thus intensified migration.

In fact, the direction of flow of migrants in Nigeria this period was mainly South to North, and the migrants consisted largely of Southeasterners going to the developing Northern cities like Kano and Plateau provinces like Jos. In the view of Udo (23), if one takes a close look at these movements, one would see with ease that migrants were drawn from very densely populated areas with over 800 persons per square kilometre as well as some medium density areas with 400-800 persons per square meter.

Nzirimo (24), has highlighted the demographic and population impacts which have affected certain sections of the Southeast, where there was a high rate of migration. He attributed the causes of such migration to three factors namely, the land hunger, which affected the Igbo people around Onitsha, Awka, Okigwe and Orlu, the dearth of fertile land which affected people around Abatete, Alor, Nnobi, Nnewi and Oraukwu communities and the rising cost of farmland around Oguta environment. However, while some part of the Southeast suffered from soil leaching and population density, others like Abakiliki and Anam people fiercely resisted migration. They were blessed with fertile land and therefore, there was increase in the production of agricultural items. As a result, they were able to maintain a high level of subsistence existence similar to that obtained during the pre-colonial times. Because of their ability to produce what would sustain them, there was no pressure or need for migration.

The Nigeria-Biafra War and Southeast Migration

The Nigeria-Biafra War is seen as the watershed in the current orientation in Southeast migration. It was a war that would decide the future of the movement in the zone. The war forced an unprecedented movement of the Igbo living in other parts of the country back to the zone. This would have adverse effect on the people who lost most of their property to the war and also on the zone which was already saturated considering the landmass and scarce resources. As succinctly summarized by Ola (25), the war marked the “beginning of forced migration and the period of increased Igbo diaspora.” The event of the Civil War trapped many Igbo students and other professionals outside Nigeria, and accounts significantly for why lots of Southeasterners are abroad.

At the end of the war, poverty and the collapse of social structures served as catalysts that catapulted the people of the zone, not just to different parts of Nigeria, but to different parts of the world in search of survival. Uwalake (26) has it that the suffocating economic and political effect of the Nigeria-Biafra war made the Southeast an ecological wasteland, from which victims stream to other viable areas in Nigeria for livelihood. Thus a good deal of the improvements in the Southeast since 1970 has largely been fruits of self-help and individual determination warranting migration for better life of the individual and family.

Current Status of Migration in the Southeast – Causes and Motivations

The major factor causing Southeast migration is economic hardship. The economic hardship is a consequence of the deterioration of social system, lack of social security, downturn in the political economy occasioned by the structural adjustment programme of the 1980s. Thus quest for economic prosperity is a primary factor motivating the people of Southeast to move from their villages to the urban areas, and from urban areas to international destinations. In this direction, the greatest pull factor can be found in the promise of greener pastures in the destination communities. In the light of this, current status of Southeast migration is better appreciated when looked at from both economic and it’s allied labour perspectives. The Southeast migrants in the class of economic migration are the traders, entrepreneurs, investors and allied service providers that migrate to cities or other countries. It is estimated that 75% of the people of Southeast are economic migrants. Another set of economic migrants from the zone are the apprentices, who migrate at the invitation of their masters or relatives to learn some trades or skills. This group of people, are mostly internal migrants and most of them are young, within the age group of 20 to 35 years. Sometimes they start at the very tender age as many did in those early days after the civil war when survival, more than education, was the priority.

Southeasterners also engage in skilled labour migration for the purpose of employment. The migrants that engage in this form of migration usually have special trainings, knowledge and expertise. These individuals, usually are graduates from colleges, polytechnics or universities, and are mostly found among young experts as academics, medical practitioners, engineers and related professions. The migrants associated with labour migration, more often, follow the pattern of urban to urban (internal) and urban to foreign (external) destinations. Locally, the labour migrants are mostly young persons with employable skills and knowledge who move to cities, like Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt in search of employments in public or private sectors. At the international level, their destinations are mostly, America, Europe, United Arab Emirate and Saudi Arabia. The number of Southeast professionals that embrace this movement is on the increase.

Apart from economic and labour, social status stemming from the intrinsic social character of the Southeasterners is another important motivating factor propelling the migration of Southeasterners. This social dimension of the Southeast migration pattern is captured by Dmitri (27), in the thought of “social importance of abroad-based Igbo” as a status symbol, being the reason “Igbo migrants attempted to achieve social status and influence in their villages.” To be regarded as being ‘abroad’ is a thing of pride in the Southeast. However, it must translate into visible wealth which has been experienced or shared from by the community.

A very interesting element supporting the Southeast migration is the impact of the support group of kindred to the migrants from their extraction in the destination countries. For the Igbo, the town unions provide a sustained support and guide for the people of Southeast wherever they find themselves. These unions become a facilitation platform for migration, consequently making it attractive for the people who leveraged the town union networks to get linked to their kinsmen living abroad. This practice aligns with Igbo ideology of ‘onye aghala nwanne ya’ (Do not abandon your brother). The ideology has contributed in bonding, strengthening and unifying the migrants especially the new and the young. For instance, migrants that reside in Northern Nigeria, especially in North East and North West, live in clusters, in designated settlements for strangers, also known as, Sabon-gari, (28). The presence of the various Igbo communities provides the pre-departure information to intending migrants to these Northern states about where to reside.

Like in the early days after the civil war, population pressure and sparse land resources for commercial agriculture is still one of the root causes of Southeast migration. Most Southeast communities do not have enough land even for subsistence agriculture, and the search for alternative means of livelihood push many out of their villages to areas of ample land resources.

Another angle to the dynamics of migration in the Southeast is that while there is constant migratory flow of the Igbo to other zones in the country, there seems to be a limited number of immigrants coming into the zone. There is a hand-full of migrants from other zones in the major cities of the Southeast. While some of these are civil servants and employees of big cooperate bodies and firms, others are skilled labourers and artisans who work as tricycle riders, shoemakers, tailors, herbalists, and especially security agents.

Nevertheless, the issue which often attracts critical comments from other tribes is that there are no large populations of other tribes in the Southeast the way you have the Igbo in other zones. Some commentators have tried to explain this by claiming that inhospitality of the Igbo is what discourages migrants from the Southeast. For instance, in Musa’s (29) contention the Igbo ill-disposition to rent out shops or sell their lands to outsiders is one of the reason non-Igbo are few in the Southeast. This position however runs counter to a fundamental cultural value and ethic of the Igbo people. Culturally, ill-treating visitors in Igboland is abominable (30). It is this understanding that propels Onyeneke to propose that the limited number of non-Igbo migrants in the Southeast is because the zone has the highest population density in sub-Saharan Africa. On account of this there is constant competition over space. This state of affair usually is not conducive for outsiders who are often not prepared to enter into such fierce competition. It is also one of the major reasons the Igbo leave their homeland to where there is availability of land (31). Another reason Onyeneke gives to debunk the hypothesis of Igbo inhospitality is the marginalization of the Southeast starting from the end of the Civil War. He observed that the marginalization can be seen in the lack of Federal establishments in the zone, including lack of industries and seaports. All these made the Southeast unattractive for migrants.

Southeast and Gender Migration

The ratio of male to female migrants in the Southeast is another area that deserves attention. Apart from the Slave Trade during which Stevenson (32), reported that “Igbo women counted for 45 percent of the enslaved and 27 percent of all Africans brought to the Chesapeake, the majority of emigrants from the Southeast are men. Although this trend has changed significantly over the years, most recent researches still show that the number of men migrating from the Southeast is more than women migrant population.

In their empirical study on the Impacts of Rural-Urban Migration on Socioeconomic Development of Rural Communities of Southeastern Nigeria, K. Ajaero Ignatius and Ani Madu (33), discovered that across the Southeast most of the migrants are males. Specifically, 82% of males migrated in Imo State as against 18% of females. In all the states studied, more than half of the migrants are males while Ebonyi State has the greatest proportion of female migrants who make up 40% of the migrants in the state. The major reason for this dominance of male migrants according to ethnographic information from the fieldwork is that there is more pressure on the males to succeed. Therefore, the males migrate early and when they have stabilized, they may come back to take their family members or marry. Some even leave their families in the rural areas and periodically pay them visits.

A new dimension observed by researchers in the emigration of women from the Southeast is that most of these women are single and that their preferred destination is usually Europe. The improved standard of living in Europe, the protection of the rights of women and the ease with which African women are granted visas are some of the factors driving this migratory trend (34). However, another attractive motive in making the journey to Europe according to Ndiokwere (35) is the growing knowledge of an existing sex market in Europe which was made known through the contact in mid-1980 by Nigerian business women who discovered this lucrative sex business. It was actualised through the international connections of certain human traffickers whose major commodity was to bring women from the developing nations of the world like Africa, Asia and South America into the developed nations as commercial sex workers. There are others who migrated on their own through contact or arrangement by friends who are in the business and have given them information on its lucrative nature, and assisted them to migrate to join in the business.

This is not to suggest that all female Southeast migrants to Europe and elsewhere are sex workers.

There are, in fact, a remarkable number of skilled female migrants, students, business people and professionals that have been attracted and drawn to love, settle and work in Europe, the U.S.A and elsewhere. The knowledge of the involvement of the people from the Southeast in this form of irregular migration relating to sex work is very vital to the Nigerian migration discourse where the prevailing narrative associates this type of migration dynamics to the South-South especially Edo State.

Migration and Human Resource Development in the Southeast

As a zone that relies much on migration for livelihood, expectations are high on the contributions of Southeast migrants to human development. This has led to controversy on whether migration should be seen as contributing to the development or retrogression of the zone. Those arguing that migration leads to underdevelopment of the zone focus on the negative impact of the emigration of highly skilled manpower such as academics and professionals in search of greener pastures. The movement accounts for brain drain, which is antithetical to human development. In addition, the massive investment by Southeasterners outside the Southeast is impairing human capital development in the zone. It has equally promoted irregular migration and other social vices in the zone.

A contrary view however claims that migration is adding value to human development and wellbeing in the Southeast. It is a general knowledge that migrants are agents of change, innovators and investors because their remittances and acquired wealth of knowledge and skills often aid development in their countries of origin (36). Remittances from migrants are contributing to human development in Southeast as families whose relatives are abroad have money for investment, payment of medical bills, school fees, economic empowerments and other services. In support of this, a study conductedy Nwajiuba (37), in Southeast Nigeria shows that up to 50% of household spending is contributed by migrants outside the African continent.

In terms of social development, Southeast has also benefited immensely from her sons and daughters in the diaspora. These benefits come through the transfer of knowledge and skills, engagement in medical and educational missions. Regarding medical and educational mission, many indigenes of Southeast are part of the groups of Nigerians in diaspora such as Nigerian Doctors in the US under the “Association of Nigerian Physicians in America (ANPA),” that come home annually to provide medical services to rural communities. Apart from these missions, some southeastern individuals and groups in the diaspora have built medical facilities and schools or equipped schools with modern educational facilities. Politically, Southeastern diaspora have returned home at different times to take up elected or appointed political and governance positions while others are helping to sponsor some politicians.

On governance of migration, especially from the perspective of diaspora engagement in national development, the Southeast is one of the zones that have undertaken concrete actions towards institutionalization of migrants/diaspora engagement. At the state level, effort has been made to decentralize migration governance through the involvement of state and local government authorities and spaces. States such as Anambra State have established ministries and commissions within their state administration specifically for diaspora and related issues. In Anambra State, the ministry is known as Ministry of Diaspora, Culture and Tourism. It coordinates other relevant departments and agencies in migration and diaspora related areas. What is more, the Ministry oversees the interests and participation of different Anambra indigenes in diaspora in the development of the State. One of the ways it attracts diaspora interest is through outreach to diaspora communities in deferent destination countries during which it presents engagement opportunities in the state development. Outstanding diaspora who made their marks in the state development are distinguished with honours and recognitions.

Challenges to Migration in the Southeast

A major challenge to migrants from the Southeast may be seen in the phenomena of xenophobia, discrimination and exclusion in the host states in Nigeria. In most cases, any crisis in any host state in Nigeria leaves Southeast migrants vulnerable as crisis would usually snowball into attacks against non-indigenes. Thus people from the Southeast often suffer loss of lives and property at any of such crisis. These attacks often force some migrants from Southeast to return to the Southeast empty-handed. There have been incidents where people from the Southeast were scapegoats as nuisance in a host state and were forcefully evicted out of the state in a very inhuman manner. The case of nocturnal deportation of beggars, indigents and miscreants from Lagos under the Fashola administration is a sorry case in point.

Another challenge of migration in the Southeast is the eruption of internal displacement both environmentally and conflict induced. In recent times many states in the zone are grappling with problems of management of IDPs, victims of floods and the ongoing attacks by bandits believed to be armed cattle herders. The first category of displaced persons come from riverine communities, especially communities in Anambra, Imo and Abia states. The second category comprise mainly individuals from farming communities who are driven from their homes by armed herders. In the Otuocha area of Anambra East, there are about three IDP camps setup by the government of the state to care for victims of flooding and herders’ attacks (38). Outside Nigeria, people from Southeast have been victims of xenophobic attacks directed against African immigrants in South Africa and have been executed in some East Asian countries for various drug offenses and crimes without proper legal representation (39).

Another major challenge to migration in the Southeast is the problem of human trafficking. In a survey by Ajero (40), it was discovered that human trafficking was common in the zone with the highest volume of this crime occurring in Ebonyi and Abia states. According to the survey, the victims of this crime are women and children who are usually recruited by the traffickers and taken mostly to states in the Southwest and South-south. Most of the children are subjected to child labour domestic labour and in farm settlements in Ogun, Ondo and other states. Some are taken to neighbouring countries like Benin Republic and Ivory Coast where they are forced to work in plantations or as attendants in bars.

In a similar empirical survey, Ahigwe discovered that there is a number of women-run syndicates in the Southeast that specialize in recruiting young girls and taking them to different cities in Nigeria to serve as attendants in bars where they would eventually end up as sex workers (41). Olota in his own investigation discovered and analysed the international dimension of trafficking as discussed above (42). Another angle to trafficking in the Southeast borders on the smuggling of children, from outside, especially the northern part of the country into the zone. Basically, children smuggled in this manner are either adopted by their smugglers or sold to others. The Kano-Anambra controversy where it was alleged that some children missing in Kano were later discovered in Anambra is a clear case of this type of trafficking in infants.

The “Baby-factory” phenomenon is another form of trafficking in persons currently beleaguering the Southeast zone. Young girls are either coerced or lured into out-of-marriage pregnancy. The syndicate then provides a “nursing home” where these pregnant adolescents are secluded and catered for until the delivery of their babies. The young mothers are then settled by the syndicate and the babies sold to waiting buyers. This is a chain that connects both locally and internationally. The Nigerian government has established NAPTIP to address the issues of trafficking in persons. However, a situation where the Agency has only one office and no functional means of mobility to police traffickers in the entire Southeast tells the lack of government commitment to the mission of the Agency.

Furthermore, there is the danger of irregular migration Europe through diverse routes including the Sahara Desert. This has remained trending despite public enlightenment on the risks. The young Southeasterners in this category are daring and determined as they will prefer to die rather than stay poor in their communities. Common characteristics of this group of irregular migrants is lack of adequate education, skills and access to embark on regular migration. The availability of mobile phones, the Internet and plethora of social media platforms have facilitated irregular migration. The migrants effectively use them to connect and gain information from their informants on how to navigate the tortuous route to Europe. Irregular migration is also fuelled by the display of affluence by some diaspora that creates the hunger in the young people at home to migrate at all costs.

Moreover, paucity of study and data on migration dynamics of the Southeast is a major challenge to migration management in the zone. Based on this lack of data, many of the programmes on addressing migration issues in the country do not include the Southeast. Some states in the zone have developed institutional structures for engaging the diaspora in development, but this is about the migrants that have succeeded and have something to contribute to the state. Such attention has not been given to a whole lot of other areas of the migration dynamics. It would seem therefore that our governments are only interested in those that have succeeded; a case of what the Igbo will call “ogbara uru, agbaghi oghom”, one who counts only profits and does not countenance any loss; one thinking only of harvest and giving no thought to planting. This attitude is reflected in the many cases, internal and international, where migrants from the Southeast find themselves in trouble and neither federal nor the state governments raise a voice or a hand to help.

There is a dearth of key national agencies and programmes of migration governance in the zone safe for the establishment of the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) and recently created state focal points on Diaspora Matters by Nigerians in Diaspora Commission 9NiDCome) and state taskforces of National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP).

Conclusion and policy recommendation

Southeast occupies an important place in the Nigerian National Migration Discourse and deserves significant attention. Migration brings both gains and challenges to the development of the zone. Southeast migrants have significantly contributed to the development of the zone through their remittances, knowledge-transfer and community projects. On the other hand, high rate of emigration especially irregular migration results in brain drain and brain waste in the zone.

The study recommends firstly, that the people of Southeast should sustain the use of remittances and knowledge gained from host communities to aid development in the zone. At the same time government in the zone should intensify efforts in establishing and improving the institutionalization of diaspora engagement in development. For instance, state governments in the zone should introduce policies that make doing business easy and thereby attract more Southeast migrants to invest in the zone. This will contribute to creating more jobs, employment opportunities, and economic empowerment of the people, especially the young people. Thirdly, the town unions and governments in the Southeast should renew campaign against irregular migration and trafficking to save the carnage of young Southeasterners travelling to Europe through the dangerous irregular routes.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 5 - NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS: SOUTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE

Otakpom Charles Asuk

Introduction: History and Development of Migration in the South-South

The South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria comprises of six states namely Akwa Ibom, Baylesa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. The zone sits at the landmass of approximately 85,303 square kilometres with a population of about 21,014,655 as reported by National Population Commission (NPC) From the precolonial to contemporary times, dire socio-economic conditions, social and political conflicts (warfare), and environmental shocks have prompted dynamic, complex and multifaceted migrations, devoid of any homogeneity in the South-South geopolitical zone, with broad features which continue to unfold (1). The pre-colonial movements of people were encouraged by lack of defined boundaries between existing kingdoms (2). Migration in the geopolitical zone can be categorized into four main phases, viz: the precolonial era up to the end of the nineteenth century; the beginning of the twentieth century through the colonial and early post-colonial period; the short-term exodus of refugees during and after the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70); and, the era of global economic recession from the 1980s (3).

The historical development of migration in the zone earnestly began with the Atlantic trades between 1400 and 1900 that led to the flow of millions of forced migrants to the New World and Europe through the Niger Delta ports of Andoni, Bonny, Nembe-Brass, Elem Kalabari, Okrika, Old Calabar, and Warri in a commercial nexus linking a vast slave supplying hinterland of Igboland, Ibibioland, the Niger-Benue Confluence, the Benue Valley and the Niger Delta (4). The ports also retained thousands of slaves in the Canoe-Houses as adopted children or domestic servants, while some merchants moved slaves to frontier settlements and engaged in land colonization (5). Similarly, Aro traders and medicine-men, Awka ironsmiths and Abam warriors established numerous diaspora colonies along the slave routes (6), corroborating G. Standing’s description of a directed migration characterized by slavery, serfdom, forced and indentured labour (7). Aro diasporas also dispersed themselves among the Ikwerre, exercised preponderant influence, and entrenched themselves in local authority (8). By 1807, the port societies had become heterogeneous with the “slave” population surpassing the freeborn (9). Precolonial pattern of migration was forced, permanent and spontaneous.

The transition to palm oil trade promoted the acquisition of domestic slaves by House-Heads to increase human capital and productive labour, and the migration of Christian missionaries and educated-freed slaves like the one hundred Igbo missionary volunteers from Sierra Leone to the Eastern Niger Delta in 1853(10). Between 1827 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, there was an unfettered outflow of 10,000 Nigerian labour migrants from Calabar and Owerri Provinces to Fernando Po: Owerri-50%, Calabar-38%, Ogoja-10% (11). Colonialism also heightened large-scale rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-urban, urban-rural (intra-and interregional) and international labour migration. It also encouraged human trafficking, seasonal and planned migration through labour recruitment processes to achieve its export-oriented economic policies supported by improvement in transport and communication facilities, especially railways and seaports in Calabar, Port Harcourt and Warri (12).

From 1900, colonial policies of taxation and corvee labour increased rural-urban migration for paid employment (13). The repeal of the 1901 House Rule Ordinance in 1915 abolishing domestic slavery on which the Canoe-Houses of the Niger Delta and Efik communities had depended led to the introduction of contract or indentured labour (house-boy) system with the recruitment of manual workers from Igboland, Ibibioland, and Cameroon (14). The construction of railway line from Port Harcourt to Udi (Enugu) between 1912 and 1916 facilitated the migration of hundreds of families and carriers of subsidiary businesses from Owerri, Aba, and Bende Divisions to Port Harcourt (15), while many labourers were conscripted from Okigwe District to work in Port Harcourt (16).

Port Harcourt became a frontier of monopoly, which guaranteed migrants’ monopolization of economic opportunities, penetration of political system, direction of the process of cultural change, and subjugation of the host to their hegemony. From 1912, Port Harcourt became “the pride of the Igbo” (17). By 1953, the African population of Port Harcourt stood as follows: Igbo-45,503 ('77.3%'); Ijaw-4,535 ('7.7%'); Ibibio-2,022 ('3.5%'); Ogoni-1,037 ('1.5%'); Abua-133 ('2%'); Ngenni-24¹⁸. The statistics excluded the Soros and the large Hausa community founded by migrants hunting elephants for ivory in the 1890s. Hausa migrants developed the first strangers’ settlement in Port Harcourt in 1917 led by Halilu from Zaria. There was a near suspension of Hausa labour migration between 1918 and 1920 due to the post-First World War influenza pandemic. It resumed from 1936. The Hausa were predominantly seasonal migrants who rarely completely emigrated from natal homes. From the 1920s, Ijaw and Ogoni also migrated voluntarily and irregularly to Cameroon and Gabon (19).

From 1937, cotton and coffee plantation owners in Fernando Po collaborated with canoe owners in Calabar to intensify illegal traffic of adults and children for migrant labour recruitment from Cross River to Fernando Po. It was sustained by Spanish authorities and employers’ liberal payments to recruiters for each migrant labour; the pressure of colonial taxation in Nigeria to warrant voluntary emigration; and, the engagement of Nigerian migrant labour in lucrative contraband or illegal smuggling trade between Fernando Po and Calabar. Following the ratification of the Anglo-Spanish Labour Agreement Concerning Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea of December 1942 to regularize these irregular flows, the firm of Messrs John Holt and Company was appointed as the licensed labour recruitment agent for the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Fernando Po. John Holt did direct recruitment and also engaged Nigerian sub-recruiters so that by 1944 Nigerian migrant labour population in Fernando Po was 17, 000²⁰. Some Nigerian recruiters from the South-South zone were:

Table 1: Nigerian recruiters from the South-South zone

S/No	Name of Recruiter	Area of Recruiting	Monthly Quota
1.	Robert Oji	Calabar Division	30
2.	Bassey Okon Udo	Uyo Division	20
3.	A. I. Williams	Eket/Etinan	30
4.	B. A. Effiom Eyamba	Abak Division	50
5.	Bryson Ufot Etukudo	Opobo Division	40
6.	J.S. Uranta	Opobo Division	40
7.	G.U. Anige	Ikot Ekpene/ARO/ITV Division	50
8.	Johny E. Etim Walker	Ikot Ekpene/Enyong	40

Source: Annual Report of the Department of Labour, 1944.

Nigeria’s political independence in 1960, the onset of the petroleum economy, the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70, global economic recessions and the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the 1980s stirred complex local and international migratory flows in the region. From the 1990s, the zone witnessed mass migrations following the Ogoni Revolutions, intergroup conflicts such as Andoni-Ogoni, Urhobo-Itshekiri, Urhobo-Izon, Itshekiri-Izon, etc, and Niger Delta militancy. External conflicts like the Sudan and Liberian crises also pumped refugees into the zone, albeit incomparable to the Civil War scenario where returnee migrants from Northern Nigeria flooded the zone and vice versa. While the Civil War ended indentured labour, its end opened up opportunities for other forms of labour contracts and migratory flows in the zone. The Igbo of Nnewi and Onitsha involved in sales and fabrication of motor spare parts entered all cities and urban centres in the zone. In Sapele, Igbo migrants participated fully in the local timber business, rubber tapping and “the brewing of local gin known as kai-kai” (21).

The impact of the Civil War intensified the apprenticeship system and occasioned structural reinforcement of ethnic sentiment and solidarity. Migrants prospered, ventured into property acquisition, penetrated the hosts’ political economy, and resorted to the establishment of a strategic ethnic circle of influence and domination of hosts especially smaller ethnic groups who became numerical minorities in their own communities (22). This migration led to the formation of new identities and heightened ethnic consciousness and differentiation. Migrants became powerful political and cultural brokers, while hosts’ resistance to migrants’ domination led to the struggle for ethnic preservation and host-migrant tensions. Hence, the dichotomy between frontier of parity and frontier of monopoly: the former thrives on mutual exchange and borrowing of cultural traits and institutions, while the latter thrives on dominance, control and exclusion²³.

Migration Dynamics in the South-South Geopolitical Zone

The region is characterized by voluntary and forced as well as regular and irregular migration patterns with critical outcomes like the formation of ethnic diaspora that produced identity questions in indigene-settler dichotomies. There are two categories of migration, intra- and inter-group, as well as two dichotomies, internal and international (24). The historical factors that accentuated migration in the region include: the Atlantic trades, colonialism, post-colonial crude oil economy, and the Nigerian Civil War. The pull factors include: available economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers, and basic enabling social environment, while the push factors include: geographical, economic, socio-political, demographic, colonialism, and cultural (e.g. the practice of primogeniture, inheritance by the first-born of the parents' entire wealth, estate or office, while the displaced younger siblings would migrate in search of greener pasture) (25).

The causes of migration are embedded in the structural factors in communities of origins or destinations as many migrants in the region did not come from all-poor villages or were they all-poor individuals. In Sapele, Delta State, for instance, people emigrate for more abundant life and freedom from extended family problems, kinship obligations and entanglements, or due to disagreements with relatives (26). However, kinship structures provide highly persuasive information about available opportunities at destinations, accommodation and financial support for later migrants. Also, kinship networks enliven the theory of ethnic pull as people generally migrate to destinations where representatives of their ethnic group had settled, and credits a “cultural propensity to migrate” to ethnic groups like the Fulani and Igbo (27).

Comparatively, rural-urban migration is more prevalent than rural-rural or urban-urban movement in South-South Nigeria. Rural-rural labour migration which predominates in the agricultural communities of the region were either seasonal or long-term. This intra-rural mobility involving the relatively uneducated (Ogoni farmers to Ikwerre or Andoni fishermen from Rivers State to Cross River or Bayelsa State) may not be unconnected to the lack of access to land resources, favourable environment, or cultural restrictions that led to widespread unemployment or underemployment. Factors that compelled potential migrants to move out may include rural control system, family ties and local community, distance and urban social system²⁸. Migrants also left natal homes due to such crimes as murder, adultery and witchcraft, and to achieve freedom even from community elders, oppressive customs and traditions or to escape from youth-dominated crime environment; although such migration could also serve as punishments for such crimes. However, increasing educational opportunities and rising educational levels raised the propensity to migrate to the urban centres in the South-South geopolitical zone.

Migration in the zone is boosted by the psychological posture and aspiration to move out of poverty and become materially richer than non-migrants (29). This aspiration led to circular, regular, and irregular migration patterns through which migrants flood major cities like Port Harcourt, Uyo, Warri, Asaba, Yenagoa and Benin “to make money”. Prevalent contemporary migration trajectories in the South-South include the diverse forms of intra-group and inter-group migrations: temporary and permanent, circular, displacement and refugee-prone, as well as return migration. The migrants “represent not only large numbers of informal economic operators, but also civil servants and graduates on mandatory one-year national service” as well as military personnel on transfers and even students. Federal civil servants and military personnel as well as staff of oil multinational corporations on transfers to these cities always relocate with their families. Also, Nigeria’s ratification of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Protocol on Free Movement of Goods, Capital and Labour in 1979 facilitated the migration of skilled and unskilled West African nationals into the zone (30).

The unavailability of annual migration records and statistical data on circular, regular and irregular migratory flows in the region is worsened by the politics of census that renders secondary data unreliable. While Calabar, Port Harcourt and Uyo experience high inflows of irregular or undocumented migrants from neighbouring countries, the exact magnitude remains unknown and unquantified. Hausa/Fulani migrants dominate the irregular trade in foreign exchange, while migrants from Edo and Delta states control the intra-regional sex trade whereas migrants from Imo and Benue states dominate inter-regional sex trade. Similarly, migrants from Northern Nigeria engaged as domestic workers, gatemen (locally called Mai-Guard) and farm labourers in different parts of the zone. Only Yoruba migrants are not commonly found as domestic workers to hosts. The deregulation and privatization policies of the Federal Government also warranted the migration of huge number of skilled manpower across the zone. The hordes of labour migrants constantly negotiate a living in the zone’s urban and rural areas, send regular remittances to their homes and also contribute to the “host communities where they ply their trades and market their skills” (31).

Prostitution-induced, child-trafficking and forced labour-related rural-urban movements in the zone are commonplace. In many cases, women and children, males and females, are regularly trafficked from different parts of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers states to Port Harcourt, Calabar, Uyo, Yenagoa, and Warri. Young girls and children are also trafficked regularly from the South-East to the South-South (32). While males dominated as agents and victims of precolonial human trafficking, there is an increasing number of female agents and victims of trafficking in the post-colonial period. The two distinct crimes of human trafficking and migrant smuggling tend to overlap very frequently. While there is an apparent increase in border control mechanisms, especially on the Nigeria-Cameroon border, to prevent or reduce the incidence of irregular migration, many potential irregular migrants constantly turned to organized criminal groups to help facilitate border crossing processes. Unaware of the huge risks and dangers involved in these illegal transactions, many smuggled migrants often become victims of abuse by organized crime syndicates and victims of human trafficking. Children are also trafficked from the South-South zone to neighbouring countries like Republics of Benin, Cameroon, and Gabon through irregular international migration networks (33).

The gender factor in Nigeria’s migration pattern is one of the most recent dynamisc with the surge in “independent female migration” referred to as the “feminization of migration” (34). Previously, the men migrate without the women and children who may subsequently join their husbands and fathers. When the women migrated they were often referred to as subordinates of the male counterpart, in any of these forms of migration, the women were not counted or featured in the migration discourse. Consequently, at the settlement stage, sex differentials may disappear or favour women (35). It only most recently that migration studies focused on women as independent migrate, in most cases migrating for the same reasons the men do albeit with more challenges and vulnerabilities. This reality is very evident in the South-South migration dynamics. In Delta, Edo and Rivers States, there is an incremental rise in independent women migration. These females developed the capacity to dismantle many customary and economic restrictions of job segregation and discrimination in urban labour markets, which previously affected their migration. The practice of withdrawing the girl-child from school for the education of the boy-child due to diminished household income or for providing added family labour that perpetuates inter-generational poverty cycle, has been overcome by the determination of the girl-child to source for alternative means to support her education. Also, decades of economic quagmire had forced communities and families to condone independent women migration as a survival strategy. They are able to penetrate both formal and informal sectors of the economy for wage employment, as traders and business women, as house helps, or even as commercial sex workers in urban centres (36).

In the South-South migration dynamics, there is a gradual disappearance of gender bias against women, a high number of educated and skilled migrants-professionals, technical and related workers that flood the oil-rich region, and the preponderance of youths (aged between 16 and 35) who are mostly self-employed. The gender statistics in South-South migration favours the male gender in Akwa Ibom, Delta and Rivers States with 56.0%, 55.0% and 53.3%, while it favours the female in Bayelsa, Cross River and Edo States with 54.9%, 55.4% and 51.2% respectively. Below is the percentage distribution of migrants and return migrants by states and sexes.

Table 2: Percentage distribution of migrants and return migrants by states and sexes.

S/N			Migrants				Return Migrants
	State	Male %		Female %	Total	Male %		Female %	Total
1	Akwa Ibom	56.0		44.0	300	93.3		6.7	30
2	Bayelsa	45.1		54.9	319	67.9		32.1	28
3	Cross River	44.6		55.4	289	61.1		38.9	36
4	Delta	55.0		45.0	280	54.3		45.7	35
5	Edo	48.8		51.2	299	57.1		42.9	7
6	Rivers	53.3		46.7	315	51.6		48.4	62

Source: NPopC, 2012 (37).

The age bracket of the first generation migrants was between 1 and 35 years for both male and female. The group consisted of household heads and servants, while the initial status of migrants fluctuates between household heads and servants depending on the available opportunities for both male and female. During the era of colonialism, most young migrants aged between 1 and 16 years were engaged as house-helps and servants in domestic work, commercial activities, and menial jobs. Many of the older group of migrants between 16 and 45 were married and most times moved with their families. In the rural-rural migration pattern, migrants of the economically active age of 15-45 predominate, while in the rural-urban migration patterns, middle age or young adults of working age between 25 and 34, the youth population, are in the majority. In the contemporary era, younger people in their late teens, twenties and early thirties now migrate more than the adults, especially due to university education (38).

The distribution of household population by migration status reveals that migrants constitute 43.2% and 45.3% of the total populations of Bayelsa and Delta states respectively. The flow of migrants across geopolitical zones indicates that the South-South ranks second behind North-Central as the highest receivers of immigrants (39). In the South-South region, Akwa Ibom, Delta and Edo are identified among states with the highest propensity to migrate. The National Population Commission Reports of 2011 indicate the percentage distribution of migrants in states by state of origin and previous state of residence as captured in the 2006 population census as follows:

Table 3: Percentage distribution of migrants in states by state of origin and previous state of residence

S/N	State	By State of Origin %	By State of Previous Residence %
1	Akwa Ibom	17.3	56.9
2	Bayelsa	4.7	28.4
3	Cross River	9.3	36.0
4	Delta	18.4	41.6
5	Edo	18.7	34.2
6	Rivers	2.4	13.9

Source: NPopC, 2011b, 2011c (40).

The above data demonstrates that Akwa Ibom (56.9%) is the only state in the South-South with more than 50% of their populations living in other states in the past 10 years. In the changing pattern of internal migration, there is a noticeable new high in immigration with Delta and Bayelsa states identified among the few states that have overtaken Lagos, which previously had the highest number of immigration in Nigeria. In the geopolitical zone, Delta and Edo states with more than 5% pose among states in Nigeria with the highest numbers of return migrants (41). Below is the statistical representation of percentage distribution of household population by migration status.

Table 4: Statistical representation of percentage distribution of household population by migration status

S/N.	State	Migrant %	Non-Migrant %	Return Migrant %
1	Akwa Ibom	11.5	88.0	0.6
2	Bayelsa	42.9	56.9	0.3
3	Cross River	32.0	65.1	2.8
4	Delta	39.8	54.8	5.5
5	Edo	32.3	61.6	6.2
6	Rivers	34.2	62.4	3.4

Source: NPopC, 2012 (42).

In the distribution of migrants by areas of residence (rural and urban), while Delta State has 80.4% of its migrant population residing in the urban areas, 83.3% of Akwa Ibom migrants reside in the rural areas with extensive agricultural activities and menial jobs. The percentage distribution of migrants by area of residence (rural and urban) for the six states of the South-South geopolitical zone is as follows:

Table 5: Percentage distribution of migrants by area of residence - Rural and Urban

S/N.	State	Urban %	Rural %	Total %
1	Akwa Ibom	16.7	83.3	100
2	Bayelsa	62.4	37.6	100
3	Cross River	62.4	58.5	100
4	Delta	80.4	19.6	100
5	Edo	72.6	27.4	100
6	Rivers	72.6	27.6	100

Source: NPopC, 2012 (43).

National Population Commission (NPC) Survey Report of 2010 reveals that internal migrants constitute 43.2% and 45.3% of the total populations of Bayelsa and Delta States respectively. In terms of spatial distribution of migrants, Bayelsa State with 42.9% makes it one of the states with the highest inflow of migrants in Nigeria. In terms of gender ratio of internal migrants in the zone, Akwa Ibom demonstrates a female migration rate of 44.0% against 56.0% for males. With reference to return migratory flows, Akwa Ibom poses 93.3%. The net migration values for migrants indicate that the South-South with 42.53% ranks second behind North-Central as a labour immigration epicentre in Nigeria due to the dynamics of the crude oil economy with heavy impact on existing infrastructures and services (44). Inordinate mining and irresponsibility oil firms to Corporate Social Responsibility have added to other forms of natural and human-induced environmental degradation and attendant hazard that have forced many especially the rural and poor population into internal displacement and forced migration. Environmental shocks of the magnitude of the 2012 flood ravaged communities in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States. It caused grave demographic dislocations and resettlement problems and occupational shift. Data from the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is as follows:

Table 6: Demographic dislocations from the 2012 flood in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States

S/N	State	No. of Affected LGAs	No. of Affected Communities	No. of IDPs	Affected Pop.	No. of Houses Destroyed/ Damaged
1	Akwa Ibom	6	34	9,555	37,984	-------
2	Bayelsa	8	21	523,506	1,181,009	217,483
3	Cross River	8	28	46,000	503,234	1,800
4	Delta	10	23	77,421	705,412	3 2,300
5	Edo	4	15	23,939	113,412	-------
6	Rivers	4	170	230,342	820,453	-------

Source: NEMA Statistics, 2014 (45).

Explicitly, the prevalence of ethnic and language groups has continued to ensure the treatment of national and sub-national boundaries as artificial, and relevant national laws and regulations aimed at guiding inter-state movement of persons are difficult to enforce. Hence immigrants from a particular ethnic group always form cluster settlements. Fundamentally, economic-related factors dominate the motivation for migration in the South-South region, but the decisions to migrate were sometimes made by the families of the migrants. Obviously, both forced (involuntary) and willing (voluntary) migration in the region do not follow any regular pattern, while intra- and inter-regional migration exist in rural-urban, rural-rural, urban-rural and urban-urban flows.

Conclusion

Migration dynamics in the South-South region are linked to internal and external historic socio-economic changes and the centrality of the Niger Delta to Nigeria’s political economy. Nigeria’s inability to evolve a sustained effective governance architecture to holistically manage the incidence of migration even with the adoption of the National Migration Policy adopted in 2015 is huge.

Endnotes

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Charles, J. O. Ethnography of African Societies: Sub-Saharan Region. Lagos: Serenity Publishers, 2008, p.90.
Ofonagoro, W. I. Trade and Imperialism in Southern Nigeria, 1881-1929. Nok Publishers, New York, 1979, pp.30-45; Nwoko, K. C. “Labor Migrations, Economic Practices and Cultural Identity” pp.240-42.
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Osuntokun, “The Dynamics of Nigerian-Equatorial Guinea Relations”, pp.53-60.
Nwoko, “Labor Migrations, Economic Practices and Cultural Identity”, p.248-9; Oyeniyi, “Internal Migration in Nigeria” p.27; Ikwuyatum, “The Pattern and Characteristics”, pp.115-7.
Nwoko, “Labor Migrations, Economic Practices and Cultural Identity”, 2011, p.249-52; Ukaogo, V. “Igbo Migrant Population and the Development Agenda in Nigeria”, p.266.
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Bogue, cited in Charles, Ethnography of African Societies,57-8
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NMP Document, 2015, pp.1-3.
NMP Document, 2015, p.3.

CHAPTER 6 - NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS: SOUTH-WEST PERSPECTIVE

Rasheed Olaniyi

Introduction

South-Western Nigeria consists of six states: Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo and Ekiti. It is also known as the South-West geopolitical zone of Nigeria crafted out of the defunct Western Region. Until the relocation of Nigeria’s seat of government to Abuja in 1990, Lagos served as the Federal Capital Territory. It remains the economic capital of Nigeria. The zone is predominantly occupied by Yoruba people, who have customary rights to land resources. The people of the zone are mostly farmers, traders, artisans and educated professionals. This zone has been generally referred to as the most tolerant zone in Nigeria to migrant workers due to cultural unity and cosmopolitan nature of the people.

The South-West area lies between longitude 20 311 and 60 001 East and Latitude 60 211 and 80 371North with a total land area of 91 77,818 km2. It is bounded in the East by Edo and Delta states, in the North by Kwara and Kogi states (by the river Niger), in the West by the Republic of Benin and in the South by the Atlantic Ocean. The geographical location of the zone, especially inter-state and international borders, makes it suitable to internal, international and cross-border migration. The zone is enriched with arable land for cultivation, savannah grassland for animal husbandry, and abundant mineral resources of all kinds. All these attract migrants. The South-West zone has several border towns and villages often manipulated by human traffickers and irregular migrants. These include: Saki and Kisi in Oke-Ogun area of Oyo State; Badagry in Lagos State, Idi-Iroko and Imeko in Ogun State.

In 2016, the National Population Commission (NPC) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) put the current figure of Nigeria’s population at 193,392,517. Six South-West states of Lagos, Ondo, Ogun, Oyo, Osun and Ekiti states, according to the analysis, grew from 31,533,821 in 2010 to 38,257,260 in 2016. Based on internally generated revenue, Lagos state (GDP: $33,679 Billion), Oyo state (GDP: $16, 121 Billion) and Ogun state ($10,470 Billion) were among the richest states in Nigeria in 2018⁽[1]⁾ These fascinating economies attract internal, inter-regional and international migrants to the zone due to its vibrant markets, labour opportunities, skills, art and entrepreneurial opportunities, favourable climatic conditions and tolerant host communities.

The economic viability of the zone ensures that Lagos has the first and busiest airport in Nigeria as well as busiest seaports in the West Africa sub-region. There are international roads in the zone linking neighbouring countries in West Africa. The zone has border towns including international borders in Lagos, Oyo and Ogun states.

Goods are easily exported and imported, hence, the South-West zone witnesses a lot of inflows and outflows of people for different purposes on daily basis. The lucrative and viable economic space in the formal and informal sectors influence internal and international labour migrations in the zone. The industrial complexes in Lagos, Oyo and Ogun continue to attract migrant workers. The Agbara Industrial Zone, commercial farming in Skaki, Igbeti, Atan-Ota, Shagamu, IjebuOde, cocoa and kolanut plantations in Osun, Ekiti and Ondo encourage migration. Migrants are engaged in the cultivation of cassava, maize, vegetable; animal husbandry and fishery in other states of the zone.

Over the years, labour migration facilitated human capital development through apprenticeship schemes in the urban areas. Migrant artisans established their trade in the cities, which attracted trainees. The urban centres and rural areas have attracted migrant workers for menial jobs and petty trading from many parts of Nigeria and West African region. The activities of migrant workers have contributed significantly in boosting the potentials of the rural economy through cash crop production and cultivation of foodstuffs as well as vegetables. Other economic activities in the informal sector facilitating migration into the zone include petty trading, commercial transport, auto mechanic services, manufacturing, agriculture, commercial sex work, commercial begging, domestic work, major markets textile - Itoku in Abeokuta, Island, Balogun, Idumota markets, Computer village, Mile 12 market, Alaba International Market in Lagos; Bodija, Shasha markets in Ibadan provide opportunities for migrants. The Yoruba host communities yield significant commercial spaces for migrants, where they have exclusive control and dominance. In Ibadan, the Igbo dominance of spare parts, electrical materials, electronics trade at Ifeleye, Oke-Padre and Abata Kan are prominent examples. In the same city, Hausa migrants appropriated commercial spaces at Shasha, Ojoo, Sabo and Ori-Igi section of Bodija market. This has promoted peaceful co-existence, urbanization and socio-economic development.

The South-West zone is the most educated area in the country. Literacy rates at 75 per cent are much higher than the national average of 40 – 46 per cent ⁽[2]⁾. It has the highest number of higher institutions, both public and private. It is important to note that Lagos is the economic capital of not just the region but West Africa and Africa at large. Lagos is also referred to as a MEGA CITY and the richest in Nigeria ⁽[3]⁾. Lagos state output in 2017 was $136 billion, more than a third of Nigeria’s gross domestic product ⁽[4]⁾. More so, Ibadan is the largest indigenous city in West Africa which has in turn encouraged migration ⁽[5]⁾ The medical facilities in the zone are patronised by people from different places.

State governments in the South-West zone, especially, Lagos State have been very strategic and supportive in the works of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Nigeria-Swiss Partnership on Migration. The zone has an enabling structure for decentralising migration dialogue process for local participation. The IOM established Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme in 2001, Migrant Resource Centre and Migration Health Assessment Center in Lagos and other parts of Nigeria⁽[6]⁾.

Migration Trends

Internal Migration

Migration within the South-West zone

The Yoruba people of South-Western Nigeria are very mobile and this is evident in their movement within the zone for business, farming, religion, inter-marriages, settlements, spiritual purposes and so on. These intra-zone movements can also be linked to their commonly shared cultural identity and myth of origin traced to their progenitor, Oduduwa. Urban centres pulled migrants within the zone for human capital development and socio-economic growth. This has led to the process of urban diversity as different Yoruba sub-groups co-exist in the cities and towns. The mingling of indigenous groups and other Yoruba migrants facilitate mutual understanding and commercial opportunities. Urban markets in Ibadan, for example, are populated partly by indigenous traders and migrants from other parts of Yoruba land in Southwest, Nigeria ^([7]).

Migration into the region

The South-West zone has become a major destination for internal migration in Nigeria. There is a popular notion that Lagos is the small “London of Nigeria” and that has attracted a lot of people to the coastal city and other parts of the zone. Many migrant workers moved into the South-West zone due to ancestral and cultural linkages (for example, people from Edo and Delta), agricultural purposes, trading, farming, businesses, education, employment and so on. Internal migration into the zone led to the formation of large scale trading blocs in the cities, with wider connections in Nigeria and globally.

Since the end of the Civil War in 1970, Igbo migration to South-West Nigeria increased tremendously. Many Igbo migrants were able to reclaim their “abandoned properties” in Ibadan and Lagos, which further encouraged them to migrate. The poor environmental and socio-economic conditions in the South-East pushed many Igbo migrant workers to the South-West zone. The business zeal/ commercial orientation of the Igbo from the South-East further informed their movement into the zone because it is believed that there is wider market and ease of doing business. In virtually all the urban centres in the South-West zone, the Igbo migrants have crafted commercial identity in the large-scale distribution of electronics, building materials, textiles, automobiles, and more significantly, auto spare parts trade ^([8]). In some towns, Igbo entrepreneurs have emerged as “landlords”, land speculators and estate developers. Igbo auto spare parts traders have wider national and international connections from their market stalls and distribution centres in the South-West zone. In a way, migration facilitated effective and extensive local, regional and international market integration. The commercial activities of Igbo migrant traders in Lagos, Abeokuta, Osogbo and Ibadan linked Nigeria with Asian markets in Singapore, China, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia and Dubai. Igbo migrants in the South-West zone have intensified their level of social integration by marrying Yoruba women. In recent times, there has been significant increase in the inter-ethnic marriages between Igbo migrants and Ijebu Yoruba women.

Hausa traders have a very long migration history to the South-West zone. The zone has been a traditional Hausa migration corridor. Unarguably, no market is complete in the South-West without Hausa population. Hausa traders carved a commercial niche in the distribution of vegetables, grains and other foodstuffs, textile, head-loading, livestock trade and petty-trading^([9]). Hausa merchants, popularly called “Mallams” have successfully monopolised Bureau de Change (Currency Exchange Services). Their activities in the currency market facilitate informal financial services that promote cross-border and international trade and mobility in the South-West zone. More so, the collapse of the textile and other industries in Northern Nigeria contributed to the movement of Hausa, Fulani, Nupe, Ebira, Igala, Tiv, Agatu and other migrant workers from Northern Nigeria into the zone. Migrant workers, most especially youths, have migrated from Northern Nigeria in large numbers to participate in the lucrative urban transportation services (Okada riding) ^([10]). The increasing desertification of arable land in Northern Nigeria provoked new waves of migration of Hausa youths to the South-West zone among other destinations. Since the outbreak of ethno-religious conflicts and Boko Haram insurgency, internal migration from Northern Nigeria to the Southwest zone has multiplied in many folds. The South-West has witnessed the influx of youths from Northern Nigeria, possibly displaced by insecurity or in search of economic survival.

Many internal migrants from various parts of Nigeria engaged in various businesses, agricultural activities and artisanship skills. Igbo women are famous in the urban markets for trade in vegetables and foodstuffs. The commercial activities of Hausa kolanuts traders and tenant farmers/farm workers from Benue, Nassarawa and Cross-River states continue to enhance the rural economic viability in the Southwest zone. There are Fulani pastoralists who settled in the rural areas for many years and new ones moving from the Northern part of Nigeria southwards in search of greener pasture for their livestock. In many areas, Fulani pastoralists have become integrated in the local communities. The Fulani capital assets and cattle markets are accommodated in the South-West. Prominent Fulani settlements in Yoruba communities of the South-West zone include Iwoye Ketu and Afon in Ogun State; Tede, Oje-Owode, Iseyin and Irawo-Ile in Oyo State, Iwo in Osun; Oko-Atunja and Ayede in Ekiti State^([11]). Peaceful co-existence with Yoruba host communities enhanced livelihood security of the Fulani pastoralists. However, there have been occasional violent conflicts over land resources in Oyo, Ogun and Ekiti states in recent times^.([12])

Small-scale artisan production, trade and services of various internal migrants have been tremendously indispensable in the South-West zone. Many migrants are self-employed craftsmen such as shoe repairers, tailors, goldsmiths and silversmiths, wristwatch repairers and others. Their potentials have been harnessed in many respects.

The South-West zone, like other parts of the country, faces the complex challenges of the emergent irregular migration. Human trafficking has exhibited its notoriety in baby factories and child labour ⁽[13]⁾. For many years, women and children in the rural and urban communities have been trafficked to the cities in the South-West zone. Most of them are recruited by traffickers from Kwara, Niger, Benue, Akwa Ibom and Cross River states and trafficked through long distances in uncomfortable lorry-loads to Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan and so on. As noted by Olateru-Olagbegi,

There are places in cities such as Lagos, which are notorious as recruitment centres where traffickers hand over women and children to employers of labour. Studies also show that at Asewere, a village between Ondo and Ore in Ondo State of Nigeria, lorry loads of women and children from the South-eastern states of Nigeria are dumped by traffickers and distributed for various forms of labour including prostitution ⁽[14]⁾.

Many of the internally trafficked victims are forced into the labour process such as domestic service, shop-attendance, catering service, head-loading, hawking and sex-work. Many trafficked young boys are forced to work in exploitative labour conditions in quarries, cocoa farms and urban markets. According to the Nigerian Immigration Service, Oyo State is rapidly becoming hot spot of girl trafficking in Nigeria. In 2016, the Immigration Service rescued 134 victims and arrested 38 traffickers, 107 end-users who were handed over to the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) for proper prosecution. In 2017, 139 victims were rescued, and 1 trafficker and 1 end-user were arrested and handed over to NAPTIP. In 2018, 163 victims were rescued, 27 traffickers were arrested and handed over to NAPTIP. In the first quarter of 2019, 28 victims were rescued, eight traffickers with 12 end-users arrested ⁽[15]⁾.

In the Baby factories, for example at Mowe Ibafo in Ogun State and Amuwo Odofin in Lagos State, trafficked women are forced to make babies for sale. These vulnerable women, mostly young adolescents, have found themselves in this situation due to several reasons ranging from poverty, peer pressure, lack of family values, lack of education and awareness. In addition, cultural biases against teenage pregnancy among the Igbo forced many young women to migrate to the Southwest for the possibility of social acceptance and accommodation. This situation has led to exploitation of women and abuse of their rights ^([16]).

It is quite obvious that the influx of beggars to the South-West, mostly from Northern part of Nigeria has become a grave cause for concern for security and environmental factors. In many cities and towns, these beggars have constituted themselves as high risk factors. Examples are colonies of beggars at Makola/Sabo in Ibadan and Oko Baba in Lagos. ^([17]). They litter the streets and contribute to the spread of diseases, risk to their lives and the lives of others and insecurity in the land. They also contribute significantly to urban congestion ^([18]). Indeed, the observable fact of child abuse involving the use of “rented babies” for street begging has become bothersome.

Movement outside the South-West zone

Historically, Yoruba migrant workers, including artisans and traders migrated to other parts of Nigeria to practice their trade. In the colonial period, they migrated and settled along railway lines such as Lokoja, Zungeru, Zaria, Jos, Kano, Potiskum, Abuja and so on. They established flourishing communities in Kaduna, Sokoto, Maiduguri, Katsina, Zamfara, Mokwa, Keffi and other parts of Northern Nigeria^([19]). Internal outflow from the zone occurs for business purposes, mining of columbite and tin in Jos, transport and artisanship skills in Abuja, Port Harcourt, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Benin-City, education and business to the South-East and South-South, North-West, North-Central and North-East. While the South-West zone has hosted tremendous number of Hausa Okada riders, many states in the South-East, South-South and Northern Nigeria received many Yoruba women herbal medicine sellers. In recent times, the commercial activities of Yoruba women herbal medicine sellers are conspicuous in Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto, Maiduguri, Aba, PortHarcourt, Onitsha and Owerri.

International Migration

The Yoruba have always been embarking on international migration from the pre-colonial era. The Old Oyo Empire participated in the trans-Saharan trade and established commercial contacts with the Nupe and Hausa kingdoms. Lagos and Badagry were major hubs of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. In the era of trans-Atlantic slave trade, many Yoruba were transported to the New World in South America to work as slaves in Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Cuba and many others. Following the abolition of slave trade, many liberated slaves resettled in Lagos, Abeokuta and other places in the Southwest. In the colonial era, the Yoruba migrated to the British West African colonies of Gold Coast, Sierra-Leone and The Gambia; Francophone African colonies especially Cote d’Ívorie, Togo, Benin Republic, Guinea, Senegal and Mali; Europe and United States of America for the purpose of trading, work and education. Yoruba artisans and professionals now migrate to United Arab Emirates, Canada, Europe, South America, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and other destinations. It is remarkable to note that while Yoruba migrants from Ejigbo town in Osun State have historically settled in Cote d’Ivoire their counterparts from Ogbomoso town in Oyo State settled in Ghana.^([20]). The zone has many travelling and migration agents that advertise regularly on radio, television and the print media.

The Peculiarities of the South-West Zone for the Purpose of International Migration

The South-West is unique in the sense that it is characterised by “mixed migration”: transit, destination and source for regular and irregular international migration.

Source Zone:

The South-West zone has played key roles as a source for regular and irregular migration. Many people have migrated from the zone to other parts of the world. Apart from the traditional migration to Europe and USA, many migrants from the zone have moved to the prosperous global markets in Canada, Asia, Middle East and the Caribbean. Others have migrated to South Africa, Angola, Liberia, Rwanda and so on. Yoruba diaspora communities have been formed in many parts of the world. Most of them are playing key roles in the social and economic development of their homeland. Some have been encouraged by state governments in the zone to return home in order to participate in democratic governance. Beyond financial remittances, Yoruba in diaspora embark on medical missions and educational support in their various home towns([21]). However, many have been deported from various parts of the world due to irregular migration and other factors. In addition, the attractiveness of international migration has gradually denied the zone of its highly trained professional middle class needed for social and economic development. There is an ongoing brain drain as academics, medical professionals, engineers, artisans and others are migrating abroad.

Transit Zone:

Due to the presence of vibrant international airports, sea ports and international road networks, which can easily aid the movement of people from Nigeria to other parts of the world, the South-West has been used as transit zone for all kinds of migrants. There are many organisations who deal with movement of people within the zone as travelling agents and transporters. The zone is used for cross-border migration through the many routes along the border towns. The issue of trafficking is now attracting the attention of government and other agencies in the zone as the activities of traffickers are now on the increase. Before now there were negligible activities of the traffickers due to the civilised and sophisticated nature of the people in the zone. The recent increase can be attributed to the clampdown on the traffickers in the South-South (especially Edo and Delta which share border with Ondo state in the South-West) ([22]).

This issue of trafficking in person is facilitataed by the fact that Lagos and Ogun states in the zone share border with Benin Republic. People are trafficked from the zone or into the zone for prostitution, forced labour, child labour etc. The porous borders have been used by criminal networks for trafficking women and girls from the zone and other parts of Nigeria. Women and children are trafficked to other West and Central African countries of Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Cape Verde, Mali and Senegal. Nigerian women and children are also trafficked through the international airport in Lagos to destinations in North Africa and Middle East such as Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Oman, mostly for domestic services and sex work. Some are also trafficked from the zone to Central Asian countries. On many occasions, young women and men are trafficked overland from Ibadan and Lagos through Kano and Sokoto to Niger Republic and Libya. In order to curb this irregular migration pattern, the IOM under the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration, and European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) project, organised business training programmes for returnees in Lagos and other parts of Nigeria. The EUTF-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration facilitated 39 charter flights from Libya between April 2017 and May 2018. Returnees were also supported under community-based projects and in-kind reintegration assistance. From 9 to 19 March 2020, the International Organization for Migration organized series of newly-designed business skills and management training in Lagos, as part of providing needs-based and comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration support to Nigerian victims of trafficking voluntarily returning from Libya and other countries along the central Mediterranean route. About 200 beneficiaries successfully participated in the extended business skills training ([23]).

Destination

The South-West zone is a major destination for ECOWAS intra-regional flows of West African migrants. Regional migrants to South-West are increasing in this era of globalization. There is a significant population of ECOWAS citizens from Benin Republic, Ghana, Mali, Togo, Senegal, Niger, The Gambia, Guinea Conakry and Guinea Bissau. The benefit of harnessing the potentials of the foreign migrant workers for development has become obvious in the aesthetics of housing construction in many parts of the Southwest. Afolabi et al (2016) explain how migrant craftsmen from major four countries in West Africa namely Benin, Ghana, Niger and Togo, are preferred by construction professionals for crafts work on building construction sites in Lagos ([24]). Migrants from the Gambia, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Senegal play prominent roles in the gemstones trade. They established a regional market at Ojoo, Ibadan, which expanded their commercial networks with global markets in Asia and Europe.[25] Senegalese migrants are prominent fashion designers and makers of embroidery.

Beggars from Niger Republic often migrated to the South-West during the dry season and return during the raining and planting season. On the other hand, during the raining season, South-West continues to attract migrants from Togo, Ghana and Benin, who are basically migrant farmers. Following the trend of economic decline in West Africa from the early 1990s, there is a transition from trans-border trade to trans-border farming along the Nigeria-Benin Republic border in Oyo and Ogun states. The migration of Bialaba environmental migrants from Benin Republic to Saki in Oyo State and Abeokuta in Ogun State in search of fertile land for farming as a result of climatic change is a leading example([26]). Popoola observes the indications of low level of migrants’ integration in the rural border communities of Southwest ([27]). Many of the migrants rented their houses, land and preferred marrying among themselves. They had the aspirations of going back to their countries of origin. Southwestern Nigeria has hosted several international migrants. The Indians, Lebanese, Syrians, Arabs, Africans and now, Chinese, Koreans and Taiwanese settled in Oyo, Ogun, Osun and Lagos states for their business investments. Many of the international migrants established factories, which generate employment opportunities and sources of revenue for the government.

The Lebanese migrants have been part of the South-West society since the early 20^th century. Many of them invested in bakery, grocery stores, lottery business, manufacturing companies, transport, education and so on ([28]).The Chinese migrants invested in various sectors of the economy. There is a thriving China town in Lagos. However, some Chinese have been accused of land grabbing and illegal mining activities ([29])

Since the 2nd World African Festival of Arts and Culture, FESTAC ’77 in Lagos, the zone has continued to attract local and international tourists/visitors for cultural festivals such as Ogun festival, Osun, Osogbo, Ojude Oba, Eyo, Oranmiyan, Oke-Badan, Egungun festivals and so on. These festivals have generated revenue for the government and improved the international status of the country.

The sub-region of West Africa has produced refugees and victims of trafficking. There are refugees from Togo hosted in Lagos State. In 2008, the UNHCR closed the Oru refugee camp, which had hosted refugees from Liberia and Sierra-Leone for about 18 years.

The South-West zone has become a major centre for cross-border irregular migration. There is significant human trafficking through the porous borders. Women and Children are trafficked from Benin Republic, Ghana and Togo for domestic services, street trading, bar/restaurant work and sex work. The trafficked boys are forced to work on quarries, gemstones mines, commercial farming, block making industries, building construction, street begging and crime. There is rising wave of child labour at quarries (in Abeokuta, Ondo, Ibadan), on cocoa plantations (in Ondo, Ogun and Ekiti states), in mines (Ogun, Osun and Oyo states).

Conclusion and recommendations

Migration has implications in the South-West zone in terms of economic, social, educational, political and demographic realities. Migration in the zone follows a variety of patterns, including regular and irregular internal migrations that are both inflow and outflow; regular and irregular international migrations that involve immigration and emigration.

The high level of tolerance in the zone permitted migrants to form trading blocs and appropriate urban commercial spaces. In some cases, migrants intensified their social integration through inter-ethnic marriages. These increasing inter-ethnic marriages intensified national unity. Others, such as Hausa migrants continued to carve out exclusive neighbourhoods and commercial spaces for themselves. Migration led to expansion of urban markets for patronage of goods and services, thereby boosting economic development in the zone.

The provision of services and labour in the formal and informal sectors of the economy offered employment opportunities and increased human capital development. The Yoruba people of Southwest zone lived with the migrants in their domain through mutual understanding and ethnic tolerance.

New fashions provided by a myriad of internal and international migrants produced social change and cosmopolitan outlook in the zone. Remittances provided by the Yoruba migrants in the diaspora contributed significantly to the national gross domestic product, poverty alleviation, family empowerment, infrastructural development, social welfare and brain circulation.

Numerous challenges such as paucity of migration data, inadequate synergy among government MDAs involved in the migration governance, inadequate awareness on the dangers of irregular migration, inability to harness the benefits of regular migration for development, ineffective border management and unbridled abuse of ECOWAS free mobility protocol could be identified in the zone.

There are likewise several threats of certain migration patterns in the South-West. The zone is bordered by other West African countries with sea ports and land routes, utilized for smuggling of cars, contrabands including arms and human trafficking. Unending business of human trafficking and smuggling to and from South-West Nigeria has been witnessed. Re-trafficking and re-migration of trafficked victims, re-migration of returnees and deportees and increasing cases of child migration and unaccompanied returnee minors have become worrisome in the zone. There is ineffective integration of voluntary returnees and deportees.

Security threat partly arose from inflow of migrants moving in droves without decent accommodation and means of livelihood. Of recent, the high rate of kidnap, armed banditry and incipient terrorism in the zone were attributed to some migrants ([30]). This partly informed the creation of Amotekun South-West security initiative and the ban on commercial motorcycle operators popularly called okada in some of the major roads in the zone.

There is significant loss of manpower in the rural areas due to massive migration of youths to urban areas in the zone and beyond. The resulting low level of agricultural productivity leads to food insecurity and high prices of food stuffs. Internal and cross-border migration into the zone overstretches existing urban social infrastructure. These migration trends far outstrip available urban infrastructure, thereby deepening the crisis of degeneration and decay. Unplanned population increase has its attendant social consequences. These include environmental pollution, spread of diseases and epidemics, drug trade and abuse. Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists and conflicts between local people and migrant land grabbers have been added to the features of inter-group relations in the zone.

This study recommends more involvement of local and state governments in migration dialogue; promotion of collaboration with indigenous rulers, community and religious leaders; involvement of transporters, artisans, artists, youths and women groups, in migration management. There should also be improvement of border management and control; identifying measures to control irregular migration in the zone; increased sensitisation on the dangers of irregular migration, as well as the pathways available for regular migration. Data generation and management for evidence based migration management; timely prosecution of traffickers, smugglers and cross-border criminals; and evolving strategies on how to harness potentials of the migrants for the development of the zone are indispensable.

Endnotes

[1] National Bureau of Statistics. Internally Generated Revenue At State Level (Q2 2018) National Bureau of Statistics, 2018. https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/Internally_Generated_Revenue_At_State_Level_Q2_2018.pdf. (accessed November 30, 2020).

[2] National Population Commission. Basic Education Profile for Southwest Nigeria Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo States
National Population Commission (n. d.) https://www.epdc.org/sites/default/files/documents/nigeria_subnatn_sw_0.pdf.(accessed 30 November, 2020).

[3] Pilling D. Nigerian economy: Why Lagos works Financial Times., 2018

https://www.ft.com/content/ff0595e4-26de-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0(accessed 30 November, 2020).

[4] Ibid.

[5] Dele Layiwola, Ed., The City State of Ibadan: Texts and Contexts. Institute of African Studies in Collaboration with BookBuilders, Ibadan, 2015.

[6] IOM. A Brief on Nigeria’s IOM Projects. N. d. https://www.iom.int/countries/ni (accessed 30 November, 2020).

[7] Dele Layiwola, Ed., op. cit. .

[8] Nwokocha, E.E. “The Igbo in Ibadan: Migration, Integration and Challenges” in Dele Layiwola, Ed., The City State of Ibadan: Texts and Contexts. Institute of African Studies in Collaboration with BookBuilders, Ibadan, 2015, pp. 153-168.

[9] Olaosebikan J., Adeleye O.S. and Adeleye O.A. . “Hausa Migrant Settlers and their Involvement in the Trade and Service Sectors of Ado- Ekiti, Southwest Nigeria.”

London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences, 2019Volume 19 (Issue 2)

https://journalspress.com/LJRHSS_Volume19/572_Hausa-Migrant-Settlers-and-their-Involvement-in-the-Trade-and-Service-Sectors-of-Ado-Ekiti-Southwest-Nigeria.pdf. (accessed 30 November, 2020)

[10] Olaniyi, R.O. “West African Migrants and Okada (Commercial Motorcycle) Business in Ibadan Since the 1990s” Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies, 2013, Vol. 23, pp. 91-114.

[11] Fabusoro E. and Oyegbami, A. . Key Issues in Livelihoods Security of Migrant Fulani Pastoralists: Empirical Evidence From Southwest Nigeria. Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Creative Arts, 2009, 4(2): pp. 1-20

[12] Olaniyi, R.O. 2015. “Bororo Fulani Pastoralists and Yoruba Farmers’ Conflicts in the Upper Ogun River, Oyo State Nigeria, 1986-2004” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2015, Vol. 50, (2), pp. 239-252.

[13] Olaniyi, R.O. 2003. “No Way Out: Trafficking of Women in Nigeria.” Feminist Agenda, South Africa, 2003, (No. 55), pp. 44-52; R. O. Olaniyi, “Child Labour and Nigeria’s Informal Economy since the 1990s,” The Nigerian Journal of Economic History, 2005, (Numbers 7 and 8), pp. 205-235; Olaniyi, R.O. 2009. “Economic Crises and Child Trafficking: A Comparative Analysis of the 1930s and 1990s” in Osita Agbu, Ed., Children and Youth in the Labour Process in Africa, Senegal: CODESRIA Book Series, 2009, pp. 35-62.

[14] Olateru-Olagbegi, B. Path to Women’s Development: Thoughts, Vision and Passion. Lagos: Women’s Consortium of Nigeria (WOCON),2013, p. 33.

[15] Wahab, B. “NIS Says Oyo is becoming hot spot of girl trafficking” Pulse Nigeria, 06 September, 2019.

[16] Saka-Olokungboye N. and Agbi N. . Family Values and the Emergence of Baby Factory in Southwestern Nigeria. Journal of Family & Adoption Law, 2018,Volume 1, (Issue 2). www.stmjournals.com. (accessed, 25 November, 2020).

[17] Aboluwade, A. . “We sleep outside under the shed and wait for alms” Nigerian Tribune.27th October, 2018. https://tribuneonlineng.com/we-sleep-outside-under-the-shed-and-wait-for-alms/ (accessed 23 November, 2020).

[18] Ogunyemi, D. “Behold Ibadan colony of beggars.” Daily Trust. April 30, 2016 https://dailytrust.com/behold-ibadan-colony-of-beggars. (accessed 23 November, 2020).

[19] Olaniyi, R.O. .Diaspora is Not Like Home: A Social and Economic History of Yoruba in Kano, 1912-1999 Lincom EuropaGermany, 2008 and Olaniyi, R.O. . “Approaching the Study of the Yoruba Diaspora in Northern Nigeria,” in T. Falola and A. Genova, Eds, Yoruba Identity and Power Politics University of Rochester Press, Rochester, 2006), pp. 231-250.

[20] Olaniyi, R.O. Safeguarding migration returns in the Context of COVID-19 Insights from the corridor Cote d’Ivoire – Nigeria. E-learning on Labour Migration Governance and Coherence with Employment Policies. 2020.

[21] Olaniyi, R.O. , “Children Abroad: Exploring the Role of Remittance in African Development,” African Development, I. M. Zulu and A. Aderemi,Eds, ( The African Diaspora Foundation, Los Angeles, ) pp. 94-142.

[22] Nigeria Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Nigeria Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2020

https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/nigeria/ Retrieved on (accessed November, 2020)and Nigeria Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Nigeria

https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report-2/nigeria (accessed November, 2020.

[23] IOM Takes New Appproach to Business Skills Training for Vulnerable Nigerian Returnees

https://rodakar.iom.int/news/iom-takes-new-appproach-business-skills-training-vulnerable-nigeria (accessed November, 2020).

[24] Afolabi A., Ijeoma Emeghe I., Oyeyipo O. and Ojelabi R. Professionals’ Preference for Migrant Craftsmen in Lagos State Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 2016, Vol. 7 (No 1).

[25] Olaniyi, R.O. “West African Stone Boys in the Ibadan Mining Frontiers Since the 1990s” Ibadan Journal of the Social Sciences, 2014, Vol. 12, (No. 2), pp. 212-226.

[26] Dreier, V. and Sow, P. 2015. Bialaba Migrants from the Northern of Benin to Nigeria, in Search of Productive Land—Insights for Living with Climate Change. Sustainability, 2015, 7(3), pp. 3175-3203; https://doi.org/10.3390/su7033175 (accessed ...).

[27] Popoola, K. O. Cross-Border Migrants’ Integration in Rural Border Communities of South-West Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development Studies 2016, Volume 9, (Number 2), pp. 138-152.

[28] Olaniyi, R. O. and Ajayi, O. M. , “The Lebanese in Ibadan, Nigeria, 1986-2012” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 2014, Vol. 23 pp. 131-149.

[29] Abubakar, S. “Osun Amotekun nabs 10 Chinese, Ghanaian, 3 locals for illegal mining” Vanguard, May 20, 2020.
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/05/osun-amotekun-nabs-10-chinese-ghanaian-3-locals-for-illegal- (accessed November, 2020).

[30] National Insight. Kidnappers of WAEC Officials, others Arrested Inside Old Oyo National Park. National Insight, March 22, 2018. https://nationalinsightnews.com/kidnappers-of-waec-officials-others-arrested-inside-old-oyo-national-park/ March 22, 2018 (accessed November 2020).

Ridwan Yusuf, 'The Truth' About 'Terrorists' In Kishi, Oyo State, Nigeria. EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW– The Iba of Kisi in Irepo Local Government Area (LGA) of Oyo State, Oba Moshood Oyekola Lawal Arowoduye https://allnews.ng/news/exclusive-the-truth-about-terrorists-in-kishi-oyo-state-nigeria-iba. (accessed November 2020).

Jeremiah Oke, OPC, vigilante, hunters comb Oyo forest, arrest 5 suspects,

September 21, 2020.

https://dailytrust.com/opc-vigilante-hunters-comb-oyo-forest-arrest-5-suspects (accessed November 2020).

National Insight, How OPC Arrested Kidnappers, Terrorists at Old Oyo Forest Reserve in Kishi…Recover Guns and Ammunitions, National Insight, September 22, 2020

https://nationalinsightnews.com/how-opc-arrested-kidnappersterrorists-at-old-oyo-forest-reserve-in-kishi/(accesssed November 2020).

CHAPTER 7 - NIGERIA-AFRICA MIGRATION DYNAMICS

Omolola S. Olarinde

Introduction

In 2017, there were over half a million documented Nigerians living in the rest of Africa, most of them (89%) in the Western and Central regions according to the World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD)([i]). The proportion of male to female migrants from Nigeria in the rest of Africa in 1960 was 58/42% but by 2000, the female migrant stock had increased to 44% of all migrants. Exceptionally, Ghana had predominantly male migrants from Nigeria (59%) in the 1960s, a time in which the Ghana gold mines were an attraction to migrants from Nigeria; over time, female migrant stock from Nigeria in Ghana increased to 51% by 2000. Conversely, males made up 83% of all Nigerian migrants to South Africa by 2000 as reported in the GBMD.

The more recent literature highlights the roles of migration governance in shaping these journeys, particularly migration for national and regional development, the safety of migrant routes, and the genderization of these migration configurations. The need to support the market towards better allocation of labour, and to provide for social welfare of vulnerable migrants has emerged as a major concern around Africa. A detailed re-examination of Nigerian migration patterns to the rest of Africa in the light of more complete datasets is not only going to contribute to the existing anecdotal evidence on Nigerian migration patterns, but also in comparing periods of less formal migration management with the increased formalization since the 1990s ([ii]). This approach obliges the increasing call for Nigeria to determine her migration objectives and express them clearly; inclusive of prospects arising from migration within Africa ([iii]).

This chapter is organized in four parts. This introduction sets the tone. The second part is a discussion of the migration from Nigeria to Africa, since the 1960s. The third part elaborates on the political economy of Nigeria-Africa migration and where possible links the politico-economic context with migration patterns observed in part two. The document concludes in the fourth part with prospects for Nigeria with a special focus on concerns and emerging ideas towards promoting better migration governance that harnesses the positive returns from migration.

Historizing Nigeria-Africa Migration Dynamics

The GBMD shows that in 2017, there were 530,787 documented Nigerians in the rest of Africa, or 29 per cent of all migrants from Nigeria. Nigeria’s migration volumes within the continent at 29 per cent are significantly below the average of African migrants living in other African countries, which has been put at 60 per cent([iv]). Nigeria is oppositely, among the top five immigrant receiving countries within the continent ([v])

Among the Nigerian migrants in Africa, almost half (48%) are in Cameroon, Chad and Niger ([vi]). Cameroon, Chad and Niger also host a significant proportion of Nigerians fleeing conflicts from Boko Haram and other Non-State Group Actors (NSGA). While migration from Nigeria to the rest of Africa is predominantly for economic reasons, the UNHCR reported that there are 292,682 Nigerian refugees in Niger, Cameroon and Chad. These are distributed as follows: 162,961 in Niger, 115,774 in Cameroon, and 13,947 in Chad; the latter showing a significant rise from 3069 refugees at the start of the Lake Chad area crisis in 2014(^.[vii]).

The map of Nigerian migration in Africa shows that Nigerians migrate mostly within West Africa (60%); and exempting those countries with large flows of refugees; the bulk of these are in Ghana (70,705), Benin (46,036), Cote d’Ivoire (43,761) and Togo (32,796). The economic, otherwise voluntary, migration patterns reflect the attraction of geographical proximity, since 89 per cent of all migrants are in the Western (60%) and Central (29%) regions, to which costs of migration are relatively lower. The colour intensity of the map indicates that as we move further from Nigeria geographically, the number of Nigerian migrants in Africa tends to decline and North Africa has only one per cent of documented Nigerians. Exceptionally, South Africa attracts a significant number of Nigerian migrants.

Migration from Nigeria to many of the countries on the African continent has risen since 1960 especially in Southern Africa where countries like Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana saw a rise in migrant stock by a factor of 303, 281, and 101 respectively. A part of the migration rise shows a diversification of migration patterns from Nigeria to other countries in Africa where there was initially only a small stock of less than ten Nigerians, for example Botswana and Namibia, Seychelles, Algeria, and Libya. Another part of the significant rises in documented migration are in the values for Cameroon and Niger which are associated with the Bakassi and Lake Chad area conflicts. Contrarily, Ghana saw a significant decline in migrant stock from Nigeria in 2017 compared to 1960. In addition, countries such as Uganda, Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo that have witnessed war in the 1970s and 1980s continue to show a decline in migrant stock from Nigeria even in 2017([viii] ).

The profile of those migrating within Africa shows that an important proportion of them hold University degrees. In a field study by Olatuyi, Awoyinka and Adeniyi, 76 per cent of respondents interviewed in South Africa and Ghana had a bachelors or master’s degree and most of them (67%) had private investments or were self-employed at the destinations.([ix]). Kirwin and Anderson also found an association between religion and the desire to migrate from Nigeria with more Christians (68%) than Muslims willing to migrate([x]). The desire to migrate was also concentrated in Lagos (84%), other South Western states (70%), South East (70%) and South-South (60%) geopolitical regions in Nigeria and higher among educated urban residents who use the internet frequently affirming the connection of rise in migration with the financial means to migrate([xi]).

Migration from Nigeria to the rest of Africa has been on the rise. In 2013, the overall increase according to regions was: West Africa (40%), South Africa (34%), East and North Africa (13% each) and a decline in migration to Central Africa by 31 per cent driven by a fall in the values for Cameroon. Economic opportunities at the destination as well as economic hardship, particularly unemployment at origin are significant drivers of migration from Nigeria, but also political stability and service delivery such as access to water in the countries of destination([xii])

The conflicts in Nigeria in recent history (since 2014) has displaced a significant number of persons, including children, across the borders as well as internally. United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) documented that in 2017 four million of the refugees in Africa, a number which represents 57 per cent of their entire population are children.([xiii]). There were over two million internally displaced persons in Nigeria in 2019, in 2017 about one million of the displaced were children.([xiv]). The UNICEF also reported the disturbing practice of recruiting child suicide bombers in Nigeria and drew attention in 2017 to a rise in the number of children involved in this practice.

A number of child migrants across Africa including from Nigeria are seeking employment opportunities. Hashim and Thorsen posit that the Nigerian child socialization process includes duties that would be considered work in the global context.([xv]). In this case, while Nigeria has Child Rights Act, which prohibits the use of children for labour, inherent social practices that contravene the provisions of this Act remain within many communities in Nigeria. Child migrants from Nigeria, especially boys move to work in cocoa plantations in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana as well as cotton plantations in Benin and Burkina Faso; and some of these child migrants have been trafficked.([xvi]). A part of that movement is seasonal occurring mainly during the dry season, when children from Nigeria move to work in farms in other West African countries. In relation to recruitment for armed conflict, Carrion Gaspari and Zanella in 2018 estimated that in 2015 and 2016, there were 400 children recruited by non-state group actors in Nigeria and Mali([xvii]). The study also mentioned that girl children from Nigeria go to other West African countries, especially Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali to work as waitresses in marquis. Many of the girls were trafficked for example to Burkina Faso; and trafficking of girl children was identified as a problem peculiar to Nigeria and Guinea([xviii]).

The column chart on migration to West Africa shows that Mali (86%), Togo (51%) and Ghana (19%) had the most significant rises in the number of Nigerian migrants. Also, notable was an 80 per cent rise in Niger with its unique circumstance as host to a relatively large number of Nigerian refugees fleeing the conflict in Lake Chad area. Migration from Nigeria to other West African countries has seen the most significant rise among the regions on the continent.

Migration from Nigeria to Ghana fluctuated significantly between 1960 and 2017. Ghana had gained independence in 1957 and had a vibrant economy driven by exports of cocoa, coffee and minerals such as gold and other metals, and relative economic stability([xix]). A significant number of Nigerians working in mining and other businesses and retails sectors were in Ghana.([xx]). Indeed, there were almost twice (1.57 times) as many Nigerians in Ghana in 1960 compared to 2017. The expulsion of Nigerian immigrant community from Ghana in 1969, following the ‘Alien’s’ Compliance Order, which gave foreign nationals two weeks to obtain a resident permit or leave, had immediate effect on the stock of Nigeria migrants in Ghana; by 1970 the stock of Nigerian migrants had shrunk to one-third of the 1960 values, and by 1980 the migrant stock was merely five per cent of the 1960 values. ([xxi])

The second phase of the ECOWAS protocol on free movements of people effective in July 1986, comes with this slight growth in the stock of Nigerian migrants in West Africa. This included Ghana, and by the year 2000 there had been a 75 per cent rise in the number of Nigerians in Ghana, yet the numbers remained marginal when compared to the initial 1960 values. The long-term impacts of Nigeria-Ghana relations meant that even if an upward trend resumed in 1990, Nigerian migrants in Ghana by 2017 remained less than half of the values of 1960.

Less volatile fluctuations in migration patterns show in the Nigeria-Cote d’Ivoire case. Migration rose most significantly in 1980, yet by 1990 when migration to most of West Africa was rising, the migrant stock of Nigerians in Côte d’Ivoire had declined. The values started to rise again in 2000 and peaked at 43,761 in 2013 and stayed the same in 2017. Although the stock of migrants from Nigeria to Côte d’Ivoire had doubled in 2017 compared to 1960, there were only 33 more Nigerians than in 1980.

Benin and Togo fall into a different pattern of steady rise in migrant stock from Nigeria since the 1960s. Migration to Togo proceeded as a steady rise and peaked at 32,796 in 2017. Similarly, migration to Benin has been on upward trend since 1960 and peaked at 46,036 in 2017. These trends reflect strengthening good relationships where migrants built on previously formed networks with these countries. They also reflect more stable opportunities in the agricultural sector relative to mining and other sectors as most Nigerians in Benin go to work on cotton and cocoa plantations.

In the case of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal, migration from Nigeria has risen only marginally; indeed, for Burkina Faso, the migrant stock remains lower than the 1990 values. In countries like Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and Liberia, the overall stock of Nigerian migrants is only marginal and fluctuations have been negligible.

Indeed, migration to West and Central Africa combined make up almost 90 per cent of all documented migrations from Nigeria within Africa. Central Africa hosts 29 per cent of all Nigerians or 154,707; with Gabon (22,779) and Central African Republic (2,453) leading as destination countries. The number of Nigerians on the move to the Central African region are driven mostly by Cameroon. While the number of Nigerians in Sao Tome and Principe remain small (363) relative to the rest of Central Africa, this reflects a growth of 90% since 1960. The most significant growth in the migration of Nigerians in East Africa is seen in Gabon; with a wave of migration starting after the 1980s, there was a remarkable rise after 2010 when peace was restored in Gabon. By 2017, there were twelve times more Nigerians in Gabon than in 1960.

The migrant stock of Nigerians in Southern Africa is 29,539; or about 6% of Nigerians in all of Africa. Most of this population is concentrated in South Africa where 93 per cent of Nigerians in Southern Africa or 27,326 live; followed not so closely in number by Namibia (910), Botswana (770) and Zambia (532). There has been steady rise in the number of Nigerian migrants in Botswana, Malawi, and Zimbabwe but only marginal in comparable magnitude. Migration from Nigeria to South Africa rose tremendously from 1960 to 2017 by a factor of 281. Part of this is associated with the end of apartheid in 1994, and along with this the improvement in economic growth with the democratization of South Africa. Even though growth in production has been marginal in South Africa since 2015, the rise in Nigerian migrant stock persists.

Nigerians in East Africa make up four per cent of all Nigerians in Africa or 22,145 and the top locations are in Sudan (17,488), South Sudan (3,541) and Kenya (976) and these values have been relatively stable over time.

North Africa has the smallest proportion of documented Nigerians at one percent or 4,100 of those in Africa as a whole located primarily in Libya (2913), Egypt (1173), Algeria (634) and Tunisia (553); there was no data for Morocco. Documented migration from Nigeria to Northern Africa has risen steadily since the 1960s with no country showing any significant leap. The documented migrants from Nigeria are concentrated in Libya and Egypt. Notably, there is a significant number of undocumented migrants from Nigeria across Africa, and the situation is especially dire in Northern Africa from where migrants hope to pass into Europe.

A vibrant network of Nigerian migrants has formed across Africa especially in countries with economic prosperity levels relatively close to Nigeria, for example South Africa. The World Bank Global Bilateral Remittances Matric (GBRM) estimated remittances to Nigeria from South Africa at US$ 324 million and Ghana at US$ 874 million in the year 2017([xxii]) The calculation methodology of these estimates, by default assigns destinations with higher immigration values with higher remittances, so that Cameroon and Benin also feature with high remittance values. However, an earlier study by Olatuyi et al. shows that on the average, a Nigerian in South Africa remits about US$ 3,300 home annually, and for Ghana the average annual amount is US$ 2,470 (.[xxiii]). The GBRM database captures remittances sent through official channels, which would explain part of the seemingly lower values than those indicated by surveys such as Olatuyi et al.([xxiv]). Remittances are ordinarily underestimated in the World Bank reports relative to the Central Bank of Nigeria report. However, GBRM offers the advantage of providing data according to source country of remittance inflow. According to the GBRM (2018) estimates, US$ 6,191 million was remitted from Africa alone to Nigeria.

Migration from Nigeria to the rest of Africa is in most cases between 20 and 30 per cent higher for men than for women. Notable exceptions with predominant male migrant stock from Nigeria include South Africa (82%), Egypt (79%), Gabon (72%) and Zambia (70%). Historically migrant stock of males exceeded females in Gabon throughout the period, and by 2000 the difference had risen so high that there were 62 per cent more males. In South Africa by 2000 the ratio of male to female was 5:1. In Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia the number of Nigerian males also remained significantly higher than females although the difference had been declining marginally with time. In the case of Guinea, there had been a steady rise in the number of male migrants from Nigeria while the change in number of females was less significant.

In Ghana in 1960, males were significantly higher than females (by 31%). However by 1980 the proportion of females compared to males rose significantly and by 2000 there were about two per cent more females than males. Malawi followed a similar trend with Nigerian female migrants rising faster than males and in Zimbabwe females from Nigeria overtook males in 1970 and stayed higher while in Senegal females increased above males and remained higher since 1990. Yet by far the most significant rise in female migrants in 2000 compared to 1960 was for Sierra Leone where by 2000 there were twice as many women from Nigeria. While the literature on migration by gender is sparse, general information on gender disparity in labour markets suggests that these patterns are driven by labour market opportunities that are traditionally gender specific such as farming for males and restaurant jobs for females. The data on bilateral migration from Nigeria was missing for a number of countries, however, a 2015 report of the African Union on labour market statistics also showed Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania having higher proportion of female migrants from all countries relative to males.

The Political Economy of Nigeria-Africa Migration

Nigeria and indeed Africa has been transitioning to more formalized migration governance structures, from a period when migration was not a major political concern, as observed by Sam-Arhin, to the institutionalization of migration governance through streamlining migration into national development plans. In 2014 Nigeria adopted the National Policy on Labour Migration (NPLM). This was followed by the adoption of the National Migration Policy (NMP) in 2015 and the National Diaspora Policy, validated in 2019 and adopted in 2021. There has also been a formalization of transnational networks through the Diaspora Commission Establishment Act (2017) creating the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM). Overall, Nigeria has the most comprehensive migration governance policies in Africa. ([xxv])

At the backdrop of the national positions towards migration are agreements across the continent that foster neo-liberalized markets for development. The Abuja treaty in 1991 through its protocol on relations between the African Economic Communities (AEC) and Regional Economic Communities (REC) called for inter-REC cooperation. The African Union rests on the founding principle of free movement of people. The draft protocol of the (Abuja) treaty establishing the AEC (2017) affirms the “common vision for an integrated, people-centred and politically united continent and commitment to the free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment” within the planned aspiration 2 of the African Union Agenda 2063. In addition to these, there are a number of policies and programmes promoting migration for development, more recently the declaration on migration by the African Union (AU) in its 25^th Assembly in 2015, and Intra-African Talent Mobility Partnership (2014). In terms of regional integration, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in its 2019 regional integration index rates Nigeria as moderately integrated.([xxvi]). This systematization of migration governance counts towards coordination and coherence of migration management, and shows the expressed national objectives as well as institutions that foster achieving those aims.

The chapter aligns with Baland et al. who offer that the best way to look at governance is as a subset of institution theory,([xxvii]) especially since governance can only be observed as a product of both economic and political variables.([xxviii]). Institutions or ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions’([xxix]) are critical to migration outcomes. In addition to political institutions, economic institutions help allocate resources to their most efficient uses.

There are various approaches to examining the impact of institutions and actors on migration patterns. For example, an adaptation of migration network theory to state and non-state actors’ behavior explains migration preferences as those that suit the actors’ goals. There are a number of captivating discussions around the impact of networks on migration outcomes, with the focus resting on determining the rules of the game. Networks have been significant in negotiating integration within Africa. Similarly, transnational communities between Nigeria and the rest of Africa, for instance between Nigeria and Ghana rely on migrant networks to develop. However, as seen in examples of expulsion of migrants within the continent, networks can become fragile in maintaining agreements. In terms of migrant networks, it can be argued that formalized migration management structures increased their fragility. There are also cases in which formal regional agreements have been relegated to the background in favour of political interests of sovereign states. One instance is the 1983 Shagari political administration of Nigeria, which placed electoral goals ahead of national developmental objectives in expelling migrants from Nigeria.

In the sense expressed by Acemoglu and Robinson, political institutions hold de jure and de facto power to influence outcomes ([xxx]). These political institutions such as constraints on exercising authority could be in the form of de jure formal arrangements or de facto economic opportunities. Economic institutions, such as free markets or the liberalization of migration across the continent could become affected by these political institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson argue largely that collective choices come with economic consequences and groups with stronger political power prevail in the case of conflicts of interests.

The argument is extended to this chapter to explain how governance impacts upon configurations of Nigerian migrants in the rest of Africa through de jure powers of political institutions and de facto opportunities that groups with economic and political resources offer. To simplify the task, the chapter examines a case of breach to regional agreements. Further, in a bid to reflect the kind of institutional arrangements necessary to promote desirable migration outcomes the chapter adopts the Migration Governance framework (MiGov) of the International organization for Migration, which provides ‘policy levers that a country can use to strengthen their migration governance structures’([xxxi]).

Adherence to principles of migration governance

The two MiGov principles of adherence to international standards and fulfillment of migrants’ rights; and formulating policy using evidence and a “whole-of-government” approach are generally speaking, represented in the Nigerian policy documents. Regional and national institutions have de jure power to exercise those established agreements. This section offers a selective discussion of the partner engagement principle that reflects the importance of partnerships in achieving national development. The indicator focuses on countries’ efforts to cooperate on migration-related issues with other states and with relevant non-governmental actors, including civil society organizations and the private sector’. In this simple example, if institutions are beneficial, the existence of partnerships should fare better in achieving migration outcomes than where these are missing.

Governance is critical to determining de jure power in a society,([xxxii]) and regional arrangements are better suited than bilateral ones to dilute power imbalances and bring about cooperation among weak and strong countries([xxxiii]) African regional agreements however contain stipulations that allow sovereign states to support their national interests. In spite of the well-articulated conventions and policies that Nigeria is party to, bouts of ‘crisis’ approaches reflect commitment problems (34) of the political power in sticking to pre-determined principles and agreements and therefore in achieving migration objectives.

Periodic expulsion of immigrants is a common example of such commitment problems. Expulsions have been less frequent among African countries since the 1990s; this is the time the formalization of migration governance has increased in the region (35). A few examples from the time prior to this period suffice to draw attention to these bouts of ‘crisis’ approaches that reflect commitment problems: the expulsion of Nigerians in 1969 from Ghana; and after the oil boom, Nigeria’s so-called ‘retaliation’ in revoking Articles 4 and 27 of the free movement protocol and expelling over a million migrants in 1983 and 1985 (36) about half of whom were Ghanaians.(37, 38 ). More recently, the externalization of the Niger border ([xxxiv]) and in 2020, the Ghana Investment Promotion Council’s insistence on imposing a US$1million tax on Nigerian traders in Ghana. (39) The expressed regional interest has been integration, and Nigerian migration policies recognize that migration fosters development. However, the tendency to target immigrants in response to national development problems especially in the labour market has been linked with government attempts to gain political favour of the electorate by blaming economic problems on migrants.

Meeting objectives of migration governance

Institutions facilitate or impede the attainment of migration governance objectives. Advancing the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society, effectively addressing the mobility dimensions of crisis and ensuring that migration takes place in safe, orderly and dignified manner are the three MiGov objectives. Nigeria is signatory to a number of treaties and conventions, (40) that protect human and labour rights of migrants. In addition to these, the NPLM emphasises a commitment to migrants’ protection and societal welfare in relation to migration. De jure, while these institutions recognize the developmental impact of migration, de facto economic benefits resulting from the liberalisation of migration accrue directly to migrants themselves, and the macroeconomic benefits may not immediately be observable especially with inadequate documentation and studies. Moreover, institution theory makes it clear that even significant macroeconomic gains can be ignored if they are not in favour of existing power structures.

Arbitrary expulsions of immigrants within the continent reflect group interests that neglect existing arrangements. The result is an immediate dip in migrant stock but also migrants’ loss of property and in extreme cases, loss of life. Brydon’s account of the Ghanaians returning home following expulsion from Nigeria in 1983 reflects elements of more recent challenges on the regional road routes. The returnee Ghanaians transiting through Togo border reported hunger and even death from food related problems such as surviving on coconuts and then becoming constipated (41). The national economic consequences of such expulsions are often underreported, still studies such as Brydon’s emphasize that they almost never mean economic improvement for the expelling country and reflect resource gain only to the political power of the moment.

Conclusion and recommendations

The chapter is a selective evaluation of the migration experience from Nigeria to the rest of Africa. It calls for more thorough examination of how institutions affect migration outcomes and what kind of incentives and disincentives can enhance desirable outcomes. Nigeria remains a sending, transit, and receiving country from the rest of Africa for which it is important to lead with adequate migration institutions.

The chapter highlights that governance instruments are in place at the national and regional levels de jure empowering the pursuit of national and regional migration objectives, however migration objectives have been subject to commitment problems across the region. These commitment problems show up in arbitrary expulsion of migrants across the region in spite of existing agreements including continental liberalization drives. A number of incidents from Nigeria and other African countries suggests that crisis type interventions continue across the continent and the approaches reflect various group and national interests, rather than existing established principles and agreements. These are most often responses of the individual African countries to migrant activities within their territory. These have had adverse effects on the migration configurations across the continents and in particular on the welfare of various Africans on the move.

The chapter submits that the increasing formalization of migration management within the continent requires more explicit commitments to the determined migration objectives. A possible remedy will be to empower regional bodies, since this dilutes national power structures, to use disincentives to dissuade governments from defaulting from preexisting agreements. Also, crisis management approaches could be envisioned proactively since a crisis plan is more likely to stick within stipulated objectives.

Migration actors are more likely to stick with agreements towards maximizing the welfare of migrants when there are clear indicators of the impacts of immigrants on destination countries across Africa. This is a call for improved migration data including on labour market participation by gender. The genderised data is important among other reasons to highlight any shifts in traditional gender specific occupations and possible impacts on development. Indeed, other non-state actors could emphasize the returns from migration when political players try to renege on agreements.

Endnotes

World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database, World Bank Group and Izden, C. Parsons, Schiff M. and Walmsley T. L. “Where on Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration, 1960-2000”, World Bank Economic Review 25(1), 2011, pp.12-56
Brydon, L. “Ghana’s Response to the Nigerian Expulsion of 1983”. African Affairs, 84, (No. 337), 1985, pp. 561-585.
Arhin S. The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Nigeria. Arnold Bergstraesser Institute for Cultural Studies Research. Freiburg, 2019.
Eva, D and Schraven B. Regional Migration Governance in Africa and Beyond: A Framework of Analysis. German Development Institute discussion paper https://www.die-gdi.de/en/discussion-paper/article/regional-migration-governance-in- africa-and-beyond-a-framework-of-analysis/> (accessed October 2020)
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Economic Development in Africa Report: Migration for Structural Transformation. UNTCAD, New York and Geneva, 2018 https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/edar2018_ch2_en.pdf> (accessed November 2020)
World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database.
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Nigerian Refugees in Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Data Portal, 2020 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation> (accessed November 2020)
World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database, also see Faluhaux and Shoumaker. Democratic Republic of Congo: A migration history marked by crisis and restrictions. Migration Policy Institute newsletter, Brussels, 2018 https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/democratic-republic-congo-migration-history-marked-crises-and-restrictions> (accessed October 2020).
Olatuyi, A. and Adeniyi. C. Nigerian Diasporas in the South: Harnessing the Potential for National Development. African Carribean and Pacific Report ACPOBS/2013/PUB06, 2013.
Kirwin, M., & Anderson, J. Identifying the Factor Driving West African Migration, West African Papers (Number 17). OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018.
Kirwin, M., & Anderson, J.
Kirwin, M., & Anderson, J.
United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) Data snapshot of migrant and displaced children in Africa, Data brochure, 2018 at <https://data.unicef.org/ resources/data-snapshot-of-migrant-and-displaced-children-in-africa/> (accessed August 2020)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2019. Nigeria emergency newsletter. Geneva, last updated July 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/nigeria-emergency.html> (accessed September 2020).
Hashim T. and Thorsten. K. Child Migration in Africa. Zed Books. London, 2011.
Carrion A., De Gaspari, M. and Zanella S. Young and on the move in West Africa. Report of Save the Children and Mixed Migration Centre, West Africa, 2018.
Carrion A., De Gaspari, M. and Zanella S.
Carrion A., De Gaspari, M. and Zanella S.
L
Brydon, L.
World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database.
World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database.
Olatuyi, A. and Adeniyi. C.
Olatuyi, A. and Adeniyi. C.
Arhin S.
UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) 2019. African Regional Integration Index Report (ARII) 2019. <https://www.uneca.org/sites/ default/files/PublicationFiles/arii-report2019-fin-r39-21may20.pdf> (accessed November 2020).
Baland M., Moene K.V and Robinson, J.A. Governance and Development Center for Research in the Economics of Development University of Namur CREDWP, 2010.
Atkinson, M., & Fulton, M. The Political Economy of Good Governance. The Third International Conferenceon Public Policy. Singapore, 2017.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & and Robinson, J. Institutions as a Fundmanetal Cause of Long Run Growth. In P. A. Dulauf, Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol.1A, 2017, 386-472.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & and Robinson, J.
International Organisation for Migration. Migration Governance Indicators. Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC), 2016. https://gmdac.iom.int/migration-governance-indicators (accessed November 2020).
Baland M., Moene K.V and Robinson, J.A
Brydon, L.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson explain that individuals with political power cannot commit to not using them in their own favour, which results in distributional and efficiency problems.
D. Illegals and Expulsion in Africa: The Nigerian Experience. The International Migration Review, Vol. 18, (No. 3), Autumn, 1984, pp. 426-436.
D.
Brydon, L.
For a detailed discussion of expulsions in Africa see Adepoju, A.
Other examples of xenophobia exist across Africa including in the expulsion of Nigerians from Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, and South Africa
For example the ILO C-97 Migration for Employment Convention of 1949 in 1960 and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW; C-143) of 1990 in 2009; African Charter; UNESCO Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Certificates, Diplomas, Degrees and other Academic Qualifications in Higher Education in the African States, 1981 and so forth. For more detailed discussion see SEF (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden Development and Peace Foundation) 2016. Regional Migration Governance in the African Continent: Current State of affairs and the Way Forward. Bonn October 2016.
See for example Tubiana, J, Warin, C. and Saeneen G.M. 2018. Multilateral Damage: The Impact of EU Migration Policies on Central Saharan Routes. CRU (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations). Netherlands.

(Try cutting off from here. But watch if it affects the reference numbers in the body of the work)

References

[i] World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database, World Bank Group and Izden, C. Parsons, M. Schiff and T. L. Walmsley (2011) 'Where on Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration, 1960-2000', World Bank Economic Review 25(1):12-56

[ii] Brydon, L. 1985. Ghana’s response to the Nigerian expulsion of 1983. African Affairs, Oct., 1985, Vol. 84, No. 337 (Oct., 1985), pp. 561-585. Oxford University Press.

[iii] See Sam Arhin. 2019. The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Nigeria. Arnold Bergstraesser Institute for Cultural Studies Research. Freiburg.

[iv] Eva, D and Schraven B. 2018. Regional Migration Governance in Africa and Beyond: A Framework of Analysis . German Development Institute discussion paper available at < https://www.die-gdi.de/en/discussion-paper/article/regional-migration-governance-in- africa-and-beyond-a-framework-of-analysis/>

[v] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2018. Economic Development in Africa Report: Migration for Structural Transformation. UNTCAD. New York and Geneva. available at < https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/edar2018_ch2_en.pdf>

[vi] World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database, 2018. The World Bank Group.

[vii] UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 2020. Nigerian Refugees in Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Data Portal <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation>

[viii] See World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database. 2018; also see Faluhaux and Shoumaker. 2016. Democratic Republic of Congo: A migration history marked by crisis and restrictions. Migration Policy Institute newsletter, Brussels available at < https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/democratic-republic-congo-migration-history-marked-crises-and-restrictions>

[ix] Olatuyi, Awoyinka, and Adeniyi. 2013. Nigerian Diasporas in the South: Harnessing the Potential for National Development. African Carribean and Pacific Report ACPOBS/2013/PUB06

[x] Kirwin, M., & Anderson, J. (2018). Identifying the Factor Driving West African Migration. Paris: West African Papers Number 17. OECD Publishing.

[xi] Op cit

[xii] Op cit

[xiii] United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 2019. Data snapshot of migrant and displaced children in Africa, Data brochure available at <https://data.unicef.org/ resources/data-snapshot-of-migrant-and-displaced-children-in-africa/>

[xiv] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2019. Nigeria emergency newsletter. Geneva, last updated July 2020 available at < https://www.unhcr.org/nigeria-emergency.html>

[xv] Hashim and Thorsten. 2011. Child Migration in Africa. Zed Books. London.

[xvi] Carrion A., De Gaspari, M. and Zanella S. 2018. Young and on the move in West Africa. Report of Save the Children and Mixed Migration Centre, West Africa

[xvii] Carrion et al, op cit

[xviii] Op cit

[xix] Brydon. 1985. http://www.west-africa-brief.org/content/en/six-regions-african-union

[xx] Brydon, op cit

[xxi] See World Bank GBMD

[xxii] World Bank GBMD. Ibid.

[xxiii] Olatuyi et al. 2013. ibid

[xxiv] Op cit

[xxv] Sam Arhin 2019. Ibid.

[xxvi] UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) 2019. African Regional Integration Index Report (ARII) 2019 available at <https://www.uneca.org/sites/ default/files/PublicationFiles/arii-report2019-fin-r39-21may20.pdf>

[xxvii] See Baland J.M., Moene K.V and Robinson, J.A. 2010. Governance and Development Center for Research in the Economics of Development University of Namur CRED WP 2010/07.

[xxviii] Atkinson, M., & Fulton, M. (2017). The Political Economy of Good Governance. The Third International Conferenceon Public Policy. Singapore.

[xxix] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & and Robinson, J. (2005). Institutions as a Fundmanetal Cause of Long Run Growth. In P. A. Dulauf, Handbook of Economic Growth (Vol. Volume 1A, pp. 386-472). Elsevier.

[xxx] Op cit

[xxxi] International Organisation for Migration. 2016. Migration Governance Indicators. Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) available at <https://gmdac.iom.int/migration-governance-indicators>

[xxxii] Baland J.M., et al 2010. Ibid.

[xxxiii] Brydon. 1985. Ibid

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson explain that individuals with political power cannot commit to not using them in their own favour, which results in distributional and efficiency problems.

41See for example Tubiana, J, Warin, C. and Saeneen G.M. 2018. Multilateral Damage: The Impact of EU Migration Policies on Central Saharan Routes. CRU (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations). Netherlands.

CHAPTER 8 - NIGERIA-AMERICA MIGRATION DYNAMICS

Samuel Zalanga

Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to examine the dynamics of migration of Nigerians to North and South America, with specific emphasis on migration to the United States and South America. The chapter begins by presenting the theoretical perspectives used to account for why people migrate, why migration persists once it starts and the social consequences of migration on the sending country, the receiving country and the people migrating.

The chapter also focuses on the demographic insights on Nigerian immigrants in the United States. Here too, the data is presented in a comparative manner to help the reader appreciate how Nigerian immigrants in the United States compare to the general US population on the one hand and other sub-Saharan African population in the country on the other hand. The analysis in this part also highlights the difference between Nigerian-born Nigerian immigrants in the US and American-born Nigerians who are part of the Nigerian Diaspora in the US.

While there are no specific data on the migration of Nigerians to South America, yet the chapter underscores trends within the larger dynamics and perspective of the migration from Africa to South America. Most Africans involved in the South American migration process are from the West African region of the continent. Although this migration trend is relatively recent, especially in the last fifteen years in the 21^st century, a careful analysis of the trend creates a sobering feeling of concern about the desperation of African youths and middle-aged persons willing to risk their lives in search of a better future. The ideal ultimate destination of most of the migrants from Africa to South America is the US or Canada through the US-Mexican border. However, some may abandon the North America project to settle in any of the South American countries for reasons including the frustration and inability of reaching their goals.

In the concluding part of the chapter, several lessons, insights, conclusions and middle-level theoretical generalizations are highlighted based on the analysis in the chapter. One major lesson underscored in the conclusion is that Nigeria and indeed Africa runs the risk of remaining underdeveloped or haphazardly developed because no country or continent can sustainably develop itself by allowing its youths, middle-aged workers, scholars and diverse professionals to massively migrate to other countries and often with no desire to return to their countries of origin.

Explaining Nigeria-America Migration Using Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

If we want to explain why Nigerians decide to migrate to North America (especially the United States) and South America, instead of other parts of the world, there can be any number of factors that are responsible for that, but using theoretical perspectives as guide to the discussion, we can structure the analysis and the range of possible explanations. It should be noted also that no one single theory explains the phenomenon of migration. Instead, each theoretical perspective provides some meaningful insight in explaining the complex phenomenon of migration especially as they apply to the focus area of the chapter, the Nigerian-Americas migration perspective. Some of these theories include:

Neoclassical Economic Approach: Explains migration by applying the principles of demand and supply as it relates to labour and human capital across geographical location and places. Labor moves from locations where it is underutilized to locations where it is effectively utilized;

Dual Labour Market Theory: Migrants fill the gap created in the primary labour market by the restructuring of economies of developed countries that constitute destination countries of choice for migrants from developing countries;

World Systems Theory and Migration: Restructuring in developing countries dislocate their citizens compelling them to migrate, but they migrate mainly to countries that have economic, political, military, cultural and linguistic affinities and ties with their own countries. Nigerians rarely migrate to countries whose official language they cannot speak. Most Nigerians initially moved to Britain because of colonial ties and the legacy of British Commonwealth policies but with more stringent immigration policies, laws and rules in Britain and Europe at large in recent times, many Nigerians started thinking of moving to the United States and Canada. Today, there are more Nigerian immigrants in the United States than there are in Britain. Of course, today, some Nigerians are moving to South America because their sense of desperation and alienation in Nigeria has heightened, and compared to Nigeria, many South American countries are more socially ordered, and provide better opportunities or at least a strategic pathway to migrating to North America through Central America, and Mexico.

Network Theory: Explains the continuation, persistence and perpetuation of migration once started. It argues that once the pioneer migrants settle in the destination country, they form a community with the host community and yet maintain community with the country of origin. This network of communities forms a platform that facilitates continuation of migration from the community in the country of origin to the host country. This theory highlights the fact that communities in Nigeria that started to migrate to North or South America long ago and have established migrant communities in the new country will attract more migrants from their communities than communities in Nigeria that have had no or few people in their community that have migrated to the new country. Migrants from such communities that have no representation in North or South America will encounter greater challenges and risks in migrating because they have no strong and established network of ties and relationships in the new country. By and large, people in the Southern regions of Nigeria started migrating to North and South America far earlier than those from the Northern region. This explains why there are comparatively fewer migrants from the Northern region of Nigeria, especially Hausa-Fulani in North or South America.

Nigerian Immigrants in the United States: Insights through Demographic Dynamics

There are numerous sources of information about the demographics of Nigerians living in Diaspora and specifically in the United States. It is therefore hard to assume that only one source of information exists or that the numerous sources of information will all provide the same information because of variation in the metrics that they use. But according to (1) NGEX Nigeria (2020), the United Nations in its 2015 report on ongoing trends regarding international migration, identified the five countries in the world that have the leading concentration of Nigerians in Diaspora. The countries in order of numbers are: The United States of America, The United Kingdom, Cameroon, Ghana and Italy. Part of the reason why it is very difficult to have reliable information on Nigerians living abroad is that many Nigerians living outside the country are not always willing to cooperate in identifying themselves appropriately for documentation in official records. In addition to that, many of their host countries do not consider it important to have such specific records of immigrants from a particular country. Consequently, the number of Nigerians counted officially is often two or three times less than what it is in reality. For instance, according to the US Census of 2014, there were 322,231 Nigerians living in the United States, while according to the Migration Policy Institute, in 2015, there were 367, 000 Nigerians also living in the United States. But the United Nations Migrant Stock Report said that in 2015 there were 237,221 Nigerians living in the United States (2). This is an example of how different organizations can report on the same variable but with significant variation in numbers because of the different metrics that they use.

There is also evidence to support the fact that although the number of Nigerians living in Diaspora is not that very high, yet the amount of money they contribute to Nigeria through home remittances (i.e., migradollars) far out-size their number. The World Bank identified the top ten countries that are sources of remittances by Nigerians in Diaspora as of 2018, and among these starting from the top to the lowest are: United States – 38%, United Kingdom – 21%, Cameroon – 8%, Niger – 8%. Other countries that are also sources of the top ten home remittances are: Italy – 8%, Ghana – 5%, while the Diaspora in Benin, Canada, and Spain each contribute 3.8%, with those in Cote d’Ivoire contributing 2.6%. Overall, in 2018, the total value of Nigerian Diaspora remittance was US$24.4 billion. This amount as at that time represented 6.1% of the Gross Domestic Product of the Nigerian economy, and it was equivalent to 86% of the budget of the Nigerian Federal Government that year. Of crucial significance is the fact that the home remittances that year also amounted to eleven times the size of the foreign direct investment that came into Nigeria. The home remittances to Nigeria were also initially relatively small as it was less than 3 billion US dollars up to 2004, but it jumped from there to 17 billion from 2005 and moved on into the range of twenty billion US dollars per year and remained steadily upward to the range of US$24 and above from 2018.

Another observation about the data is that fluctuation in the amount that the Diaspora remit back to Nigeria is influenced by the fluctuations in the economies of the countries where the Diaspora live (3). Apart from Nigeria’s oil industry, the Nigerians in Diaspora are the second largest source of contribution to foreign exchange earnings in Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product according to the World Bank. It is because of this phenomenal contribution of the Nigerians in Diaspora that in 2019, the Federal Government of Nigeria decided to honor and recognize her Diaspora community by designating July 25^th as the annual Diaspora Day. Nigerians in Diaspora have also contributed to the development of the country by returning home to join the government, invest money / start a business, and create charitable organizations. Some Diaspora members also return to teach in higher institutions of learning in Nigeria, which amounts to contributing to building human capital, facilitating economic growth and elevating institutional capacity (4). According to the Institute of International Education, the earliest presence of Nigerian students in the United States was as far back as 1920 when a few students came to study at various universities but they all returned to Nigeria. This of course was during the era of colonial rule. By 1926, records show that there were three Nigerian students studying in the United States, but this number increased to 22 by 1944. The political instability in Nigeria related to the civil war that was fought in the mid-1960s discouraged Nigerian students in the United States, for the first time, from returning home after completing their studies. This group of students constituted the first and early generation of immigrants from Nigeria in the United States.

Several countries in the developing world send their students to the United States to study. Based on available records, from the end of the 1970s to the early 1980s, Nigeria was among six countries that had the highest number of international students in the United States. Up to the end of the 1970s, the great majority of Nigerian students that came to study in the United States returned to Nigeria after completing their studies. But starting from the 1980s, this trend decisively changed because Nigeria implemented the structural adjustment program among other policies and this affected the stability of the Nigerian economy. Owing to fear of the decline of the standard of living and the crisis in the economy, many of the Nigerian students who graduated in the 1980s from US universities did not return to Nigeria. As those Nigerians remained in the US, they had children and this started increasing the size of Diaspora Nigerians in the country. By 2016, Nigeria when compared to all other nations sending their students to study in foreign countries, ranked as the fifth nation in the world in terms of the number of students studying outside the country, with the United Kingdom and United States as the main locations of the Nigerian students studying abroad. In that year, Nigeria sent 9,500 students to study outside the country and it is the largest number from any African country. As of 2020, there were 13, 423 students of Nigerian origin that are studying in the United States (5).

According to the American Community Survey produced by the US Census Bureau (ACS), in 2019, there were 461,695 immigrants of Nigerian ancestry living in the United States. This number represents 11% of the sub-Saharan African population living in the United States, while also equivalent to 0.14% of the U.S. population. It must be noted that not all Nigerian immigrants in the United States are foreign born. Indeed, the same 2019 American Community Survey stated that 15% of Nigerians living in the United States were born in the US. Using the same American Community Survey, it can be deduced that the number of Nigerians living in the United States has impressively appreciated given that between 2008-2012 the Survey concluded that there were 263,000 persons of Nigerian ancestry living in the United States, which amounted to 449% growth in the Nigerian population in the US if 1980 figure is used as a benchmark. A related issue regarding the presence of Nigerian immigrants in the United States is the question of where they are located in the country. The United States is a very large country with huge land mass and so it is important to understand how Nigerians are distributed across the country. Nigerians live all over the United States but there are certain states, regions and cities that have the highest concentration of Nigerians. The states in the union of the United States that have the largest concentration of Nigerians are: Texas, New York, Georgia, California and Maryland. Further elaborating on this issue, the American cities that are established as the ones having the highest concentration of Nigerian immigrants are: New York City, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, Los Angeles and Philadelphia. Some US cities that are currently emerging as having increased concentration of Nigerian immigrants are San Antonio, Charlotte, Orlando, Austin and Indianapolis (6).

Based on American Community Survey (ACS) of 2019, out of the total number of Nigerian immigrants living in the United States, 85% were born in Nigeria. One implication of this is that the second and third generations of Nigerians are relatively young in age and not very large in number as a proportion of the Nigerian immigrant community in the United States. An important point to also observe is that given that 85% of the Nigerian immigrant population in the US was born in Nigeria, this means a strong connection between the Nigerian immigrant community in Diaspora and Nigeria since the group still maintains strong network of relationships and ties with family and friends back in their home communities. Sub-Saharan African population in the US represents 1.22% of the total US population, while Nigerians represent 0.14% of the US population and Nigerians who were born in Nigeria represent 0.12% of the total US population.

Furthermore, building on demographic data, it is appropriate to note that the two largest minority groups in the US population are: the Hispanic community, which represents 18.43% of the total US population, and Blacks or African Americans who represent 13% of US population (7). Elaborating on demographics of Nigerians living in the United States, the 2019 American Community Survey documented the fact that the median age in years of the Sub-Saharan African immigrant population in the US is 31.6 years, while the median age in years of Nigerians living in the US is 31.6 years also. But when one focuses on the median age in years of US Nigerian immigrant population that were born in Nigeria, the figure rises to 41 years old. Similarly, the Survey also reports that in terms of gender distribution of the Nigerian immigrant population living in the United States, 53% of the population are men while 47% are female. Further parceling the distribution of the Nigerian immigrant population by age and generation, the Survey presented the following information:

Age 75 years Plus: -- 1%.

Baby Boomers (55-74years): – 14%.

Generation X (45-54 years): – 11%.

Millennials+ (25-44 years): – 36%.

Generation Z (18-24 years): – 11%.

Generation Alpha+ (Less than 18 years): – 27%.

What the preceding demographic data indicate is that the Millennials and Generation Alpha+ represent the largest number of the Nigerian population in the US i.e., 63%. Given that most of the Nigerian immigrant population living in the US is youthful and middle aged, we can imagine the kinds of activities that will tend to preoccupy them e.g., trying to acquire a residence, securing a marriage partner, getting a job and holding on to it steadily and cultivating genuine and meaningful friends as a form of social capital (8).

Another interesting area of the demographics of Nigerian immigrants in the United States is in the area of their average income and there are several ways to make sense of it. Citing the 2019 American Community Survey, NGEX documented that the average individual income of people in the United States in 2019 was $35,672, while that of Blacks was $24,509, and that of Hispanic population in the country was $22,002. On the other hand, the average individual income of Sub-Saharan African immigrants was $27,224. The average individual income of the Nigerian Diaspora as a whole was $36,141 but within the Nigerian Diaspora, the average individual income of those Nigerians that were born in Nigeria was $45,387 (9). Further exploring the income data in a deeper manner, the 2019 Survey presented the data comparatively as follows: Median Household Income in 2019 of the whole United States was $65,712, while that of Blacks was $43,862 and that of the Hispanic community was $55,658. On the other hand, the 2019 Median Household Income of the Sub-Saharan African community in the United States was $52,465, while that of the Nigerian community was $65,672, but that of Nigerian-born Nigerians in the US was $66,513.

Based on the preceding data also, one can gain insight into the taxes that Nigerian immigrants in the United States paid. The taxes citizens pay in the United States is a crucial component of what makes the government function effectively and enables it to provide critical public services to the citizens. Indeed, taxes give a certain degree of power and influence to the citizens in terms of being able to hold their governments at various levels accountable. In 2018 alone, the total amount of income taxes that was paid by Nigerian immigrants in the United States at the federal level was over $2.7 billion while they paid $1.4 billion as income taxes at the state and local levels such as county or what might be called the local government level. These taxes are in addition to consumer taxes that people in the United States pay when they buy something in the marketplace, which varies from state to state and from one county to another. At the background of all this, in the same 2018, $14.3 billion was roughly the amount of income earned by the Nigerian immigrant families or households in the United States. After paying all federal, state and local taxes, Nigerian immigrants in the United States in 2018 had $10.2 billion to spend, which in strict economic terms will be their effective purchasing power as consumers. While some of the preceding information may come across as exciting and something to celebrate, the reader must be warned of the following information. The poverty rate among sub-Saharan immigrants in the United States in 2018 was 19%, while the poverty rate of Nigerian immigrants was 14%. On the other hand, the poverty rate of US-born Nigerians was 12% compared to Nigerian immigrants born in Nigeria whose poverty rate in 2018 was 14% (10)

Another relevant area of demographic information that can shed light on Nigerian immigrant community in the US in relation to other communities in the country is that while 33% of the general US population have a bachelor’s degree or higher educational qualification, within the sub-Saharan immigrant population in the US, 37% have bachelor’s degree or higher educational qualification. In the case of the Nigerian immigrant community in the US, 64% have educational qualification that is bachelor’s degree or something higher. In terms of ability to communicate, although many Nigerian immigrants speak a language other than English, they generally communicate well in English. While only 22% of the general US population speak a language other than English, in the Nigerian immigrant community, up to 48% of people speak another language apart from English. Indeed, among the Nigerian-born immigrants in the US, the percentage of people who speak another language apart from English rises up to 62%. Many of the Nigerians that migrated into the United States came with a certain high level of education or they pursued higher education here before regularizing their non-immigrant status to become citizens. Many Nigerian immigrants in the United States speak Pidgin English which is another lingua-franca within the Nigerian community, but in general, the most common spoken languages within the Nigerian immigrant community in the US apart from English are: Igbo, Yoruba, Tiv, Bini, Hausa, Efik and Urhobo. Of course, there are many other languages that are spoken by smaller groups of the Nigerian immigrant population in the US that are too numerous to be identified here. Through various kinds of celebrations, Nigerians try to maintain their cultural heritage and connection to the Nigerian society and traditions. Indeed, some of their cultural heritage affects how they operate as citizens, religious believers, consumers and in the pursuit of their goals and aspirations in life in the United States (11).

Nigerians living in Diaspora everywhere but particularly in the United States form voluntary associations. The voluntary associations are part of the broader sphere of civil society organizations. Some of the organizations, are cultural, while others are religious or professional development organizations. They also have voluntary associations that are oriented to civic engagement or that are sports-related. It is important to note that while there are many organizations in the Nigerian Diaspora that reflect the multicultural and cosmopolitan makeup of the country, the great majority of the organizations formed are in the realms of culture and ethnicity, to the point where they are almost replicating the divide among Nigerians back in the African continent (12). The two dominant religions in Nigeria are Christianity and Islam and they are both represented within the Nigerian immigrant community in the United States. Owing to historical and cultural factors identified earlier in the chapter, there are comparatively fewer Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the Nigerian immigrant community in the United States, vis-a-vis Christians who tend to be highly concentrated in the Southern region of Nigeria. It is indeed a well-known fact that the Southern region of Nigeria is far more Westernized, better educated and more highly involved in migration to the United States than people from the far Northern region of the country.

On another note, there is an emerging pattern of religious expansion that is taking place in the Nigerian immigrant community which is almost reversing the effort by Christian missionaries from the United States to expand Christianity into the interior of Nigeria and Africa during the colonial and the immediate postcolonial period. Today in the United States, virtually all the very big Christian denominations in Nigeria have their church branches across different cities in the United States and other parts of the Western world. Examples of church denominations in this respect are: Living Faith Church otherwise known as Winners’ Chapel, Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), and Mountain of Fire and Miracle Ministries (MFM), among many other denominations that are too numerous to be listed here.(13). The branches of the churches are, however, not evenly distributed across the different regions of the United States. Most of the church branches tend to be concentrated in the East Coast, Southern region of the country and parts of the Midwestern region. The churches are sparsely located in the West coast and Northwest region. The churches in terms of their sociological function play other important social functions beyond being places of worship given that many social events that bring people in the community together are held there, for instance, wedding ceremonies, graduation events, birthday celebrations and funeral occasions to celebrate the lives of persons that have died.

In the data compiled by NGEX, one can also get an insight into what are the things that preoccupy the lifestyle, interests and behaviors of many Nigerian immigrants in the United States. NGEX identified things that Nigerian immigrants in the US have spontaneous and natural liking for i.e., a feeling of affinity. What many Nigerian immigrants are passionately engaged in, in terms of emphasis are: movie, value shopping, music, fast food, foodies, luxury shopping, business professionals, sports, technology and pets. On the basis of all these, NGEX ranked the affinities that Nigerian immigrants in the US prioritize as follows: “Shopping, Food, Movies, Music and Sports.” Unfortunately, there is no concern for social justice or social transformation; neither is there a forum concerned about the precarious situation of Africa and the Black race in the intensified era of dog-eat-dog capitalism that is penetrating Africa and widening the gap between the rich and poor more than ever before. Nigeria today is the country that has the highest concentration of people living in extreme poverty. When properly understood, the concern about the struggle for a more just and fair society for all and the precarious condition of Black people in the world is not just applicable to Africa but it is relevant even in the United States. Indeed, NGEX provides us even deeper insight into the priorities that preoccupy the psyche and consciousness of the great majority of Nigerian immigrants in the United States. The following have been identified as the top ten purchasing behavior of Nigerians in the United States in order of priority: “Employment Services, Women’s Apparel, Post-Secondary Education, Home Décor, Motor Vehicles (Used), Residential Properties (For Sale), Financial / Investment Services, Pre-owned House (For Sale) Apparel & Accessories, and Dating Services.” The data on the affinities of Nigerian immigrants in the US and their purchasing behavior priorities can give us a clue and insight into what seems to preoccupy the lives and struggle of the great majority of the people in the Nigerian immigrant community and the implications of that for their contribution to creating a more just and fair society for all, assuming this is a priority and concern of the people of the African continent and those in Diaspora in the 21^st Century. It can be argued based on the data that for the most part, even when people in the Nigerian immigrant community pursue higher education in the US, for the great majority, their primary concern is not the perception of education as a source of enlightenment but using it as a means to increase their consumer status and purchasing power, which is consistent with America’s mainstream bourgeois culture, where consumerism has become the main source of meaning and identity in life.

If we recognize Western progress which came through the cumulative process of modernization, we must understand that there was a generation during the era of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment that made progressive social change and the betterment of humanity the focal concern of public discourses and in the process, they popularized, legitimized and mainstreamed the discourses in spite of challenges and imperfections. The pertinent question to ask here is: which generation will perform such historic role in Africa, and Nigeria to be precise in this context as it was spearheaded by men and women of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment era? Using consumerism as the main source of identity and meaning in life makes a people to be living primarily in the present with little or no concern about the overarching meaning of human progress from the past, through the present and thinking about the future of humanity. In the next section, effort will be made to describe and analyze the migration of Nigerians/Africans to South America and beyond in search of opportunity and better life.

In Search of Opportunities and Better Life: The Migration of Nigerians/Africans to South America and Beyond

The migration of Nigerians to the Southern region of the Americas is subsumed within the lager migration of Africans to South America discourse which rather started in recent years. Consequently, there is no detailed documentation about that and more importantly, there is no solid systematic data on the migration of people from any one specific country in Africa to South America. Often the information available about the migration patterns are reports that cut across people from different African countries (especially West and Central Africa) and sometimes the report even includes information about people from Asian countries. It is also important to note that for many African immigrants who migrate to countries in South America, their ultimate destination is either the United States or Canada, but in order to do that, they would sometimes have to cross the borders of seven to nine countries in Latin America and in some cases, this may take up to or more than a year to accomplish. In recent years, there has been increased number of Africans showing up as migrants in South American countries and especially the US and Mexican border. In reaction to that, there have been concerted efforts especially under the influence of the United States and President Trump’s immigration policy towards Africans to create deliberate policies or regulations that would make it more difficult for the African immigrants to move from South America to the US-Mexican border.

As earlier highlighted in the chapter, it is not easy to single out any one reason and use one theory to account for why people migrate and, in this case, migrate from Africa to South America, a development that was never the case for the most part since African countries became politically independent from colonial rule. But it is still worthwhile to explore some of the factors that are prompting this new wave of migration from Africa to South America. According to Regis Minvielle (14), a major explanation for why Africans are migrating to South America can be summarized as follows: “the quest for self-advancement fed on a set of structural push factors that exist in most sending societies: a saturated urban labor market, endemic unemployment, deteriorating living conditions in rural areas, and political and environmental crises.”

Unfortunately, European countries have made migration from Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea extremely difficult giving rise to the description: “Fortress Europe.” Thus, when the opportunity to migrate from Europe became blocked, African people started thinking of other options. Meanwhile, they were inspired and galvanized about the viability of migration as a pathway to success because they have heard stories of people from their countries or communities who have migrated to other countries and have prospered in life by using their professional skills, investing, getting married to a citizen of the country they have moved to and gradually becoming a citizen. While they recognized the challenges and difficulties that characterize the migration process, many were still determined to embark on it. Describing the departure point of the early Senegalese migrants to Argentina, Regis Minveille (15) observed as follows:

Thus, the pioneers, who had mostly arrived from urban areas and with migration experience, were succeeded by new figures: young single men, without trade or school qualifications, of rural origin, mainly from around the Senegalese cities of Diourbel, Touba, Thies and Kaolack. Like their elders, they refused to sit at home and followed the scent of the generous immigrant programs offered by Brazil and Argentina.

It can be observed from the quote that migration from Africa to South America is not only an issue of people living in Africa’s urban centers but extends to many youths that are from Africa’s rural communities. Many of such people are not trained in any skillful area and do not have any serious level of education.

There are also certain external factors that constitute the pull factors that made many Africans think of migrating to South America to either live there or use it as a pathway to arrive in the United States or Canada. Many African migrants in Libya who were prepared to cross over into Europe found out that they could not achieve their goals and so they started looking for alternatives. In this respect they found out that it was easy to apply and get Brazilian visa while they were in Tripoli. Furthermore, President Rafael Correa of Ecuador who was president from 2007-2017 created a progressive and inclusive migration policy, which did not require someone to have a visa to travel to Ecuador and so many African migrants took advantage of that to move to Ecuador as a gateway into the Americas. African migrants also found that the real estate boom in Argentina demanded a great amount of labor and the wages in Brazil and Argentina then were better than in African countries.

Another factor that must be taken into consideration in explaining what has facilitated the migration of Africans to South America is that there was increased airline routes starting from Cape Verde in May 2018 to South America. Thus, someone can travel by sea or by air and traveling by air is faster and safer. The South African Airlines has had flight route from Johannesburg to Sao Paulo, Brazil since 1971. Meanwhile, in July 2013, the Ethiopian Airlines started a flight route from Addis Ababa to Sao Paulo, Brazil via Lome, in West Africa. Similarly, the Royal Air Maroc started a flight route from Casablanca to Sao Paulo, Brazil. All these enhanced means of transportation enabled many Africans to fly to South America, especially with the initially easy access to Brazilian visa or even no visa requirement to visit countries like Ecuador.

It is also important to remark that certain political and economic reforms in South America also created social environment and opportunities for Africans to migrate. Because many of the countries in the region fell under dictatorial regimes in the 1970s, migration was perceived in a different way. Migrants were then conceptualized as a threat because they would bring and promote foreign subversion. Consequently, immigration control was tightened during this period. In yet another dimension, in the 1980s, the global trafficking of cocaine across continents grew and flourished and with that phenomenon becoming widespread, immigration control was strictly heightened because the trafficking of drugs became an issue of security concern and social control. All these would have made it difficult for Africans to migrate to South America during this period especially given that there was drug trade network that was emerging between Africa and South America.

The turning point in the social and political opportunity structure in South America that will open up the region gradually for migration from Africa was the emergence of democratic transitions in the early 1990s. Under democratic regimes, immigration in the region has been perceived in a more positive light which brought a paradigm shift in public policy. Furthermore, with the spread of neoliberal economic ideology in the region, economic policies promoting regional integration and free trade which means the free movement of goods and services across borders were adopted as a strategy against economic isolation. To further accentuate this trend, in the early years of the 21^st century, there emerged “center-left” governments that were progressive and had new ways of thinking. They wanted to promote more humane approach to immigration and so they decided to reconsider and redefine migration policies in their countries. There are three concrete examples of countries that had center-left governments in power, which brought about a reorientation in immigration policy in South America that would later constitute a social and political opportunity structure for African migrants migrating to South America. The first example is President Nestor Kirchner of Argentina. Under him the Patria Grande program was introduced which allowed those seeking asylum to be granted temporary residence permit, which then opened doors to them to access many privileges of Argentine citizens. Prior to that there were 630,000 migrants that were undocumented between 2003-2007 in the country. The second example is the work of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva who was in office from 2003 to 2011. He made great effort to promote Brazilian African heritage given that Brazil has the largest Black population outside Africa. The third example of social and political opportunity structure in South America that encouraged and inspired African migration is the work of President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, 2007-2017. Ecuador under President Correa promulgated a new constitution that made a strong statement affirming migration: “no one shall be declared illegal by reason of his or her status as a migrant.”

Generally, when African migrants enter South America through Ecuador, the migrants seek the assistance of smugglers to crossover into Peru and Northwestern Brazil. While there, they apply for asylum and on that basis, they get the “protocol receipt” document which grants them the right and privilege to work in the countries and get access to public services.

African Migrants’ Search for Destiny in South America: The Journey, Challenges and Opportunities

The term extracontinental migrants in Latin America is used to refer to all migrants that are from out of the continent, which in this case will include migrants from Africa and Asian countries. As highlighted earlier, there is no concise and specific documentation about Nigerian migrants in Latin America. The literature available always provides information in general in the sense that it covers the whole of the African region and also Asian countries. Extracontinental migrants are considered specifically to be all migrants that do not originate from the Western-hemisphere but are moving into Latin America and passing through it with the ultimate hope of reaching the United States or Canada. Generally, and for the most part, these extracontinental migrants enter Latin America legally with the appropriate visa or in some cases, without visa required such as was the case when countries like Ecuador did not have visa requirement for foreigners. Essentially relaxed visa requirement by Ecuador, Brazil and Guyana made it possible for these countries to become gateways for Africans entering the continent. As the extracontinental migrants transit through Latin American, they take months or several years to reach their preferred and chosen destination, which often is the United States or Canada for the great majority. But evidence confirmed that because the goal of reaching these ultimate destinations is infused with danger, is costly and risky, often many of the migrants abandon the goal and settle in one of the Latin American countries even though not their first choice. It is difficult to give a comprehensive description of the trajectory of the African migrant journey as they transit through Latin America in search of their destiny as the journey can start in different locations and move in different directions. To provide the reader an idea of the significance of the trend of extracontinental migration in Latin America, in the 2018 Fiscal year, Mexico apprehended 10,200 extracontinental migrants. But in the same fiscal year, only 12,550 extra continental migrants crossed the US Southern boarder through ports of entry, which indicates some discrepancy as Mexico apprehends less than the number that crossed the US Southern border. It has also been reported that in the last five years, the people that have crossed the US-Mexican border come from 80 countries that are in Asia and Africa. Indeed, India was found to be the country that is the source of origin of most of the extracontinental migrants as it accounted for 72% of the extracontinental migrants that were apprehended in the Fiscal Year 2018. What this information indicates is that there are countries in other regions that are ahead of African countries in terms of transiting through Latin America as they head to the United States and Canada. The same data also stated that the top African countries whose citizens were apprehended as part of extracontinental migrants by US Border patrol agents were: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo. African migrants who arrived at the US Southern border often applied for asylum and when their application is denied they are considered to be unqualified for admission.

One factor that has created social and political opportunity for extracontinental migrants in general in Latin America is that the deportation of such migrants is infrequent and rare. A case that was considered rare and phenomenal and drew international interest in this respect was when in October 2019, Mexico deported more than 300 Indian migrants. The reason why it has been difficult for Latin American countries to deport extracontinental migrants is because Latin American countries do not have repatriation and deportation agreement with African or Asian countries.

The Journey of Extracontinental Migrants in Latin America: Crossing “The Darien Gap”

Based on the records, most extracontinental migrants enter Latin America through Ecuador or Brazil. This is so because of the relatively relaxed visa requirements of the two countries even though the visa requirements were later tightened because of dramatic increase in extracontinental migration. Once they arrived Ecuador or Brazil their journey into the hinterland is facilitated by different means and conditions. Sometimes they pay smugglers to facilitate their journey or they capitalize on relationships they have developed with other migrants they have encountered on the way who have the same plan as theirs. In terms of moving from one location to the other, they use buses, private cars, boats or walk on their foot depending on the location and context. Generally, from Ecuador and Brazil the extracontinental migrants head to Columbia. Once they enter Columbia from the South, they avoid checkpoints by taking a regular bus and head to the northern part of the country. The most difficult challenge they face in the whole trip as they transit to the US-Mexican border is crossing “The Darien Gap.” “The Darien Gap” is one of the highly concentrated and dense jungles in remote Latin America. One can only access and cross “The Darien Gap” by foot or land. The significance of “The Darien Gap” to the journey of the extracontinental migrants is that it separates South America from Central America. Once the extracontinental migrants reach Northern Columbia from the South, they will arrive at Turbo or Necoli from where they will cross the Gulf of Uraba. In crossing the gulf, they solicit the services of local fishermen who serve as smugglers and facilitators for their journey into a new land. Sometimes in crossing the Gulf of Uraba, the boats they use are over-capacitated. Over-capacity of the boats leads sometimes to the boats capsizing or sinking, thereby killing many people. But for the most part the great majority of the boats cross the gulf successfully and safely.

When the extracontinental migrants cross “The Darien Gap” safely and successfully, they will arrive in Panama. Panama is one of the most efficient states in managing its international borders in the region. This is made possible because the country has only one major highway that constitute an entry point or route into the country connecting the Northern and Southern parts of the country. The migrants enter Panama from the Southern border. Panama Patrol Officials are rated highly in their monitoring of Panama borders and the country has one of the most effective and efficient immigration enforcement policy for dealing with extracontinental migrants in Latin America. They rarely deport extracontinental migrants. The extracontinental migrants cross into Central America from Panama and continue their journey. It generally takes them one- or two-days using buses or private rented vehicles to transit through various Central American countries on their way to Mexico and ultimately to the US Southern border with Mexico. From Panama, they will cross into Nicaragua where they are required to pay $150 to the Nicaraguan military for what looks like the cost of protection services. From Nicaragua, they cross into Honduras and Guatemala. In these two countries, sometimes the extracontinental migrants are kidnapped by criminal groups for ransom.

Finally, the extracontinental migrants enter Mexico through its Southern border with Guatemala in the town of Tapachula which is in Chiapas, Mexico. Originally, in Mexico, the Mexican authorities give the extracontinental migrants on arrival an official document called SalvoConducto, which allows them up to twenty days to exit Mexico using any border, which means they can travel by road or through international flight. With this official exit document, extracontinental migrants can travel through Mexico from the Southern border to the US Southern border which is in the Northern part of Mexico. Of course, one result of the arrival in Mexico is that a lot of the extracontinental migrants whose ultimate destination is the United States or Canada will concentrate at the US-Mexican border thereby creating a serious challenge to the US-Mexican Border Patrol Officials and immigration officers.

Strategy for Managing and Controlling Extracontinental Migration: International Cooperation

It has earlier been highlighted that Ecuador in 2008 started a policy of no visa requirements for foreign visitors to the country but within a year, the government had to reverse that policy on some nations that are national origins of the great majority of extracontinental migrants that flooded the country within a year. Similarly, Brazil also had to eventually tighten its visa requirements for African migrants when they started flooding the country at a faster pace. One reason why these two countries had to reconfigure their policies is because no country’s immigration policies stands alone without having impact on the neighboring countries as shall shortly be highlighted about Mexico and the United States. Apart from increasing the stress on social institutions and services, fast-pace rate of the movement of extracontinental migrants can create challenges in cultural adaptation. But many Latin American countries should be commended for creating opportunities for extracontinental migrants to learn the language of the new country freely, get married to someone if they so desire and be given legal residency that allows the extracontinental migrants to be employed, send their children to school and get access to healthcare services and being guaranteed the freedom of movement.

As part of the strategy to control and manage the movement of extracontinental migrants, government officials from the US, Colombia, Panama and Costa Rica reached an agreement from late 2014 – 2015 to cooperatively adopt and implement a policy known as “controlled flow.” The countries thought that in order to effectively manage the extracontinental migrants, there was need to limit the number and pace of movement of migrants, especially the cases of persons seeking political asylum so that there can be smooth functioning of the offices working on and attending to the needs and concerns of the extracontinental migrants. To cite an example, Panama’s National Border Service only allows 100 migrant cases to be processed daily. This helps the next nation that the extracontinental migrants are moving through to not feel overwhelmed.

Building on the regional international cooperation on managing and controlling extracontinental migrants using the strategy of “controlled flow”, the US pressure on Mexico on the issue of extracontinental migrants must be highlighted. In October 2019, Mexico, under US President Trump’s pressure stopped issuing the SalvoConducto to extracontinental migrants. The US federal government under the leadership of President Trump pushed against migration to the US from many regions of the world but especially African and Muslim countries. Consequently, the Federal Government of the United States exerted pressure on Mexico to stop issuing the SalvoConducto. For instance, in compliance with the US pressure, in October 2019, when African extracontinental migrants wanted to organize a form of caravan to cross Mexico to the US-Mexican border, the Mexican authorities used its power and force to prevent them from doing that.

It must be noted also that even among migrants, there are variations in life chances depending on the range of resources that one controls. For instance, it has been documented that Asian migrants that constitute part of the extracontinental migrants have more money and financial resources. Consequently, they are able to pay for effective and efficient smugglers which enables them to escape the Mexican government’s decision to stop issuing SalvoConducto to extracontinental migrants under US pressure. Such Asian migrants could also bribe local officials so that they are allowed to proceed with their long-distance trip across Latin America from the South to the US-Mexican Border in the North.

Conclusion: Lessons and Insights about Nigerian / African Migration to North and South America

By way of conclusion, we want to highlight some lessons, insights and possible middle-level theoretical generalizations and observations that one can make on the basis of the discussion in this chapter. As noted in the introduction to the chapter, even though the chapter tries to focus on Nigerian migration to North and South America, it focused just on the United States and South America because of time and space limitations. Furthermore, the chapter avoided a discussion of Nigerian migration that is not embedded in the broad conceptual framework and theoretical perspectives that are not only in the literature but also have analytical utility in enabling the reader to situate the Nigerian migration experience in global context instead of engaging it in a manner that can be characterized as provincial analysis. The chapter also embedded the Nigerian migration experience within the continental African context because most of the reports on migration to South America covers Africa as a continent instead of any detailed discussion of any single country. Furthermore, although there is Nigerian migration to South America, the numbers do not seem phenomenal as that of other West African countries like Senegal, which has a whole neighborhood in Buenos Aires named “Little Dakar.”

The first lesson and insight from the chapter worth highlighting is that the parts of Nigeria that were more deeply exposed to Western education were not only the earliest to migrate to the US and South America but even today, there are more people from the Southern region of Nigeria than from the North that have migrated to North America. The second lesson from this chapter is that the contemporary level of migration from Nigeria is intricately connected with lack of inclusive development that caters to the yearnings and aspirations of ordinary citizens - namely sustenance, self-esteem and freedom. This is the type of development that Amartya Sen conceptualizes as freedom and the capability to function. The third lesson from the discussion in this chapter is that generally, the high risk involved in migrating is due to lack of or difficulty in accessing regular pathways to migrate.

The fourth lesson from the discussion in this chapter has to do with the centrality of language in the capacity and ability of Nigerian migrants to adapt and effectively succeed in the new society that they have moved to. It is in this respect that Georg Hegel’s concept of “categories of mediation” becomes relevant for mention here. According to Georg Hegel, the individual’s ability and capacity to come to the point of realizing himself or herself as a social being is made possible by the society they live in (16). The insight from this lesson is that African migrants by learning the language of another society are forced to reorient their identity, status and sense of being as social beings. This enables them to participate in more varieties of discourses.

The fifth lesson is linked with the former namely the ambivalent impact of the expectation that in order to succeed in the new society or culture, the immigrant has to assimilate into the culture and society, granted that there are different degrees of assimilation and the challenges this presents to new immigrants. Examples of this include those assimilating the American democratic culture of rights, freedom, liberty, social responsibility and equity as well as the consumerism and individualism of capitalist economic system. All these are matters and issues of concern as Nigerian immigrants assimilate into US culture. The assimilation into US culture can make many Nigerians or African migrants more egocentric. Indeed, in the Nigerian community in the US, there have been cases of murder among married couples owing to high degree of egocentrism and competition between husband and wife over money, status and property. Also and as these Nigerians continue to maintain cultural links with their home communities or countries of origin, there is a high probability of them propagating and spreading these silent and subconscious elements of American culture that can have detrimental consequences on Nigerian development and on the lives of ordinary people.

The sixth lesson that can be drawn from the discussion in the chapter is that the capacity and ability of Nigerian or African migrants to send funds back home or their ability to accumulate wealth depends on the macro-economic situation of the country they are living in. Many Africans in Brazil and Argentina found it difficult to pay their bills, save and send money home when the macro-economic situation of the countries experienced recession and their currencies were devalued. There are so many forces today that have impact on the trajectory of the macro-economic policies of a country to the point where immigrants cannot guarantee that in their new country everything about the economy is guaranteed. Moreover, in societies such as the United States, while income earned by immigrants may be higher than in their home countries in Africa, the cost of living and relatively high taxation rate result in a situation where it is difficult for many to save and so they can easily relapse into debt.

Finally, an important lesson from the chapter is that given that more Nigerian youths and professionals continue to migrate and are not willing to return, the development of the country remains bleak. Over 45% of Nigerians are prepared to migrate out of the country, if given the opportunity. This then becomes a stalemate and one that is not by any means helping Nigeria to grow and promote inclusive development, and do so at a fast pace that can absorb the burgeoning youth and middle-age professionals.

The one way to be relevant in a neoliberal capitalist economy is to have marketable and highly relevant and needed human capital and skills that will be a value addition to the economy and society. Having such human capital requires education or vocational training, which many African youths lack. This is the situation the great majority of youth and middle-aged persons in Nigeria find themselves in i.e., unemployed or underemployed and irrelevant in the calculus of the neoliberal marketplace. The human resource of a country is its number one resource and if the human resource becomes substantially irrelevant in the neoliberal capitalist global economic calculus, then the people become surplus and the economy whether at the national or global level totally ignores them. No country or continent can truly develop under this kind of situation and therefore, this raises the possibility of many parts of the African continent becoming 4^th world nations as they remain underdeveloped in a world that is changing very fast. This is unpleasant to say but it is a reality on the ground if one looks at Nigerian society specifically and African societies in general from the bottom – up.

Endnotes

NGEX Nigeria (2020)
(NGEX 2020: 4).
NGEX 2020:5).
NGEX 2020:6).
NGEX 2020:7).
NGEX, 2020:8-9).
American Community Survey (ACS), 2019, US Census Bureau)
NGEX 2020:13).
(NGEX 2020: 14).
NGEX 2020:15; New American Economy Analysis, 2018).
NGEX 2020:16).
NGEX 2020:17).
(NGEX 2020:18).
Regis Minvielle (2018),
Regis Minveille (2018)
Each Society, through its language, which embodies societal cultural identity, awareness and consciousness, shape the individual to become a social being. It is through language or categories of mediation that people develop or acquire their identity and status in society. Through their status they make meaning of themselves and their social experiences in the world.

CHAPTER 9 - NIGERIA ASIA-PACIFIC MIGRATION DYNAMICS

Austine Ifeanyi Okere

Introduction

Nigerians have continued to migrate towards developed regions of the world with the preferred destinations in Europe and North America which have seen the largest concentration (excluding African countries) of Nigerians over time (1). In addition to this, intra-regional migrations have increased significantly in Nigeria. The National Migration Policy estimates that "about two thirds (63 percent) of Nigerians migrated to other African countries," while 18 and 14.8 percent migrated into Europe and North America respectively. (2)

Developed regions of the world and West African countries have continued to play host to many Nigerian migrants. The lure of better living conditions, economic and professional opportunities, and quality education and the urge to escape harsh economic realities in Nigeria have historically been the prime motivations of Nigerian migrant stock to developed regions (3) while continued improved regulations on freedom of movement and establishing livelihood (4) among Africans have motivated Nigerian intra-regional migrations consisting of multifaceted demand-pull and supply push factors. In 2013, the United Nations provided relevant data on Nigerian migrations towards developed regions; it contended that between 1990 and 2013 this number more than doubled as over 50 percent of migrations from Nigeria were to developed regions of the world. (5). Developing regions were less attractive to Nigerian migrants. As such, discourse on migration dynamics, however little they may be, focused on developed regions. African migration to other developing regions was neglected.

Developing regions, particularly those in Asia, only started attracting relevant research attention on Nigerian (and African) migration during the late 1990s as a result of their impressive economic growth which presented increasing economic opportunities. On the Pacific countries, scholarly attention was either as an appendage of developed regions or via numerous bi-lateral socio-cultural exchanges often reflected in multilateral international institutions like the Commonwealth of Nations. Another important aspect of literature on Nigerian migrants to developing regions is that such research more often than not was undertaken by foreigners and reflected their perspective on Nigerian migrant stock. Such researches were occasioned by certain events. For instance, in China, Bodomo contends that the Chinese Government's attention (and Africa-Chinese migrant studies) to the presence of large African migrants in Guangzhou only began after street protest over a Nigerian death during a police street raid. (6) Furthermore, the drivers of contemporary migrations into Asia and Pacific countries by Nigerians (and Africans) are still debated. While past studies considering push and pull factors have hinged their arguments on economic motivations, others emphasize the role of the state and the increased level of globalization, thus ensuring the state continues to develop adequate pro-migration policies for its citizens.

Studies on drivers of Nigerian migration to mega cities in Asia contend that the prime motivation for these increased patterns of migration rests on the following: firstly, these mega cities in Asia have undergone significant economic and policy reforms over the last 40 years, thus spurring an increase in domestic and international capital inflows; secondly, these cities have had their local economic bases transformed and attracted a cluster of firms and industries as well as infrastructure growth, thus providing more opportunities to migrants; thirdly social-policy factors allow for migration networks and information sharing on jobs, housing, and destination locations. (7)

Admittedly, the number of Nigerians migrating to Asia and Pacific countries have increased over the last 20 years with the IOM indicating preferred destinations to include East, West, and South Asia; and Australia for the Pacific area. However, like most cases on Nigerian migration discourse, data and research have not adequately covered this fledgling aspect of migration dynamics. In addition to this, countries of this region have responded to contemporary global economic and employment crisis and have taken to imposing stringent conditions for migrant admission. (8)

This chapter is thus a modest attempt to put some of the contemporary issues surrounding Nigerian migration to Asia and the Pacific countries into better perspective with the intent to inform an enlightened policy formulation around Nigerian migration to this region. Understandably, the region in question is vast with over 50 countries and home to almost 60 percent of the world's population; thus attempting to cover most of the migrant issues across these countries would be too ambitious. This chapter’s discussions would be limited to countries in the East and South Asia as well as Australia which had a combined migrant population of about 15,000 'formal' recorded Nigerians in 2013. (9) Additionally, these regions have generated the most interesting debates and narratives around migrant issues like lifestyle, family, state admittance policy requirements, remittances, business and economic opportunities as well as crime. Furthermore, these selected areas have limited academic research either conducted by Nigerians or Africans on various contemporary issues around Nigerian migration. Consequently, any research on compounding issues of Nigeria-Asia-Pacific migration would be a modest attempt to give voice to a silent but important aspect of Nigerian migration dynamics. While grappling with the absence of quantitative data on Nigerian migration to these regions, the chapter in addition to available secondary data, utilizes qualitative evidence of personal experiences sourced from interviews, online survey (covering over 80 respondents across targeted countries) and existing qualitative researches that capture those aspects of Nigerian migration dynamics as presented by this region. However, one must be cautious about generalizing the analysis provided by this chapter considering the vastness, cultural, ethnic, political, religious, and economic complexities of the regions. Nevertheless, the chapter contributes an important dimension to the mosaic of Nigerian global migrant stocks by shedding light on this often less covered discourse.

Asia-Pacific Countries: Why Now?

It would be wrong to assume that Nigerian (and African) migrants into Asia and Pacific countries have not excited academic research and discourse. Scholars have attempted to uncover various aspects of their life and how this impacts their host countries. For instance, Anas Elochukwu, who is among Nigerian pioneering scholars on Nigerian migration in China, studied the origins of African migrations into China and after tracing the incipience of black people fondly called Kunlun nu in Chinese society during the Tang Dynasty also noted that "African migration to China in modern times began with the launch of Mao's scholarship diplomacy;"(10) the scholarship diplomacy has become an instrument of Chinese 'soft power'(11) in attracting developing regions as partners to international development and challenging the global order. Although Nigeria was not among the first African countries to benefit from such scholarship in the 1950s, today, this scholarship contributes significantly to the number of skilled and educated Nigerian migrant stock to China.

While economic reasons are agreed to be one of the prime motivations of migrations, the case of Asian countries is ripe with sufficient demand-pull, supply-push, and a network of factors that have emerged over time. The Asian economic miracle (12) of the late 1990s that catapulted several countries in this region from poor to rich countries in a relatively short time has been regarded as the Rubicon which altered the course of migration dynamics in the region. With such impressive economic growth rates sustained by state-led investment- and export-led systems, Asian political leaders "believe[d] that they can achieve another success in managing internal and international labour migration to achieve goals that include protecting migrants and local workers, [while] enhancing cooperation between governments in labour-sending and receiving areas to better manage migration, and ensure that migration promotes development in labour-sending areas."(13) By the turn of the 21st century, many Asian countries tinkered with their national labour migration policies which became more diverse and reflected their economic needs and overall national economic policies.

Martin contends that post-Asian miracle international migration policy "can be approximated by a triangle." To him, countries like Singapore welcome professionals to settle with their family while rotating less-skilled foreign workers in; Japan, on the other hand, allows but does not recruit foreign professionals as the country prefers its ethnic Japanese (diaspora) as well as trainees and students; on the last side is the Gulf Cooperation Council countries which rely on migrants as private-sector workers either requiring citizen-sponsors or based on bilateral agreements with labour sending countries. (14) By aligning national economic policy and objectives to migration, Asian countries have been able to attract further migration into this area. In 2005, Asian countries had about 48 million migrants, a quarter of the 191 million-strong global migrant stock. (15) Economic policies allowed for increased internal migration within Asia with the advancement made in transportation and communication, which accelerated the effects of globalization. Asians moved across the region to benefit from such recorded economic gains. These 'Great Migrations' followed a similar pattern recorded by industrialized countries in the 1950s and 1960s which provided workers for expanding factories, fueling population growth in cities. Countries like India, China, and South Korea are still witnessing similar growth. Early indicators of migration patterns to Asia point to countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore as the initial destinations for most Nigerian (and African) migrants in the early 1990s; however, some researchers contend that this changed with the economic crisis of the late 1990s and China's steady liberalization of migration policies. (16)

Over the last decade, supply chain, production and manufacturing reached greatest level of sophistication in many parts of Asia (most especially in East Asia). This has supported both intra-regional and international migration into the area. A study on supply chains, trade and labour movements in Asia shows that "a single product assembled and exported from China is likely to embody knowledge-intensive designs originating from Japan, inputs from capital or skill-intensive production processes in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong or Singapore, and inputs produced from more labour-intensive methods in one or more of the ASEAN 4 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand)."(17) This system has been dubbed the 'Flying Geese' model of industrialization, a system of country-specific specialization which promotes industrialization, integration and networking of production and distribution lines and economic growth, all drivers for migration into this area.

Nigerians over time have taken advantage of the economic opportunity this model presents as the majority of Nigerian migrant stocks are entrepreneurs, business-oriented people in search of cheaper manufactured products from this region. Out of 68 Nigerian migrants surveyed, over 40 percent indicated such business opportunities as the reason for migrating to this region. Supporting this view, another study on emerging transnational traders from Lagos which surveyed 728 traders indicates that Nigerians in diaspora originating from business hubs of Auto Spare Parts and Machinery Dealers Association Market (ASPAMDA), Alaba International market (dealing with electronics), Ikeja Computer Village Market and Balogun-Idumota Market opted for Asian countries business hubs on their first trip outside the country. (18) The research showed that China was the preferred destination followed by the United Arab Emirates and then Japan; with a little number still preferring countries in Europe. The remaining respondents from the survey conducted by the author who were mostly students indicated that they engaged in some form of businesses like exporting cheap commodity goods into Nigeria as a "side hustle"(19).

A research documents that most Africans migrating into most Asian countries exhibit the following characteristics: (i) highly concentrated in major cities; (ii) engaged in trading profession and actively participate in the distributive sectors of Asian economies; (iii) more often than not, they are former students which supports the view that they are skilled or semi-skilled; (iv) constitute self-made entrepreneurs; (v) most times numerically inestimable –due to "often transient and sometimes undocumented nature (20); (vi) most of them are from West Africa. (21)

Students hoping to acquire formal education and advance career certification have been recognized as another major migrant group into this region. While data on this group is scarce and difficult to collect in Nigeria, IOM believes the number of this category of migrants has increased geometrically since 2000 to almost 22,000 in 2006 (22). Also UNESCO maintains the number has continued to rise as "[t]he outbound mobility ratio, or the number of Nigerian students studying abroad as a percentage of the total enrolment in the country, had consistently increased over time, from 14.5 percent in 2003 to 20.7 percent in 2006."(23) While the preferred destination is the United States, the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, and Canada, as well as African institutions in South Africa and Ghana, however, the choice of Asian countries has increased steadily.

Scholarships have significantly increased from most Asian countries to Nigeria as part of various bi-lateral socio-cultural exchanges; data also shows that many Nigerians are choosing to study in this area even without the availability of government scholarships. The low cost of schooling and the increased economic opportunities this region presents are attractions to many. Tuition fees, living costs, and the fact that Asia has become the manufacturing hub of the world are some of the best attractions to Nigerian student migrants desirous to participate in the global distributive chain. On average, the cost of tuition for social and physical sciences, as well as management disciplines range between 800,000 and 1.5 million NGN which is abysmally lower than what is obtainable in many countries of Europe and America. Consequently, middle-class Nigerians can afford to send their wards to study in these Asian countries. Also, middle class Nigerian workers can afford the tuition fees for postgraduate studies without incurring huge student debts. Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and China often offer affordable living costs which allow for savings and remittances. In some cases, the Nigerian students who stayed back in many of these Asian countries “transmuted into traders after their education and were instrumental in the emergence of the trader sub-population"(24). Among students surveyed by the author, over 78 percent of them indicated that their lifestyle and living cost allowed them to save sufficiently and make remittances back home (25).

In addition to economic opportunities and affordable cost of education, Nigerian migrants in Asia continue to select these countries because of significant advances in certain fields of study. Specifically, Asian governments have continued to develop policies that support the advancement of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and robotics; a discipline that continues to attract students across the world. This discipline is seen as the future of the world and many students are hoping to learn practical skills that Asian universities offer for their career advancement. An Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) report indicates that over the last decade, "Southeast Asian nations significantly outperform the rest of the world in wage-controlled robot adoption, while Europe, the United States lags significantly behind"(26) Countries like Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and China have successfully integrated advancements made in the academic disciplines of robotics and ICT into their overall production process; thus giving them an edge in global competition. In addition to this, policies have been introduced to allow for such innovations to be taught within tertiary education levels, an attraction for most Nigerian migrants hoping to benefit from such trends.

Lastly, there has been a surge in bi-lateral education agreements between Nigeria and Asian countries which directly impact the level of study-based migrations. China appears to lead the way with her scholarships, while countries like Malaysia, India, Japan, and Singapore have also unveiled processes to encourage migration for study purposes in their countries. However, most Asian nations receiving migrants (internationally) still developed policies that aimed to prevent migrants from settling as most do not consider international migration essential for economic growth, and most do not want migrants to change their culture and identity. (27) Despite this, the Asian region has recorded the most remarkable growth of international migrants stock (82 million) and has nearly matched that of Europe at 84 million. (28)

Nigerian migration into the Pacific country of Australia has often been examined not as part of the Asia-Pacific sphere, but as part of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations. While few studies combine migration trends in Australia with those in Asia, the majority of studies have found striking similarities with patterns/trends of migration here with OECD countries that have history intertwined with colonialism, the world wars, and 'Great migrations.' A study on overall African-born migration demographics in Australia shows that besides OECD countries of USA, Britain, and France which recorded over 5.6 million combined African-born migrants in 2000, Australia was among the top 8 countries recording over a hundred thousand African-born migrants in OECD countries (29)with Nigeria and South Africa having a combined migrant stock of over 60,000 in the same year.(30) The surge of African (and Nigerian) migration in Australia could be credited to the evolution of public policy change and a systemic restructuring of her migration laws to reflect the change towards acceptance for non-white migrants. Evidence of this is seen from the dismantling of discriminatory policies (like The Migration Restriction Act of 1901) which reflected the "White Australia" dogma of the early 20th century and the 1960s to becoming a multi-cultural society open to humanitarian migrations and aid-giving geared towards attracting highly skilled migrants from Africa. Consequently, "piece by piece the architecture of racism began to be dismantled, until in 1973 under the new ALP government led by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, a fully non-racial policy was introduced by Immigration Minister Al Grassby"(31). However, in spite of such policy change, Nigerians are not the predominant migrant population in Australia. Data indicates Southern Africans (South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mauritius) are taking the lead. The last two decades have also seen a surge in the refugee-humanitarian migrant category in Australia with countries like Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea significantly increasing since 2000.

It is safe to claim that successive governments in Australia, by tending to the 'wind of change' of dismantling discriminatory migration policies, began to encourage African migrations into Australia specifically under three sub-groups, namely: skilled migrants, family migration and humanitarian migration. Nigerian migrants have benefited significantly from the first two categories. What this situation presents to Nigerians is a significant increase in the opportunity to migrate into Australia which is being gradually exploited. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Nigerians constituted 0.59 percent of the total migrant population living in Australia with an estimated population of 2,496 in 2006. (32) This represents over 25 percent growth from the 1738 recorded during the 2001 census. Researchers have also studied the Australian government’s renewed aid engagement with Africa within the ambit of the changes in migration philosophy. To them, this presents an opportunity to explore the potentials of African migrants who bring with them valuable economic, social, and cultural skills and resources to the Pacific region. From this perspective, it is no surprise that over the last two decades, Australian migration tends towards the "professionals or managers, highly skilled and educated."(33) It is thus evident that with attractive government migration policies for skilled persons, and the growing policy restructuring to facilitate proper adjustment of said skilled persons, Nigerian migrants to Australia are mostly professionals, skilled workers, or students who migrate to acquire education and stay back in Australia.

Additionally, since becoming a signatory to the United Nations 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 protocol), Australia has become a leading country accepting African migrants on humanitarian grounds as authors like Hugo Graeme believe. With a fluid definition of who constitutes a refugee, citizens of conflict ridden and/or war-torn countries in Africa have used this opportunity to migrate to Australia. With persistent insurgency in Northern Nigeria, some migrants have explored Australia as a destination with the help of many religious organizations.

Contemporary Trends: Gender, Family, Lifestyle, and Challenges

The characteristics of Nigeria's migrant stock in Asia and Pacific countries bear certain demographic similarities to those in other parts of the world. Nigerian migrant stock usually consists of her productive population within the age group of 18-40. This same trend reflects in the age group of Nigerians migrating into Asia-Pacific regions. Survey and interviews conducted by the researcher corroborate information from the IOM that "a majority of them are males and are between 18 and 35 years old… [which often are] the healthiest, most educated, and potentially economically active…"(34) In his study of migration demographics in the commercial city of Guangzhou, Elochukwu narrates that he visited the popular hot spots of Nigerian migrants and his interviews revealed that out of 43 persons interviewed, over 98 percent of them were male. However, he argues that the population of Nigerian women migrating to Asian cities like Guangzhou has steadily increased, even though socio-cultural constraints still affect their numbers. (35) Supporting this view, a survey conducted by the author also showed that the majority of Nigerian migrants to countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Australia are men between the ages of 20-45 with a significant number of women also recorded. The survey showed that most Nigerian migrants in Asia-Pacific regions were either previously gainfully employed in some form of economic activities in Nigeria or were fresh graduates seeking additional qualifications. In Australia, while understanding the gender imbalance for African migration dynamics, the government instituted certain policies to significantly encourage African (and Nigerian) women migration specifically on humanitarian grounds. An example of this is the "Women at Risk Visa Class"(36) introduced in the early 1990s with the intent to attend to vulnerable African migrant women. With such policy in place, the migration of African women into Australia has steadily increased.

The number of Nigerian female migrants into countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and China on student visa has increased significantly. More often than not, they are fresh graduates seeking additional degrees. In addition to this, the number of Nigerian females migrating into Asian countries on social visas have also increased significantly since 2000. While business opportunities are usually regarded as a motivation for this, some of them have successfully utilized periods of their stay (either short or long) to set-up small businesses that they link with numerous activities back home. Additionally, some Nigerian female migrants become sex workers in some of these countries using popular social media sites as a means to link up with their clients. Be that as it may, the exponential increase in the number of Nigerian women migrating to Asia-Pacific countries is yet to become a noticeable element of Nigeria's migration dynamics thus motivating less discourse surrounding the peculiarities of this demographic. Nigerian female migrants in most Asian countries are breaking socio-cultural stereotypes (that they can only travel long distances in the company of their spouses or some male relations); and in some cases competing with their male counterparts in the international trade and entrepreneur sphere. In an interview with a female trader, she indicated that many Nigerian women migrants with business intentions, sometimes out-perform their male counterparts. (37)

The family constitution of Nigerian immigrants in Asia is somewhat different from the experiences in other parts of the world. While many countries in Europe, America, and Africa have instituted migration policies and mechanisms to encourage the migrant population to either migrate with their families or bring them over into host countries, countries in Asia do not have policies that encourage family integration of migrants. This has affected the migration of family members of Nigerian immigrants in this region. It is estimated that endogamous couples (i.e. couples of the same nationality) "constitute less than one percent of Nigerian migrants into Asia countries"(38). Addressing the peculiarities of families of Nigerian immigrant population, Elochukwu avers that among reasons for difficulties in migrating with their families, Nigerian migrants adduced the following factors: (i) the cost of child education in some Asian countries; (ii) a significant number of pre-married Nigerian migrants are undocumented, thus bringing their spouse would prove cumbersome; and (iii) public migration laws present challenges which motivate most Nigerian migrants to marrying natives for permanent residence documentation, for ease of doing business or societal acceptability reasons.(39) Corroborating the element of cost of living and education for middle-class Nigerian migrant families, A Nigerian woman interviewed in China notes:

We spend three thousand kuai ($445) every month on our two little children's education. They attend a private school. We cannot send them to public school because of hukou [household registration]. There is also excessive taxation. My husband runs a company here, but he cannot hire fellow [Nigerian] migrants to work in his company because of regulations. (40)

A survey conducted by the author showed that over 70 percent of Nigerians migrating to Asia-Pacific countries have a genuine desire to migrate with their families with reasons ranging from having families closer to better living conditions (medicare, infrastructure among others) provided in host countries. However, the above-stated factors have continued to inhibit their desires. In a bid to bypass stringent laws and policies towards migrating with families, Nigerian migrants are becoming resourceful and innovative to exploit loopholes in the system. An undocumented respondent interviewed in China reveals that many Nigerians (documented and undocumented), in the absence of necessary documents for bringing their spouse or family, resort to "getting their spouses to disguise as traders traveling into China to buy goods" (41) thus obtaining invitation letter from Chinese companies for as much as five thousand kuai (over $700) for travel purposes.

Since a significant percentage of Nigerian migrants to Asia-Pacific countries are men, and with the challenges of bringing their families to reside with them in host countries, many of these men resort to dating or marrying the natives of host communities with the desire of starting a family. In countries like Malaysia, China, Thailand, and India, there is a growing number of Nigerian male migrants who opt for getting married to natives for reasons ranging from increased business opportunities, societal acceptability, and permanent residency status. However, most of them have not been insulated from the challenges associated with such marriages. In India for instance, the interview reveals that societal and racial discrimination is high against Africans (and Nigerians) who choose to marry Indian ladies. Qualitative data further shows that although such attitudes and behaviour differ among young, middle and older generations, the existing caste system continues to play a significant role in fostering the discriminatory practices (42).

Furthermore, some Nigerian male migrants who were already married before arriving in Asia-Pacific countries also use their marriages with natives of these countries as further means to strengthen their business networks in destination countries while expanding their businesses at home. Many of them either keep Asian girlfriends or wives while maintaining another back home. Using networks and 'societal acceptability' of the status of their relationship with Asian wives or girlfriends, they hope to expand their business networks with locals and at the same time send goods back home to be managed by their Nigerian wives. One respondent in the survey conducted by the researcher noted that managing this situation depends on how 'smart' the man is; a number of the Asian ladies know that these Nigerian migrants have wives back home.

Another aspect of Nigerian migration dynamics in Asia as it concerns family is on childbirth and nationality of children whose parents are Nigerians and natives of Asia-Pacific countries. Evidence suggests a growing number of undocumented Nigerian migrants in many Asia-Pacific countries. This stems from the "overwhelmingly dominant [migration] policy model for… not allow[ing] permanent settlement and greatly restricted to non-permanent migrations."(43) Particularly in Asia, states erect barriers to settlement which many believe have been more resistant to the process of globalization than barriers to information flow and movement of finance or traded goods (44) These policies over time have increased the number of undocumented Nigerian migrants who more often than not, get married to either fellow undocumented Nigerians or natives of host countries. When these migrants have children, the status of these children is often difficult to ascertain; because they cannot be officially recorded as nationals of said countries. In addition to this, among married Nigerians surveyed by the researcher, less than 2 percent of them indicated that they had officially registered the birth of their children at the Nigerian embassies at the affected countries.

The precarious situation presents a growing number of Nigerian-born children with the difficulty of ascertaining status when their Nigerian migrant parents either get deported or incarcerated. Unfortunately, this aspect of Nigerian migration dynamics in Asia-Pacific countries has received little or no attention as Nigerian government policies have not been reviewed to provide for this growing need.

The lifestyle and challenges for Nigerian migrants living in Asia-Pacific countries present similar experiences with those of other regions, however with some peculiarities. Like most Nigerian migrants living elsewhere, the economic push-pull factor of migration plays a significant role to determine their lifestyle. While the prime motivation is centered on economic opportunities, the push factor of self-sacrifice wherein most Nigerian migrants believe their presence in Asia and Pacific countries is "to support" their families back in Nigeria determines what economic activities, risks, and choices they are likely to undertake.

In Malaysia, Indonesia, China, India and Thailand, Philippines, and Australia, Nigerian migrants over time have developed an impressive networking system oftentimes devoid of government assistance, geared towards information sharing about economic opportunities, social gatherings, communal help, relocation, and other migration needs. These network groups (formal or informal) are significant in assisting early migrants to locate other Nigerians in the same city among other needs. While some of these groups are religious, others exist as ethnic or cultural. Among respondents surveyed, about 87 percent belong to one or more forms of 'networking' associations in these Asia-Pacific countries. (45) These networks have become an important means to assist new Nigerian migrants to settle in host communities and secure means of livelihood.

One important feature of these networks is the use of social media applications like WhatsApp and WeChat for information sharing. Elochukwu contends that “[Nigerian] migrants shared security alerts and feel good/fellow-feeling messages using such social media forums”. (46) These forums are important as they highlight the lifestyle and challenges faced by Nigerian migrants. In addition to this, these networks and information shared, once viral, can draw attention to migration issues and challenges as seen recently during the Covid-19 pandemic and the treatment of some Nigerian migrants in China. On the flip-side, while these forums have been most helpful, some have become epicenters for some Nigerians to share illicit and criminal information. In many of these groups, Nigerians are advised to speak in their native languages and use Nigerian names to make it difficult for outsiders to understand the content. Elochukwu, investigated some of these message sharing and how Nigerian migrants utilize these groups to share information about police patrols, drug peddling locations, and other security issues. (47)

Drug trafficking, cybercrime, and other forms of crimes have significantly been associated with Nigerian migrants in Asia over the last two decades. Concerning drug trafficking and the fact that such illicit activities are connected to other forms of crimes (kidnapping, harvesting of human organs, etc.), Nigeria is often regarded as part of a new world order known as the "West African Drug Syndicate Networks (WADSNs)" which often rely on sophisticated networks into East and Southeast Asia referred to as the 'Golden Triangle'(48) for their operations. Howard (49) and Patin (50) compliment official report (51) on illicit narcotics in Thailand, noting that since the late 1990s some Nigerians have been migrating into Asia while setting up heroin trafficking operations (sometimes via South Africa) in Bangkok and other cities to ship parcels into America while 'effectively' using mules to move their products into other parts of Asia including mainland China. Some Nigerian migrants in Asia using lapses in security operations and border checks, recruited smugglers and street peddlers from back home and other countries like Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Ghana, Laos, Cambodia, and even mainland China. Although countries in Asia have continued to crack down on such illicit operations, some Nigerian migrants still see this as a way of life, most times daring risks and punishment involved. Some still believe that this could be another reason for the surge in migrations into Asia; however empirical evidence to substantiate this remains challenging.

Nigerian migrants in Asia-Pacific countries most times operate and survive with little or no support from the home government. Justification of this stems from the fact that most Nigerian migrants never report to Nigerian embassies on arrival; neither does the government put in place appropriate means for registration. More so, some Nigerian migrants in these countries do not participate in embassy organized activities even if they reside in the same city where the embassy is located. While there are numerous dimensions to understand this case, some plausible reasons include their immigration status; moribund online presence of most Nigerian embassies; difficulty of contacting embassy officials, and actual unsavoury treatment of Nigerian migrants by officials in those embassies. About 70 percent of Nigerian immigrants surveyed indicated that they did not inform Nigerian embassies or high commissions on arrival; 80 percent of married respondents who gave birth to children in these countries although they registered their children, they expressed reservations about the birth registration process and the attitude of the Nigerian embassy officials. As a result of this, most Nigerian migrants in this region, specifically in Asian countries, exist without home government's knowledge of their status, welfare, societal discrimination, and other challenges; as it is, the only time these offices are remembered is during international passport renewals or when issues have escalated. Expectedly, this state of affairs results in the lack of data and ultimately affects migration policy planning and implementation for Nigerians in the Asia-Pacific region.

With the existence of this disconnect between Nigerian migrants in the Asia-Pacific region and official representation of the Nigerian government in these countries, the number of cases of racial abuse and xenophobic violence suffered by Nigerian migrant stock has been on the rise without redress, particularly in Asian countries. While racial discrimination has been a recurring phenomenon for African migrants outside the continent, the situation in Asian countries has gone either un-noticed and is shrouded in stereotypes of Asians' "novelty" of the African race. (52) Among respondents surveyed, more than 65 percent indicated that they and (or) someone they know had suffered racial discrimination at one time or the other. Furthermore, when asked if such treatment was specific to Nigerians, respondents indicated that it was a general treatment targeted towards anyone of African background. In India for instance, Nigerian migrants constantly suffer extrajudicial killings which mostly have xenophobic and racial underpinnings. One report noted that in October 2013 residents of Panaji Goa lynched an Igbo Nigerian migrant named Simone Obodo for unclear reasons. (53) The local authorities blamed the incident on infighting between rival drugs gangs, while response from Nigerian government indicated racism was at play. In some Asian countries, these racial and xenophobic attacks have been closely knit with politics, as some politicians are alleged to support anti-migrant policies and encourage reactionary measures against the presence of immigrants in their countries. In Malaysia for instance, it has been reported that "politicians are fueling xenophobia" towards migrants due to reduced economic opportunities presented by increased migration. (54)

Generally, a number of Nigerian migrants in Asia have continued to suffer racial discrimination and do not seem to have any appropriate means to seek redress. Among the respondents, many indicated that due to such racial discrimination they have some 'regrets' and would prefer to migrate to other countries in Europe, America, or even in Africa. However, these dreams do not come easy considering the economic benefits many Nigerian migrants gain within this region. This is one aspect of migration dynamics on which the Nigerian government has to engage Asia-Pacific countries ensuring social and legal protection for the increasing number of Nigerian migrants.

Remittance and Policy Issues

No doubt, remittances have been recognized as a tool of positive impact on the economic growth of home countries. Evidently, remittances improve family living standards as such remittances are used to build houses and establish cottage industries as well as other businesses (55). Since 2000, Nigeria's remittance from the diaspora has significantly increased that currently, she is the largest recipient of remittance flow in sub-Saharan Africa with over 65 percent of total remittance into Africa and more than 2 percent of global remittance.(56)The World Bank ranked Nigeria the 50th highest remittance-receiving country with a steady rise of remittance inflows from USD 19.2 billion to USD 20.6 billion in 2011 and USD 20.8 billion in 2013; While Nigeria shares in the over 10 per cent increase (about USD 46 billion) 2018 remittances for Sub-Saharan Africa as reported by the World Bank Nigeria's impressive remittance inflow even outperformed foreign direct investments and non-oil export income in some fiscal years. While efforts have been made by the Nigerian government to improve on existing remittance inflow policies and structures, there is still much to do regarding remittances from Nigerian immigrants in the Asia-Pacific region. The establishment of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM) and the development of the Nigerian Diaspora Policy are steps in the right direction that will help in improving the remittance flows. However, particular attention should be paid to the question of the Nigerians in the Asia-Pacific region in order to improve the huge resource of remittances from that region.

Since economic gains are recognized as major push-pull factor motivating migration to the regions in question, many Nigerian migrants usually accumulate sufficient savings and (or) have successful businesses and constantly engage in remittances back to Nigeria. Among respondents surveyed, 83 percent indicated that they use predominantly 'informal' remittance channels either bi-weekly or monthly to send money back home (57) More so, since most economies in Asia drive the trade and global commodity market, there is constant inflow and outflow of money from this region, and many Nigerian migrants are part of these financial activities. While most countries in Asia utilize remittances as an indicator to monitor and formulate migration policies for the region, some take to discouraging remittances away from the region by making it cumbersome for migrants to send money back home. As such, the existence of informal remittance channels appears to be the most reliable and frequently employed means of sending money back home for many Nigerian migrants. Interview with a Nigerian businesswoman in China indicates that most Nigerians, regardless of the foreign exchange rate, resort to using the private ‘vendors’ to send money back home; they pay at the prescribed exchange rate into the Chinese account of the vendor who then instructs the business partner in Nigeria to pay the equivalent into the Nigerian account of the client. She also reported that such vendors reinvest the money from such exchange in their businesses in China (58).

The fact that most Nigerian migrants in the Asia-Pacific region depend solely on informal remittance channels suggests the Nigerian government continues to loose significantly from such transactions. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) recognizing this challenge noted in its report that recording remittances and ensuring appropriate taxation remains cumbersome in Nigeria due to the existence and patronage of these informal channels. (59) As the Nigerian government considers developing appropriate policy response to remittance challenges in this region, working with governments of this region is pivotal, mostly since many countries restrict foreign currency exchange which became more stringent after the Asian financial crisis and the subsequent establishment of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) which enables regional currency swap. Furthermore, most Nigerian migrants engaging in different forms of business in this region have continued to decry Nigerian governments' fiscal policies which make it difficult for them to access foreign exchange as this takes a significant toll on their businesses. Many business migrants had to resort to sharp practices of currency swap at excessive exchange rates in 2017 to ensure their businesses in this region survived. One respondent indicated that he had to change business a couple of times to survive foreign exchange challenges as posed by Nigeria's fiscal policies, an issue which is a reoccurring sore point for most Nigerian business migrants in Asia.

Confirming this feeling held by some Nigerian business migrants, who in most cases are from the Southeastern part of Nigeria, one respondent speculates that the Nigerian government has initiated "anti-Igbo economic policies"(60) which, like the restriction on foreign exchange and importation ban, hurts their businesses. While such speculations may not have sufficient evidence, one cannot deny the frustrations of many Nigerian migrants who genuinely expect support from the Nigerian government on using formal remittance channels as well as access to foreign exchange for their business growth. It, therefore, behooves the Nigerian government to re-examine fiscal policies towards remittances in Asia-Pacific regions, as this represents an under-explored area for commercial banks and formal money vendors to grow remittances into Nigeria.

Compounding Issues in International Relations and Migration Data Management

The Nigerian migrant stock in Asia and the Pacific countries contribute significantly to the structure, nature, and contemporary characteristics of Nigeria's international trade. From the establishment and growth of many cottage industries to actively participating in Nigeria's growing commodities market; Nigerian business migrants, with their growing partnerships with small and large businesses in this region since 2000, have navigated the direction of Nigeria's commodity market while also seeing the development of many business hubs within Africa. Migration issues should thus be considered on the twin planes of Nigerians traveling and living in this region with guarantee of economic gains, and Asians migrating into Nigeria with similar assurances of economic gains. As indicated in the previous section, while most Asian countries are enacting labour laws which make it difficult for skilled Nigerians (and Africans) to settle and eke out a living in these countries, the need arises to secure the global value chain venture (originating from Asia) in which many Nigerian business migrants have become active participants. Consequently, migration policy response on the Nigerian side requires actively engaging governments, the private sector and institutions in Asia and Pacific regions with a view to re-adjusting and aligning with the development needs of Nigeria in terms of remittances and diaspora investment for mutually beneficial international trade. Specifically, migration policy can tend to labour, skill development, and knowledge exchange in the establishment of cottage industries learning from the experience of Asia in the march to industrialization.

Furthermore, the Flying Geese (FG) (61) model for economic development emphasized company and business migration from areas of less skill and cheaper labour into specialized and sophisticated areas. However, studies (62) suggest that such company migration is not the case in the business relations between Asia and Africa (Nigeria inclusive). And more, in the emerging skills and production network between Asia and Africa, business migrants are not part of the driving agents for this transfer. Instead of Nigerian business migrants driving the process of commodity production or trade (in Nigeria), this responsibility is monopolized by Asian migrants in Nigeria. While migration dynamics should have backward linkages benefits, the current state is precarious to Nigeria's industrialization process. History also shows that diaspora investment and proper articulation of migration policies are key drivers for industrialization, development, and proper regional integration. Key examples are seen in 19th century America and 20th century Japan. Review of Nigeria's migration policy should consider this peculiar dynamics of migration experience in Asia and Pacific countries.

Migration dynamics and policy development depend on data management and demographic analysis. Nigeria's migration data for Asia and Pacific countries remain scanty. Considering the number of Nigerians migrating into these regions and the fact that earlier migration destinations in Europe and America have over time scaled-up migration restrictions, proper documentation of demographics and data capturing can facilitate effective policy planning. Effective digitization of 'Movements Database’ for travelers on departure/arrivals requiring information on citizenship, birthplace, birth date, gender, occupation, marital status, type of movement, origin, and destination, the reason for the movement, etc., if properly managed and coordinated among relevant institutions, will greatly facilitate developing Nigeria's migration data hub. Such would not only have a significant impact on policy planning, and inter-government engagements; but would save public institutions the challenge associated with paperwork. This should be followed up with the necessary upgrade of the facilities and personnel competence in the relevant MDAs.

Proper coordination between and among relevant institutions is pivotal for data management. Citizenship registration on arrival in the host countries can be improved via online registration.

Conclusion

Issues of Nigerian migration experience in Asia-Pacific countries have received little attention in terms of policy formulation and response, data capturing and management, etc. While these regions’ migration dynamics have gone un-noticed, Nigerians have taken to this region in their numbers over the last two decades. The prime motivation for migration to this region is economic: impressive economic gains recorded in countries like China, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, Vietnam, and Malaysia. These economic gains have successfully linked this region in terms of business, manufacturing, infrastructure and intra-regional migrations. However, while intra-regional migration has significantly increased in this region, migration and settlement by skilled Africans (and Nigerians) are discouraged through certain policies. On the other hand, in Australia, Africans are encouraged to migrate on humanitarian grounds and bi-lateral government arrangements. Notwithstanding the obstacles to migration to the Asian countries, skilled and unskilled Nigerians still take to this region to participate in the global value chain originating in Asia. Many Nigerian women are contributing to the increasing rate of migration to the Asia-Pacific region. Challenges of racism, crime, and drug trafficking are part of the migration experiences of Nigerians in this region. Nigerians have built an impressive networking system devoid of government assistance to support intending migrants. Lack of efficient collection and management of data of Nigerian migration has impacted adversely on migration policy planning for this region. In terms of research, the Nigeria Asia-Pacific migration experience is still a virgin land with many areas calling for study: areas like gender in business operationalization, prostitution, drugs and trafficking, family migration and labour development issues, remittances and diaspora investment for Nigerian business migrants. It is safe to say, there is still a lot to uncover and learn about the dynamics of Nigeria Asia -Pacific migration.

Endnotes

International Organization for Migration (IOM). Migration in Nigeria: Country Profile 2009. Annual Report, IOM, Geneva, 2009, p. 55.
Federal Republic of Nigeria. National Migration Policy. Official Report. International Migration Organization, Abuja, 2015, p. 12.
See Adepoju A. and van der Wiel. A. Seeking Greener Pastures Abroad: A Migration Profile of Nigeria.Safari Publishers, Ibadan, 2010.
Examples of these include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment (Protocol A/P.1/5/79 of 1979) and various AU legislation on Migration and Development.
This information was provided in International Organization for Migration (IOM). Migration in Nigeria: Country Profile 2014. Annual Report, IOM, Geneva, 2016, p. 30.
Bodomo. A. The African Trading Community in Guangzhou: An Emerging Bridge for China-Africa relations. China Quarterly, 203(1), 2010, pp. 693-707.
Seto. K. Exploring The Dynamics of Migration to Mega-Delta Cities in Asia and Africa: Contemporary Drivers and Future Scenarios. Global Environmental Change, 21(1), 2011, pp. 94-107
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Migration in Nigeria: Country Profile 2014 p. 65
International Organization for Migration (IOM) p. 31
Elochukwu, A. A Survey of the African Diaspora in Guangzhou. International Journal of China Studies, 10(2), 2019: p. 134.
For more on the concept of Soft Power as introduced by Joseph Nye see Nye, J. Soft Power. Foreign Policy, 80(1), 1990pp. 153-171.
See World Bank, East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.
Martin, P. Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Trends, Factors, Impacts. Human Development Research Paper 2009/32, UNDP, New York, 2009), p.1.https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19215 (accessed September 2020).
Martin, P. Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Trendsp. 2
Although most of these migrations took place within the region which has a significant percent of the world's population (60 percent) Also see Martin, P. Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Trendsp. 2
Bodomo, A. The African Presence in Contemporary China. The China Monitor. 36(1) 2009: pp. 4-6

17 Serieux, J. Productive Integration of LDCs into Regional Supply Chains: The Case of South Asia. UNCTAD, Geneva, 2012, p. 3.

18.Ikwuyatum, G. Transnational Trade and Emerging Nigerian Diaspora in Asia. http://www.researchgate.net/publication/326436948 (accessed November 2020).

Online survey conducted by the authour on 'Nigeria Asia-Pacific Migration Experience'. May-June, 2020.
Elochukwu, A. A Survey of the African Diaspora in Guangzhou. International Journal p. 136
Pham, L. Just Approaches? Africa's Migrant in China, World Policy Journal.

https://worldpolicy.org/2014/07/09/just-approaches-africas-migrants-in-china/ (accessed November 2020).

International Organization for Migration (IOM). Migration in Nigeria: Country Profile 2009 p. 28.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Insitute for Statistics Database qtd in International Organization for Migration (IOM). Migration in Nigeria: Country Profile 2014p. 34.
Elochukwu, A. A Survey of the African Diaspora in Guangzhou p. 136
Online survey conducted by the authour on 'Nigeria Asia-Pacific.
Atkinson, R. Which Nations Really Lead in Industrial Robot Adoption? Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) Report. Washington DC: ITIF, Nov. 2018 pp. 1-10. http://www2.itif,org/2018-industrial-robot-adoption.pdf?_ga=2.10894196.1994749563.1592222475-403268794.1592222475 (accessed November 2020).
P. Martin, Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Trends,…14
International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Migration Report 2020. IOM, Geneva, 2019, p. 24.
Dumont J. and Lemaitre, G. Counting Immigrant and Expatriates in OECD Countries: A New Perspective (Conference on Competing for Global Talent, Singapore Management University, Singapore, 13-14 January 2005, p. 31.
OECD database on immigrants and expatriates culled from H. Graeme, Migration Between Africa and Australia: A Demographic Perspective. Australian Human Rights Commission, Sydney, Dec.2009), p. 12.
Jakubowicz, A. Australia Migration Policies: African Dimensions, Background Paper for Australian Human Rights Commission African Australians Project, 2009.https://andrewjakubowicz.com/publications/australia%E2%80%99s-migration-policies-african-dimensions/ (accessed November 2020).
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Australia Migration Policies: African Dimensions, Background Paper.
See J. Negin and G. Denning, Shared Challenges and Solutions: Australia's Unique Contribution to the Future of African Development. Lowy Institute Policy Brief. Lowy Institute, Sydney, Dec. 2008.
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Migration in Nigeria: Country Profile 2014 p. 33.
Elochukwu, A. Precarious Migrants: A Study of Nigerian Migrants in Guangzhou, (A PhD Dissertation submitted to School of Public Administration, Xiamen University, China July, 2017), p. 17.
A. Jakubowicz, Australia Migration Policies: African Dimensions, Background Paper
Online survey conducted by the authour on 'Nigeria Asia-Pacific Migration
Lan, S. Transnational Business and Family Strategies among Chinese/Nigerian Couples in Guangzhou and Lagos. Asian Anthropology 14(2) 2015, p. 138.
Elochukwu, A. Precarious Migrants: A Study of Nigerian Migrants p. 47.
Elochukwu, A. Precarious Migrants: A Study of Nigerian Migrants p. 51.
Elochukwu, A. p. 52
Interview with Naga Malleswara Rao, Indian PhD Student at Shandong University, Qingdao, China. 18th May, 2020.
Graeme, H. Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region, A Paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International MigrationGlobal Commission on International Migration, IOM, Geneva, September 2005, p. 21.

44.Graeme, H. Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region, A Paper prepared

45.. Online survey conducted by the authour on 'Nigeria Asia-Pacific

Elochukwu, A. Precarious Migrants: A Study of Nigerian Migrants p. 67
Elochukwu, A. pp. 68-71

48.Luong, H. “Transnational Drug Trafficking from West Africa to Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Vietnam.” Journal of Law and Criminal Justice. 3(2) 2015 pp. 37-54

49.Howard, M. Transnationalism and Society: An Introduction. McFarland, North Califonia, 2011.

Patin, J. “Nigerians in Thailand: Two Side of Every Story.” Thai Law ForumJuly, 2012.
ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA). Country Progress Report of Thailand at the 9th Meeting of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly Fact Finding Committee (AIFOCOM) Yogyakarta Indonesia, 2012.
Interview with Huo Zhenbo 25th May, 2020.

53 Irfan, H. Murder Sparks India-Nigeria Diplomatic Storm. Aljazeera http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2013/11/murder-sparks-india-nigeria-diplomatic-storm-201311109531844644.html (ccessed 2nd June, 2020).

54.Chidi, A. On Delhi's vilified Nigerian Migrants. The Sunday Guardian16th October 2011 http://www.sunday-guardian.com/young-restless/on-delhis-vilified-nigerian-migrants (accessed 2nd June, 2020).

Ohagi E. and U. Isiugo-Abanihe, U. Urban-Rural Migration and Rural Development in Ideato, Imo State, Nigeria. African Population Studies, 14(2) 1998 pp. 53-74
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Migration in Nigeria: Country Profile 2014p. 59
Online survey conducted by the authour on 'Nigeria Asia-Pacific
Interview with Nwakaibeya Chidigo 14th Dec. 2019.
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Remittance Environment in Nigeria CBN, Abuja, 2008 Also see World Bank, Record High Remittances Sent Globally in 2018 http://www.wordbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/08/record-high-remittances-sent-globally-in-2018 (accessed 5th November, 2020)

60.Elochukwu, Precarious Migrants: A Study of Nigerian Migrantsp.56.

The Flying Geese (FG) model of economic development is one of the theories used to explain the success of economic growth and development in Asia. It emphasizes the position that as countries become more skilled and equipped they free up lesser sectors for other countries to embark on, thus developing a 'Geese flight' pattern for specialization. See K. Akamatsu, K. Historical Patterns of Economic Growth in Developing Countries, Developing Economies 1(2) 1962, pp. 1-23 See also.Kiyoshi, K. The "Flying Geese" Model of Asian Economic Development: Origin, Theoretical Extensions and Regional Policy Implications. Journal of Asian Economics 11 (1) 2000, pp. 375-401
Brautigam, D. Xiaoyang, T. Xia. Y. “What Kind of Chinese 'Geese' Are Flying to Africa? Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms.” Journal of African Economies 27 (1) 2018, pp. 29-51

CHAPTER 10 - NIGERIA-EUROPE MIGRATION DYNAMICS

Christiana Idika

Introduction

Europe’s influence on African Migration was caused not only by colonies, which shaped the whole continent especially when thinking about the borders and ‘territories’ of the colonists, but also by recruitment of guest workers after the first and second world wars. [1]

Countries like France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands all recruited guest workers. The oil Crisis in 1973 was another major pull factor for migration and specially influenced the migration movement in the north of Africa and in the ‘Arab oil countries.’[2] The Sub-Sahara – Europe migration belongs to the most discussed topic in international migration discourse. Sadly, media reporting on it is alarmingly negative in association with colonial and discriminatory mindset.[3] This is associated with an underlying assumption about hunger and war-stricken continent. The most common images “of extreme poverty, starvation, tribal warfare and environmental degradation amalgamate into a stereotypical image of ‘African misery’ as the assumed causes of a swelling tide of northbound African migrants.”[4]

This has contributed to the different migration policies in Europe, directed towards border control[5], developmental projects, and trade policies. For instance, The EU heads of states and Government at Hampton court in December 2005 launched the “Global Approach to Migration” with a special focus on Africa. In the initiation of the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, i.e. the “Rabat Process” was also an outcome of the assumptions on African migrations. Important is that when Africa is a key issue in migration issues, Nigeria is among the countries in focus. Consequently, the established policies are perceived as the ‘solutions’ that boil down to curbing migration by ‘fighting’ and ‘combating’ irregular migration through a crackdown on trafficking and smuggling networks in combination with the intensification of border controls. African migrants in Europe remain in a minority of the overall migrant population in Europe. Nevertheless, there is this myth of Africans’ invasion of Europe.[6] This myth, which is seen as a security concern, is accompanied by the ‘sensational media reportage and popular discourses’ that give rise to an apocalyptic image of a wave or ‘exodus’ of ‘desperate’ Africans fleeing poverty at home in search of the European ‘el Dorado’ crammed in long-worn ships barely staying afloat.[7]

“The migrants themselves are commonly depicted as ‘desperate’ and (supposedly passive) victims of ‘merciless’, ‘ruthless’ and ‘unscrupulous’ traffickers and criminal-run smuggling gangs. Or, as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently stated, ‘The system of migrant smuggling . . . has become nothing more than a mechanism for robbing and murdering some of the poorest people of the world.”[8] Therefore, a perceived effort to ‘externalise’ border controls, EU states have exerted pressure on Maghreb states to clamp down on irregular migration occurring over their territory through increasing border controls, toughening migration laws, readmitting irregular sub-Saharan migrants from Europe and deporting them from their own national territories. A second policy ‘solution’, advocated mainly by African states and humanitarian NGOs, is to spur development through aid and trade, which is believed to remove the need to migrate. A third ‘solution’ advocated by governments in Europe and Africa is the launch of information campaigns aiming to discourage irregular migration by raising awareness among would-be migrants of the perils of the journey and the difficult life in Europe or to encourage migrants to return”[9]

“This focus by the media and policy-makers on irregular African migration does not acknowledge the great heterogeneity of African migrants to Europe. It also tends to mask the diversity in trends and patterns of African mobility, including returns and circulation.”[10] However, the dynamic is poorly understood and under researched,[11] which accounts for such narratives. The one-sided, homogeneous narrative affect also the account on Nigerian migration in Europe, whereby, the focus is often on trafficked sex workers and refugees and asylum seekers.[12] This chapter is an attempt to provide a dynamic and heterogeneity in Nigeria – Europe migration narrative. This chapter explores Nigerian migration trends in Europe with specially emphasis on Germany. It will consider the trajectories, trends, currents and major issues such as occupational status, diaspora, home association and transnational engagement, together with issues of regular and irregular; voluntary and involuntary migrations; legal integration. The chapter draws attention to the dynamics of gender, education, qualification, skills, family re-union, children ecology. The chapter pays particular attention to characteristics and features of Nigerian-Europe migration.

Nigeria-Europe Migration: Trends and Patterns

Generally, there are not many and reliable literature and data on Nigeria-Europe migration and in particular Germany. Most data sources and literature focus more on irregular migration such as asylum seekers and sex workers. Besides, like in other African migration cases, available data on Nigeria-Germany migration are those provided by the destination country as in the case of Germany. Migration between Nigeria and Europe as early as years after Nigerian independence consisted mostly of migration to the UK because of colonial ties. By 1980’s the destination country diversified to include other European countries such as Germany, France, Italy and Belgium among others.[13] These have increased over the years regardless of tight migration policies and border control. Nigeria is named among the five countries of concern by the EU, others include Mali, Niger, Senegal and Ethiopia. It is ranked fifth among asylum seekers after Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan.[14] The European Union in this regard put in place a policy in 2016, called “Migration Partnership Framework” (MPF). This is a policy program which aims at rethinking how EU member states, EU institutions and “third world” countries cooperate and collaborate to manage migration flows.[15] According to the document, there are both long and short term objectives of the Framework. The short term objective is to “save lives, increase rate of return and to discourage migrants from embarking on the dangerous journey to reach Europe.” Whereas the long term objective is “to build support for countries of origin in order to address the root cause of irregular migration.” (https://ec.europa.eu/commision/.presscorner/detail/de/MEMO_16_2118).

Significantly, while there are refugees and the trafficking of sex workers among Nigerian migrants, most Nigerians migrate voluntarily, and regularly. The international image of Nigerian migration is dominated by issues around trafficking, although the large majority of Nigerian emigrants are often highly skilled and do not cause problems. In what is called “settlement bias” Graeme Hugo criticized the perception that the aim of a new arrival is to settle permanently.[16] For instance, a personal experience is that one hears alongside such immigration questions or social conversation: what is your name? Where are you from? The constant question of when are you returning or when are you going back to your home country? The motivations for Nigerian migration to Europe varies according to country of destination. These motivations can be political, economic or educational. However, the policies in destination countries also play a significant role. How the migration policies of Germany affect increase or decrease of migration into Germany as a destination country compared to other European countries and the variation in impact for the choice of destination by the three conventional factors can only be determined empirically, and these seem to be lacking in studies on Nigeria–Europe/Germany migration dynamics. It is also a part of assumptions in migration narratives that choice of destinations is a function of networks and contacts. It needs to be quantitively ascertained what percentage of Nigerians migrate to Germany with or without previous contact.

Profiles and Characteristics of Nigeria Migration

Gender

There is evidence in the change in gender dynamics in African, or Nigerian migration. As far back as 2004, when Adepoju wrote his article on the changing configurations of Migration in Africa, his claim that there is increase in the migration of women, who did not just migrate to join their husbands, seems to remain the case after sixteen years.[17] Many women migrate on their own and in most cases not on the grounds of sex trafficking. “In light of the attention currently being given to trafficking, it is important to stress that, for Nigerian migration, trafficking seems the exception rather than the rule. The large majority of Nigerians migrate voluntarily, and even in the case of trafficking it is clear that the line between voluntary and forced migration is blurred.”[18] Labor migration from Nigeria has also become increasingly feminine.[19] However, on a general note, there is a lack of data on migration flows by gender in addition to minimal information on gender differences with regards to motives for migration, strategies and routes.

Occupation

Most migrants suffer downgrading on their entry into German labour market, except those who had their studies or part of their studies in Germany. Thus, most migrants seem to obtain job positions for which they are over qualified. According to Beauchemin, this is brain waste rather than brain drain.[20] In a study of Europe–African migration dynamics, focusing on DR Congo, Senegal and Ghana, the researchers observed that “the occupational trajectories of migrants show no evidence of a ‘brain gain’… A large proportion of African migrants experience downgrading on entering the European labor market. With the exception of those who pursue part of their studies in Europe, African migrants obtain jobs for which they are overqualified, and have few opportunities to improve their situation over time. In other words, migration does not pay off for well-educated Africans; what is involved here is ‘brain waste’. When they return, overall, they obtain better occupational positions than non-migrants. But this advantage reflects their initial selection at departure and subsequent selection for return. After a period of deskilling in Europe, they only experience a sort of ‘brain regain’ back home.”[21]

A research on Nigeria, may show the same results. For instance, most people that came with Deutscher Akademisher Austauschdienst, German Academic Exchange Services (DAAD) scholarships, and who mostly belong to the upper class in Nigeria e.g. in the government, return after studies because they have chances of securing job, compared to others who came on their own, and who going abroad to study was an escape from unemployment in Nigeria. According to “Deutsche Welle”, the institute for Employment Research (IAB) affiliated to the German Employment Agency, Nigerians have an edge when it comes to finding jobs in Germany. From the Federal Bureau of Statistics as at March 2017, there are more than 56,000 Nigerians living in Germany and BA showed that 20,000 Nigerians either have a steady or temporary job as at March 2018.[22] The data could be exclusive in the sense that some data sources might be neglected.

Furthermore, while conventional statistics focus on family reunification in the evaluation of Nigerian migrants in Germany, the complex nature of the family in migration is overlooked. For instance, intercultural families, where Nigerians marry Germans, while retaining a family at the home country. Besides, married couples of Nigerian backgrounds, live together in Germany without registering as married couples. Some are married without living together as married couples. The consequences show in data collection and analysis of the family status of Nigerian migrants in Germany, since most of these are undocumented. Besides, the assumption that Nigerians with families in Germany have a sole aim of unification is not always true, because most families remain apart for a long time.

Transitory Visas and Economic Integration

Generally, motives and legal status of migrants at the point of entry are diverse in comparison to the overgeneralization in reporting of Nigerian migration to Germany. The diverse motives and legal status determine also the routes the migrants would take. Illegal entry is not frequent.[23] Most migrants enter and overstay their visas, whereas others become irregular when their asylum status is rejected and they could not leave the country, either because they do not want to or because, they have no Nigerian passport for them to return to Nigeria. The category that were unable to leave Germany remain undocumented.[24] “A significant number of Nigerians apply for refugee status in European countries. In 2004, Nigerians were the fifth largest group of asylum seekers in Europe (Carling, 2006). Because of its size and its current relative stability, Nigerians have less chance of obtaining asylum status than citizens from other ECOWAS countries directly affected by civil war.”[25] The reason for this disparity also needs attention.

Education and Skill

Education is another factor in Nigeria – Europe migration. A good percentage of Nigerians in Germany have already studied in Nigeria before migrating to Germany. However, whether one will use the already acquired certificate to secure a job position depends on several factors. These factors include the person’s legal status. Most Nigerians enter Germany regularly, that is, with valid visas, but transitions in status happen during the migrant’s stay. Most people who entered with visiting visas with no intention of returning hang around at the expiration of their visas. Many a time, such people would file for asylum. Within this period the person’s stay becomes irregular, either because of over stay of his or her visa duration or the asylum/refugee application is denied. Consequently, a migrant who studied in Nigeria but became irregular in Germany, whether or not his or her asylum/refugee status is rectified, will not be able to use the certificate acquired in Nigeria to work in Germany. Furthermore, the recognition of the certificate obtained before entrance into Germany also plays a role on the possibility of using the certificate to work. Additionally, about 30% of Nigerian migrants studied in Germany and gradually integrate themselves into the labor market. Education has remained an important cause of Nigerian emigration.[26] Studying in Germany requires language competence, which also plays a role in the choice of destination in migration. UK as an English-speaking country and because of colonial ties has been a major destination country for Nigerians. Most Nigerians would prefer UK to Germany because of language challenges. However, for studies, Germany appears preferable because of cost of studies. There are several scholarship programs in Germany which encourage migration and the economic capital needed for studying is minimal compared to UK. These dynamics are very important in understanding Nigeria–Europe/Germany migration trends. Therefore, it requires proper attention in terms of data collection on both destination and origin countries, in order to evaluate the statistics of migrants with training or education before migrating, what happens after migration, and if they returned to their educational status at time of return.

Returns and Circulation

On a general study of return and circulation on migration between Europe and Africa, B. Schoumaker et al. remarked that lack of data in countries of destination (on migrants) and origin (on returnees) constitutes a handicap in measuring and understanding return migration and circulation. According to the authors, aggregate data on emigration flows from European countries are insufficient for studying patterns of return. This follows from the inability to estimate the level and trends of return migration in most countries, and measures the duration spent in the destination countries before returning.[27] A number of return programs have been constituted to encourage returns.[28] Examples of such programs include Return and Emigration of Asylum Seekers ex Belgium (REAB) assisted returns program by IOM.[29] The programs are mainly directed at the irregular migrants. Regardless there are voluntary and involuntary returns. According to the information on the website of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, “voluntary return always takes priority over forcible removals. Many governmental and non-governmental services help people who are required to leave Germany return to their countries of origin. For example, they may receive start-up and reintegration assistance. Only those who do not voluntarily comply with the obligation to leave will be removed forcibly. The federal and state governments agreed to establish the Joint Centre for Return Assistance (ZUR) in Berlin.” [30]

Consequently, there are several programs initiated by Germany for returnees. These include, the Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum-Seekers in Germany (REAG) which was launched in 1979; the Government Assisted Repatriation Programme (GARP) introduced in1989 and the StarthilfePlus which was introduced in 2017. These programs are executed in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).[31] As indicated above, asylum status is mostly rejected in case of Nigerians and consequently, they fall mostly among this category that must return to Nigeria. However, their willingness to return regardless of incentives and factors influencing such choices need to be studied.

Nevertheless, we can consider some assumptions on remote factors. Most of the assisted return programs may include economic incentives. Some authors are of the opinion that despite the progress in 2017 in cooperation with Senegal, Nigeria and Mali “the launched partnership did not immediately translate into an increase in returns, which was one of the main short-term goals of the compacts.” The assumed conclusion was that monetary assistance does not always bring about the expected immediate results in the area of return.[32]

To that effect, Nigeria remains a strategic partner in Africa for an effective readmission agreement program.[33] For Nigeria, there is no problem with readmission. However, there seems to be delay on the progress on the readmission agreement. According to the report, Nigerian officials stress that it is of no use sending people back, whereas there are no opportunities for them at home, which will make the returnees to travel again. It seems that the perception and acceptance of the Migration Policy Framework (MPF) in Nigeria are negative; and the EU’s ambition to obtain cooperation on returns through positive development incentives was a misplaced one. EU’s interest is mainly in the return but “remittances are very important for Nigeria, while development aid is not. EU officials know that more effective leverage would be through trade or research cooperation. … Nigerian officials’ assessment of the MPF is generally negative, stressing that the country has not yet seen much benefit from it. They report that they were hoping to see innovative solutions to address irregular migration, unemployment and lack of opportunities, and to reduce the dangers that migrants face during their journey, but that they have so far been disappointed. Critically, Nigeria is keen to see more legal migration opportunities into Europe and is frustrated that this has not been part of MPF agenda.”

Conclusion: The Neglected Issues in Nigeria–Europe Migration

Nigeria takes a huge space within the discussion on migration and policies in Europe and Germany in particular However, empirical research on the Nigeria migration dynamics in Europe is knowingly or unknowingly neglected or under researched. Available research and sources do not consider the profiles of migrants, there reasons for migration and their choice of destination. For example, the role of contacts, family networks, studying and language in determining why Nigerian migrants choose Germany rather than France, Belgium, Netherlands or Switzerland. There is a need for a concrete collaborative research between Nigeria and Germany, so that data in both origin and destination countries will include dates the family member departed the country of origin, education and occupational status, gender and age, marital status. The dates of return, integration into labor market, among others.

[1] Oliver Bakewell and Hein de Haas, African Migrations: Continuities, Discontinuities, and Recent Transformations, in Patrick Chabal, Ulf Engel & Leo de Haan, eds. African Alternatives Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007, p. 95 – 109, p. 97.

[2] ibid., 97.

[3] Cris Beauchemin, ed. Migration between Africa and Europe 2018, Springer International Publishing AG, eBook https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69569-3

[4] Hein de Haas The Myth of Invasion: the inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe, Third World Quarterly, 2008, 29:7, 1305-1322, DOI: 10.1080/01436590802386435, p. 1305.

[5] Gabrielli, L. Interactions analysis between control externalization and migration dynamics in African transit spaces: an indicator of the results and side-effects of European immigration policies. In J. Streiff-Fénart & A. Segatti (eds.), The challenge of the threshold. Border clo- sures and migration movements in Africa (pp. 3–16). Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011.

[6] Hein de Haas The Myth of Invasion: the inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe, Third World Quarterly, 2008, 29:7, 1305-1322, DOI: 10.1080/01436590802386435 p. 1305.

[7] F Pastore, P Monzini, et al., 'Schengen's soft underbelly? Irregular migration and human smuggling across land and sea borders to Italy', International Migration, 44(4), 2006, pp 95‐119.

[8] Hein de Haas, The myth of invasion: The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe. Third World Quarterly, 2008, 29(7), 1305–1322. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802386435. 1306

[9] Hein de Haas. The myth of invasion: The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe. Third World Quarterly, 2008, 29(7), 1305–1322. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802386435. 1306

[10] Cris Beauchemin, ed. Migration between Africa and Europe, Springer International Publishing AG, 2018, eBook https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69569-3

[11] see Richard, Black, and Russell King, Editorial introduction: Migration, return and development in West Africa. Population, Space and Place, 2004. 10(2), 75–83. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.318. Robert, Lucas, Migration and economic development in Africa: A review of evidence. Journal of African Economies, 2006. 15(AERC Supplement 2), 337–395. John Salt, Current trends in international migration in Europe, Report to the council of Europe (37 p). Council of Europe: Strasbourg, 2001. Catherine, Cross, and Derik Gelderblom, Views on migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Proceedings of an African migration alliance workshop. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006. Ralph, P. Grillo, and Valentina, D. Mazzucato, Africa < > Europe: A double engagement. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2008, 34(2), 175–198. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830701823830. Timothy, J. Hatton & Jeffrey G. Williamson, Demographic and economic pressure on emigration out of Africa. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2003, 105(3), 465–486. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467- 9442.t01-2-00008.

[12] https://www.dw.com/en/nigerian-refugees-in-germany-among-top-job-finders/a-44151590

[13] Hein de Haas, International migration, national development and the role of governments: The case

of Nigeria, p. 168

[14] https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Statistik/AsylinZahlen/aktuelle-zahlen-dezember-2019.html, https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/statistics/

[15] Clare Castillejo, EU, Migration Partnership Framework: A New Approach to Better Manage Migration. MIGRATION PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORKA NEW APPROACH TO BETTER MANAGE MIGRATION; Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik , 2017 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3_migrationpartnershipframework_2pg.pdf

[16] Graeme, Hugo, A multi sited approach to analysis of destination immigration data: An Asian example. International Migration Review, 2014. 48(4), 998–1027. https://doi.org/10.1111/ imre.12149.

[17] Aderanti, Adepoju, Changing configurations of migration in Africa. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2004. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/changing-configurations-migration-africa/. Assessed December 18 2020.

[18] Hein De Haas, International Migration, National Development and the Role of Government: The Case of Nigeria, in Aderanti Adepoju Ton van Naerssen Annelies Zoomers eds. International Migration and National Development in sub-Saharan Africa: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin (Afrika-studiecentrum Series, Band 10) 2007, p. 161 – 181.

[19] Aderanti, Adepoju, Changing configurations of migration in Africa. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2004. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/changing-configurations-migration-africa/. Assessed December 18 2020.

[20] Cris Beauchemin, ed. Migration between Africa and Europe, Springer International Publishing AG, 2018, p. 6. eBook https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69569-3

[21] Ibid.,

[22] https://www.dw.com/en/nigerian-refugees-in-germany-among-top-job-finders/a-44151590

[23] cf. Erick, Vickstrom, Pathways into irregular status among Senegalese migrants in Europe. International Migration Review, 2014, 48(4), 1062–1099.

[24] cf. Michael, Collyer, States of insecurity: Consequences of Saharan transit migration (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper, 31). Oxford: University of Oxford, 2006. Franck, Düvell, Crossing the fringes of Europe: Transit migration in the EU’s neighborhood (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper 33). Oxford: University of Oxford, 2006. Anna, Triandafyllidou, Irregular migration in Europe in the 21st century. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.), Irregular migration in Europe: Myths and realities (pp. 1–21). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2010. Erik, Vickstrom, Pathways into irregular status among Senegalese migrants in Europe. International Migration Review, 2014, 48(4), 1062–1099. See also David van Moppes, The African migration movement: Routes to Europe (Working Paper Migration and Development Series, 8). Nijmegen: Migration and Development Research Group, Radboud University, 2006. Collyer, M. States of insecurity: Consequences of Saharan transit migration (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper, 31). Oxford: University of Oxford, 2006.

[25] Hein De Haas, International Migration, national development and the role of Government: the case of Nigeria

[26] Heike Jöns, Peter Meusburger and Michael Heffernan eds. Mobilities of Knowledge, Springer Open eBook, 2017

[27] Bruno Schoumaker, Marie-Laurence Flahaux, Cris Beauchemin, Djamila Schans, Valentina Mazzucato, and Papa Sakho in Beauchemin ed. Migration between Africa and Europe, 2018 p. 35 – 80.

[28] Christian Dustmann, Return migration: The European experience. Economic Policy, 1996, 11(22), 213–250.

[29] IOM. REAB. Return and Emigration of Asylum Seekers ex Belgium, Statistical data 2006. Brussels: International Organization for Migration, 2007.

[30]https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/migration/law-on-foreigners/return-policy/voluntary-return/voluntary-return-node.html

[31]https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/migration/law-on-foreigners/return-policy/voluntary-return/voluntary-return-node.html

[32] Sergo, Mananashvili, EU’s return policy: Mission accomplished in 2016? Reading between the lines of the latest EUROSTAT return statistics (ICMPD Policy Brief). Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2017.

[33] European Commission, (2017). Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Fourth progress report on the partnership framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration. Brussels: Author. p. 6. See also European Union (2017). Nigeria: Action and progress under the migration partnership framework June 2016-June 2017. Brussels: Author.

CHAPTER 11 - UNDERSTANDING NIGERIAN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Tracie Utoh-Ezeajugh & Matthias Esene

Introduction

This chapter begins with an attempt to highlight the principle of migration governance. It then proceeds to describe the central objective of the Nigeria migration governance framework and provides insight into the evolution process and uniqueness of the Nigerian Migration Governance. We will adopt a two-prong approach in our presentation i.e. theoretical and historical analysis woven into an interactive discussion to answer the following key questions: what visible and specific system, process or structure is referred to as the Nigerian migration governance framework? What is the uniqueness? What inspired the governance framework and in what practical way does the governance framework affect the management of migration in Nigeria? The analysis will identify the major elements of the Nigerian migration governance framework and compare with similar policy frameworks of other West African countries where possible. The significance is to X-ray the practicability and/or applicability of what is termed the Nigerian Migration Governance structure.

Conceptual Analysis

The complex nature of migration provides for the involvement and interface of a diverse range of stakeholders that have varied, often divergent and yet increasingly interrelated interests. This reality requires the development of policies, actions, structures and processes to regulate individual and organisational approaches and responses to migration.

Migration governance encompasses the totality of the different ways in which individuals and institutions manage their common affairs and take cooperative action while accommodating diverse and conflicting interests involved in migration. It can be defined as "the norms and organizational structures that regulate and facilitate states' and other actors' responses to migration" (Alexander Betts & Lena Kainz, 2017, p.5). IOM Glossary on Migration presents migration governance as:

the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organizational structures (sub-national, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States’ approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation. (IOM Glossary on Migration, 2019, p. 2).

Betts (2010) affirms that "migration governance includes a range of norms, rules, principles, decision-making procedures that exist over and above the level of a single nation-state", which "exists at three broad levels" that can be identified as "multilateralism", "embeddedness" and "informal networks" (Betts, 2010, p.362). The IOM World Migration Report (2010, p. 89,) captures the overall aim of migration governance as the effort "to facilitate humane and orderly migration policies for the benefit of all", and an important aspect of achieving this aim lies in "strengthening the capacity of governments to adopt a comprehensive approach to migration management".

Thus, the major purpose of migration governance in the submission of Elaine Lebon-McGregor (2020, p.2) is to ensure that "states work collectively in ways that make them better able to fulfil their objectives than they would be acting alone". In the area of international migration, "governance assumes a variety of forms, including the migration policies and programmes of individual countries, interstate discussions and agreements, multilateral fora and consultative processes, the activities of international organizations" (The IOM World Migration Report, 2010, p.74).

Following its multi-dimensional nature involving e.g. refugees, diaspora, migrant workers, expatriates, trafficking in persons and migrants smuggling, governing migration requires and has generated different approaches, expertise, procedures and institutional set-ups. As a result, there is a plethora of institutions involved in the management of various aspects and dimensions of migration. The Nigeria migration governance framework recognizes the multi-dimensional nature of migration and the involvement of diverse actors and processes. Thus the national framework clearly identifies migration priority issues and clusters them into an integrated coordination structure.

Origins and Evolution of the Global Migration Governance and the Nigerian Experience

In Nigeria, migration or its governance did not gain prominence in national discourse until 2002 when President Obasanjo was confronted with the reality of youths sojourning through the Sahara desert.[1] Between then and now, the global and national landscape of migration discourse has greatly changed; the level of awareness is at all-time high. Nigeria, leaning on some external influences and practices has, developed a national migration governance framework, which clustered all its priorities into 5 thematic institutional sub-structures.

Major events that defined the institutionalization of migration governance between 1919 and 2015 include the creation of international institutions in the early 20th century, occasioned by the need for international cooperation on varied issues. Examples are the Postal service and other communication services (Gallagher, 2020), as well as the United Nations which was created in 1945 to replace the League of Nations, earlier created in 1920 (Fosdick, 1920). These and other establishments gave rise to a new form of international organizations that took up the task of addressing issues that required international cooperation ‘based on little more than shared aspirations; with broad agendas in which large and small had a constitutionally mandated voice’ (Ruggie, 1992, p.583).

The evolution of global migration governance should be viewed in the context of ongoing efforts "to shape and define the contours of what should fall under the remit of these respective organizations" (McGregor, 2020, p.5). One of such organisations that survived is the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), now the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Betts and Kainz (2017) affirm that the creation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 marked a key starting point for the journey of migration as a global policy issue, with their mandate including the ‘protection of the interest of workers when employed in countries other than their own’ (ILO, 2018). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in December 1950 after a series of other temporary organizations, with the International Labour Organisation providing operational support. By 1951, therefore, the institutional framework for global migration governance was mostly in place, and "although new actors have since joined the ranks, ILO, UNHCR, and IOM continue to be the three international organizations (IOs) specifically mandated to deal with matters related to population movements" (Lebon-McGregor, 2020, p.11). However, an organization like the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) which was founded in 1993, upon the initiative of Austria and Switzerland is growing into a leading regional migration institution for Europe. Created to serve as a support mechanism for informal consultations, and to provide expertise…in the newly emerging landscape of multilateral cooperation on migration and asylum issues, the organization currently has 18 member states (MS) with the entrant of Turkey in 2018 and Germany in 2020.

Africa’s migration policies were initially perceived mainly through Diaspora engagements and the facilitation of mobility towards other continents. However, the contributions of migrants have been gaining increased recognition in policies of countries and regions of destination, as well as in policy dialogues between African and European countries; and in response to these developments, governments are increasingly acknowledging migration as a cross-cutting phenomenon that must be addressed across policy portfolios at the national, regional, and continental levels. The need to respond to issues such as human trafficking and migrant protection, and the increasing awareness that migration relates to every part of government has underscored the need for formalised government approaches to migration. Many African states have therefore integrated migration as a main dimension in their national development strategies and mainstreamed it across policy domains such as health, labour market and education (Le Coz & Pietropolli, 2020).

At the sub-regional level, countries belonging to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have moved towards the implementation of freedom of movement arrangements, drawing credence from a protocol adopted in 1979, and this has required the harmonization of legislation in various domains of labour and social protection for migrants. Several national migration strategies adopted in recent years, understandably, reflect a change in approach to migration issues. Many African states have set up dedicated agencies or offices to manage specific migration issues. Ivory Coast, for example, in 2011 established a joint ministerial committee focused on human trafficking and child labour, while The Gambia and Niger set up national anti-trafficking agencies respectively in 2007 and 2010. Cape Verde’s 2012 national immigration strategy focuses on themes beyond immigration management and border control, including protection of migrants at risk, relationships with the diaspora, assistance to migrants and returnees, and the protection of migrants abroad. Many ECOWAS member countries had cited migration in their national development strategies by 2015 (Ilke, Trauner, Jegen, & Roos, 2019). Senegal’s 2014 development policy seeks to engage the diaspora in supporting national development. The Strategic Framework for Economic Growth and Sustainable Development (CREDD) 2019-2023 of Mali is geared towards turning migration into “an opportunity for development in Mali” by creating avenues for regular migration and sustainable reintegration, improving migrants’ social protection, and setting up a national agency to protect Mali nationals abroad (Mouthaan, 2019).

Prior to 2002, Nigeria had already established institutions with legal or policy frameworks that dealt with at least 4 sub-thematic areas of the current migration governance framework. These institutions included the Nigeria Immigration Service established under the Immigration Ordinance of 1958 and mainly responsible for facilitating the exit and entry of both Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike; the National Population Commission established since 1981 and responsible for the collation and analysis of all entry and exit (immigration and emigration) data; and the National Commission for Refugees established in 1989 and responsible for granting asylum and refugee status to immigrants who apply and qualify under both the UN 1951/1967 and the OAU (now AU) 1969 instruments.[2] In addition, the policy on quota system (aspect of labour migration) was been implemented by the NIS with supervision from the Ministry of Interior.

Otherwise, migration discourse only began to gain prominence in Nigeria from 2002; at a time when concerns about irregular migration and returning undocumented migrants was becoming a policy priority for the European Union and its member states. Two major triggers coming from two streams of interest helped shape the focus of the migration governance framework for Nigeria.

The first visible interest was the EU and its individual Member States. The EU was directly responsible for drawing the attention of the Federal Government of Nigeria to the activities of human traffickers and migrant smugglers along the long established trans-Saharan trade route. At the time, President Obasanjo had taken as one of the priorities of his administration to bolster the image of Nigeria in the international space having returned to democracy in 1999. It was embarrassing for the Federal Government of Nigeria when confronted with negative migration trend involving many Nigeria youths, particularly young girls who were being trafficked and sojourning across the Sahara Desert to reach Europe. The narrative was quite damaging for the national reputation or image of Nigeria abroad. The federal government was apt and responded by the establishment of National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) in 2003. This explains how the trafficking in human beings (THB) and smuggling of migrants (SOM) became migration issues for Nigeria.

On the other hand, the sheer volume of remittance from the Nigerian Diaspora community was a counter narrative emphasizing the resourcefulness and potential of the diaspora to national development. In fact, the case of Nigeria reflected the fact earlier made that Africa’s migration policies were initially perceived mainly through Diaspora engagements and the facilitation of mobility towards other continents. The Nigerian government responded by the establishment of the Nigeria National Volunteer Service (NNVS) in the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation in 2003 to oversee the overall management and general administration of volunteering and Diaspora matters in Nigeria as provided in the Act establishing the NNVS. Also the government supported the creation of Nigerians in Diaspora Organizations (NIDO) and instituted the July 25 Annual National Diaspora Day.

The establishment of both NAPTIP and NNVS was a clear reflection of the need to balance the two-contraposing priorities. Many technocrats within the government saw these two dimensions of migration as equally compelling: on the one hand, the concept of migration evoked images of humanitarian conditions of long and wasteful sojourn across the Sahara Desert. On the other, it was imperative to link up with Nigeria Diasporas to assist in the development of the country given the huge remittance inflows from emigrants and their skills and resourcefulness. Remittance inflow from Nigerian Diaspora has averaged $23 Billion over the last five years consecutively and even though the remittance inflow was largely for private consumption, the need for a policy framework was to employ alternative ways to engage the Diaspora to contribute to financing for development. Meanwhile, data on remittance inflow which is very well documented with the Central Bank of Nigeria only reflects what comes in through the formal channel.

Meanwhile, in the same year 2003, a memo had been introduced at the Federal Executive Council (FEC) to consider a proposal for a policy on Internally Displaced Persons. It is essential to recall that the idea of developing a National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons was first mooted by the National Commission for Refugees, where a draft was prepared in 2003. The result was a working document which was given to the Presidential Committee to Draft a National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (NPI) to further develop into a comprehensive National Policy. The Committee was charged with developing a framework that would enhance the prevention of Internal Displacement, propose best practices for the management of Internally Displaced Persons including the protection of their human rights and the need to mitigate their suffering once displacement has occurred. The draft NPI was first returned for internal and conceptual review in 2008 to accommodate the adopted AU Kampala Convention on IDPs. After that, other reviews had been held initiated by a series of technical, protocol and logistical issues. The NPI is yet to be adopted by the FEC.

What this reveals is that three major migration issues gained prominence in the Nigeria policy discourse at about the same time i.e. THB/SOM, Diaspora, and Internal Displacement. This experience deepened the understanding of many technocrats as to the crosscutting and multi-dimensional nature of migration and the various themes under which a country can determine and prioritize its interest.

By 2005, the EU already had a clear strategy with migration becoming a central focus of EU-Africa Partnership.[3] From the EU side, the interest and priority for migration was understood in terms of the protection of the sanctity of the asylum system in Europe. This resulted in stricter border control measures to stem irregular migration from third countries (Is this third world countries or is there a new concept of third countries?) like Nigeria and mechanism to facilitate the return of undocumented migrants. At about the same time and as interest continued to increase; Nigeria was taking stock of its migration landscape. Betts and Kainz (2017) have grouped migration governance into four historical periods which are; early migration governance (1919-1989); taking stock (1994-2006); the era of migration and development (2007-15) and the New York Declaration and Global Compacts (2016- present). Part of the stocktaking in the Nigerian case included the 2006 census and post-enumeration census data containing information on migration relating to immigrant manpower stock in Nigeria and their personal characteristics. By 2009 and 2012, data on labour immigrants could be derived from the National Manpower Stock and Employment Generation (NMSEG) surveys. Going forward, these surveys were expected to be carried out at regular intervals.

By 2013, funding from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) set the stage for many policy drives including the National Migration Policy, National Policy on Labour Migration, and the National Policy on Diaspora Matters[4] in Nigeria. The process for the elaboration of these three policy documents went on concurrently and was facilitated by the IOM. The focus and policy objectives of the proposed labour migration and diaspora policies were quite streamlined because of their thematic specificity. But the proposed National Migration Policy aggregated a wide range of crosscutting issues which were quite ambitious.[5] As such, the pertinent question was how to orient the proposed National Migration Policy to ensure coherence and coordination in the governance of migration given the crosscutting nature and the array of institutions involved in the management of the emerging and different thematic aspects of migration. The challenge was to create a coordination framework involving the different MDAs and CSOs in order to have a shared vision and concrete strategy of implementation.

Instruments of Nigerian Migration Governance

As mentioned above, since 2014, Nigeria has been involved in formulating instruments for migration governance, including a National Migration Policy, strategies on labour migration and Diaspora matters, and a coordinating framework to reform migration governance (Kwaku & Zanker, 2019). The efforts by the Nigerian government, to put in place, dynamic, functional and strategic instruments of migration governance led, on the one hand to the development of policies and, on the other hand, to establishment of commissions and committees equipped with the modalities for migration management.

Significant cooperation, partnerships and exchanges with international agencies and allies aided the development of these migration instruments. For instance, the National Migration Policy, the National Policy on Labour Migration were developed with the support of 10th European Union Development Fund (EDF) Programme “Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria” under the joint technical support of IOM and ILO. Similarly, the review of NPLM, National Migration Profile, development of the National Diaspora Policy and the development of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Return, Readmission and Reintegration (RRR), Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data Sharing and Boarder Management were all done within the current EU-IOM Initiative for Migrants Protection and Reintegration in Nigeria, 2017-2021; a component of which focuses on strengthening of national migration governance.

National Migration Policy

The National Migration Policy adopted in 2015, is concerned with "the advancement and protection of the human rights of Nigerian migrants, such as migrant workers, within and outside Nigeria". The Technical Working Group (TWG) constituted earlier for the review of IDP policy was adopted with the inclusion of some migration experts to work on the national migration policy. Inputs from relevant MDAs were collated and incorporated into a draft policy which was then presented to the FEC for approval in 2013. The draft National Migration Policy (NMP) was expanded based on several international and domestic calls for the development of mechanisms to protect the human rights of migrants, to discourage irregular forms of migration, and to explore the options and benefits inherent in the interrelatedness of migration and development. The NMP was finally adopted by FEC in 2015.

A major priority of the Migration Policy is "the free movement of nationals, as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, which states in section 15(3), Chapter II, that the State shall “provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services" (National Migration Policy, 2015, p.1). The NMP addresses issues related to migration in diverse thematic areas such as – migration and development; migration and crosscutting social issues; migration and health; migration and education; migration and the environment; migration and trade/labour market; migration and gender; migration and national security; migration and forced displacement; human rights of migrants; organized labour; internal migration; national population; migration data and statistics; and many other thematic areas (IOM, Migration in Nigeria: a Country Profile, 2014, p.70-71). There were projections that the development of the policy would achieve twenty-one objectives which include the provision of adequate information to promote regular migration; effective coordination of migration activities; maintenance of a database of Nigerians in the Diaspora; reduction of irregular migration; effective border control; promotion of dialogue between transit and receiving countries; reduction of the impact of brain drain through bilateral migration agreement, amongst others.

These objectives of NMP were classified into two major groups: structural and operational objectives. All the structural objectives are made to:

Ensure that the human, economic, labour and civil rights of Nigerians resident abroad are well protected in their host countries
Encourage orderly and regular migration of Nigerians
Promote national identity and social integration

On the other hand, the operational objectives are to:

Provide a platform for the uniform administration of migration in Nigeria
Serve as a guide to all government and non-governmental agencies and for nations

Regarding the governance of migration, the Policy provided for the framework

To create an effective coordination structure that puts every stakeholder on equal pedestal
To Establish an interface platform and channels of communication among and between the various stakeholders for information sharing
To have a common understanding of Migration issues
To prescribe a single, consistent and coherent approach to the implementation of migration related programmes and activities
To define the operational boundaries of the various stakeholders and avoid duplication and inter-agency rivalries
To serve as an M & E
To serve as platform for networking and knowledge/experience sharing

To ensure the implementation of the above framework, the Policy also provided for the institutional structure comprising of all related MDAs organized within a migration governance structure. This is discussed later in this chapter.

National Policy on Labour Migration

The National Policy on Labour Migration which was adopted in 2014 was developed to ensure "the existence of rules and regulations that all stakeholders must uphold. In this regard, Nigeria had ratified both the Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97) of the ILO in 1960 and the International (UN) Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990". (National Policy on Labour Migration, 2014, p.4.). The National Policy on Labour Migration has three broad objectives: to promote good governance of labour migration; to protect migrant workers and promote their welfare and that of their families left behind; and to optimize the benefits of labour migration to development while mitigating its adverse impact (National Policy on Labour Migration, 2014, p.6).

Some of the specific objectives of the National Policy on Labour Migration are to:

enact legislative framework as foundation of national labour migration governance;
strengthen rules and regulations for effective and efficient administration of labour migration;
strengthen existing institutional framework for labour migration and enhance coordination with all concerned ministries and agencies across all levels of government;
ensure full participation of social partners as key labour migration stakeholders in policy elaboration, implementation and evaluation;
build migration-related knowledge and database for good policy and effective administration;
cooperate with ECOWAS towards full implementation of relevant protocols;
ensure gender-responsive policy and its implementation at all levels, by government, social partners and other relevant actors;
ensure non-discrimination and equality of treatment for all workers, migrants, and nationals abroad and at home;
ensure that all employment of migrant workers is subject to labour standards and code of ethics;
promote and protect the rights of labour migrants in recruitment for employment abroad through supervision and monitoring of recruitment activities;
promote consular and diplomatic services to protect migrants and oversee their welfare;
strengthen policies and programmes for welfare of migrants, returning migrants and families left behind;
create environment conducive to attracting migrant remittances, Diaspora investments and technology transfers;
negotiate bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with major origin and destination countries (National Policy on Labour Migration 2014 P 7).

The NPLM in consonance with the National Development Plan, and the National Policy on Migration is designed to be comprehensive, fair and transparent, in line with international norms and good practices; to be effective and efficient and gender sensitive in tandem with the country’s Decent Work Agenda and the federal government initiatives. The guiding principles for the NPLM include the promotion and protection of the human rights of migrant workers regardless of their status; and the prevention of, and protection against abusive migration practices such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons and exploitation of persons; to ensure an orderly and equitable process of labour migration in both origin and destination countries which would guide migrant workers through all stages of migration, including planning and preparation, transit and arrival, reception in the country of destination, as well as possibilities for return and reintegration (National Policy on Labour Migration, 2014, p.9). The NPLM was recently reviewed and validated in 2020.

There are other policy documents that are expected to complement existing instruments of migration governance when they finally receive approval. These are, the policy drafts for internally displaced persons, diaspora matters, and the assisted voluntary return and reintegration initiative which have been developed and are awaiting approval. These policy documents are expected to provide the legal framework and the institutional mandate for proper coordination of migration activities in the respective domains.

Policy on Internally Displaced Persons

Internal displacement in Nigeria has been caused mostly by communal/ethnic clashes and in recent years, activities of bandits and natural disasters such as erosion and flooding. The nationwide flooding experience in 2012 and the continuous activities of bandits in North East Nigeria, have significantly changed the profile of the internally displaced persons in the country and created a new trend in relation to the volume of displacement and the need for a very robust and concerted humanitarian response strategy. The NCFRMI, conscious of its obligation in line with its expanded mandate on the provision of protection and assistance to the internally displaced persons in Nigeria; played a key role in the drafting process of the National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons. The policy document derives impetus from the UN Guiding Principle and the Kampala Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons. The TWG members charged with the responsibility of drafting the Policy, are various State and non-State actors, international technical experts and representatives from UN agencies. Inputs were collated from the European Union Delegation to Nigeria, Action Aid Nigeria, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre/Norwegian Refugee Commission, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Government and other stakeholders. The policy document provides the legal framework and the institutional mandate for proper coordination of internally displaced persons. The validated policy document sent by the NCFRMI to the Federal Executive Council (FEC) is still waiting for approval.

National Diaspora Policy (NDP)

The Federal Government of Nigeria, in recognition of the significant contribution of the Nigerian Diaspora, signed the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission Establishment Bill into law in 2017. The Law established the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM) to engage and utilise the human, capital and material resources of this demography in the socio-economic, cultural and political development of Nigeria. The newly created Nigerians in Diaspora Commission is expected to oversee application of the National Diaspora Policy (PWC Nigeria's White Paper Series 2019, p.4). The National Diaspora Policy which was started by the NNVS was validated in 2019 under the leadership of NiDCOM with the support of IOM within the EU-IOM Initiative for Migrants protection and Reintegration in Nigeria. The Document has been adopted by the Federal Executive Council in 2021.

Among other things the NDP has the following objectives:

To mobilize and harness the potentials of Nigerian Diaspora for national development
To develop robust and dynamic strategies targeted at harnessing resources towards national development
To respond to challenges and needs of the Diaspora in their efforts to participate in national development
To improve and sustain strong socio-cultural and economic relations with the Diaspora for national development
To strengthen relevant institutions for the coordination and proper administration of Diaspora issues
To facilitate a congenial atmosphere for members of Historic Diaspora wishing to collaborate and identify with Nigeria for sociopolitical and economic development
To create favourable frameworks for programmes that will contribute to Diaspora members’ wellbeing and development while contributing to homeland development.

To achieve these objectives the Policy underlines the commitment of Government to creating the needed human and material infrastructure to engage, enable and empower the Diaspora towards national development. Consequently, it undertakes that Government shall continue to provide the enabling environment to encourage the Diaspora to contribute their quota to national development and in the process facilitate processes of enhanced Diaspora experience for this category of Nigerians and the other category of Historic African Diaspora committed to Nigerian development.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Migration Data Management Strategy

An MOU was prepared and signed in 2014 by the six primary migration data producing agencies (Which these Agencies? Mention them).

The aims of the MOU are:

To clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of each member of the MDMWG as it relates to the exchange, accessibility and archiving of migration data across the participating MDAs to ensure standardized protocols for migration data collection and management.
To provide a structural process that enables the facilitation of migration data sharing and management in Nigeria through exchange of migration data, access and utilization between the parties.
To leverage on the respective skills, networks and expertise to be contributed by each party.

Standard Operation/Operating Procedure on Return, Readmission and Reintegration (SOP on RRR) (Is it Operation or Operating?)

The Nigerian migration governance system places great confidence on the Return Readmission and Reintegration programme (RRR) and in its strategic role in the management of migration. This is obvious in the number of government and non-government actors involved in the programme. However, this programme was marred by absence of any national structure for coordination that guarantees sustainability of the RRR by ensuring that all actors take responsibility. This situation gave rise to unhealthy competition, duplication of efforts, inconsistent strategy application and overall ineffective and inefficient response system.

In view of this challenge and realizing that the National Migration Policy in Section 4.3.3 and its implementation framework expressly provided for a guide for the conduct of return, readmission and reintegration of migrants in Nigeria, the TWG proceeded through the thematic group on Forced Migration, return, readmission and reintegration to develop an SOP to facilitate the efficiency and effectiveness of the working group.

The SOP Objectives are to:

Provide a step by step procedural methodology and timelines for the implementation of the RRR;
Establish lines of communication and proper guidance for effective coordination;
Propose clear responsibilities and operational boundaries of various actors while ensuring sustainability of the process;
It also contains referral/feedback mechanism among the various actors as well as the returnees themselves.

NIGERIAN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

Nigerian migration governance structure has four levels of coordination. These are the ministerial Committee, the Technical Working Group, the Sectorial/Thematic Groups and the Individual MDAs/State and Non-State Actors. Below is a description of their involvements in migration governance.

Ministerial Committee: This committee, also known as the Sector Policy Review Committee (SPRC), is the highest level of coordination and consultation in all migration related matters. It is constituted of ministers and heads of parastatals with migration-related mandates. The Committee is chaired by the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice and co-chaired by the Minister of National Planning and the Minister of Special Duties, who is the supervising Minister of the NCFRMI. The NCFRMI is planned as the Secretariat. Within the Act setting up the NCFRMI which is currently under review, the conception is that the SPRC would transform into the National Consultative Committee (NCC) under the chairmanship of the Minister of Justice (National Policy on Labour Migration, 2014, p.78).

Technical working group (TWG): The TWG is the second level of coordination and consultation in migration-related matters. The TWG on Migration and Development is the core instrument of coordination at the operational level whose secretariat is the NCFRMI. The TWG consists of representatives of all agencies, both State and non-State actors who are involved in operational activities relating to migration. It makes recommendations to the SPRC for approval and the NCFRMI is its chair.

iii. Sectorial/Thematic groups: The sectorial groups are working on varied thematic areas of migration in Nigeria. There are five such sectorial groups working on the following thematic areas of migration: Standing Committee on Diaspora Matters (SCDM); Labour Migration Working Group (LMWG); Migration Data Management Working Group (MDMWG); Forced Migration and Return, Readmission and Reintegration (FM/RRR); and Stakeholders Forum on Border Management (SFBM). Each sectorial group has several agencies with related mandates under it and with a lead agency, and in some cases, a co-lead agency. The lead agency provides coordination and periodically reports to the TWG. The activities of each sectorial group is guided either by a sectorial policy, as in the case of labour migration and diaspora matters; or by a strategic implementation document upon which a memorandum of understanding or standard operating procedure is signed as in the case of RRR, Data management and Border management groups.

Individual MDAs/ State and Non-State Actors: These are individual organizations, both State and non-State, whose mandates and/or activities are related directly or indirectly, and have impact on migration. These state and non-state actors operate at their respective working groups as well as with members of the TWG.

Roles and Activities of the Thematic Groups

The Five thematic groups provided for in the Policy carry out different functions of migration governance and those functions are enumerated below:

Standing Committee on Diaspora Matters (SCDM): This thematic group focuses on issues relating to diaspora mobilization. The lead agency was the NNVS until the establishment of NiDCOM in 2019. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the co-lead. SDCM began the process of the development of a sectorial policy which is National Policy on Diaspora matters in 2016. The Policy was validated in 2019 and approved by the FEC in 2021. Some issues relating to this group include diaspora contributions to national development, remittances and diaspora engagement in electoral process and other socioeconomic and political matters. Key members of the committee include the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity (FMLP), the Federal Ministry of Health, the Federal Ministry of Education, the Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment, the Federal Ministry of Youth and Development, the National Universities Commission (NUC), diaspora organizations and some civil society organizations (CSOs).

Working Group on Labour Migration: The lead agency for the Working Group on Labour Migration is the FMLE, who is also central to the development of the National Policy on Labour Migration. This group superintends expatriate quota, labour exchange and protection of migrant workers, among others. Members of this group include the Nigeria Immigration Service, the Ministry of Interior, the Federal Ministry of Health, the Federal Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nigerian National Volunteer Service and Civil Society Organisations, among others. The National Policy on Labour Migration is a functional Policy in Nigeria.

Working Group on Forced Migration and Return, Readmission and Reintegration (FMRRR): The NCFRMI is responsible for forced migration and is also at the fore front of the coordination of activities relating to RRR. The draft strategy document known as the “RRR Manual of Operation” or “SOP on RRR”, defines the roles and responsibilities of the agency in relation to RRR matters. Members of this group include the Ministry of foreign Affairs, the Nigeria Immigration Service, National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), and Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN). The RRR manual/SOP has been validated by the MDAs and the other members of the TWG.

Working Group on Migration Data Management Strategy: The National Population Commission (NPC) leads the working group on Migration data management strategy, with support from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The group has developed the Migration Data Management Strategy for Nigeria in 2013. The main focus of this group is the harmonization of migration data across all MDAs. Members of this group include the NPC, NBS, NCFRMI, the NIS, CBN, the FMLE and the NNVS, as well as other non-state actors including CSOs, unions and academia.

Stakeholders Forum on Border Management: NIS is the lead agency, with secretariat support from NAPTIP. The group focuses on issues relating to the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, border security, trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling and so on. The National Border Management Strategy and Action Plan was finalized and presented at a stakeholders’ forum in 2019 by the Nigeria Immigration Service.

Overarching Frameworks for the Coordination of Nigerian Migration Activities

The National Policy on Migration provides the overarching framework for the coordination of migration activities in Nigeria through the coordinating network presented below:

(a) The TWG is the platform upon which the activities of the various thematic/sectorial groups are coordinated, monitored and evaluated.

(b) The NCFRMI is the chair of the TWG.

(c) The Commission presents the recommendations of the TWG to the National Consultative Committee (NCC) as the Secretariat.

(d) The NCC is envisaged to take the place of the SPRC as the overall migration policy making organ of the Federal Government, and it is to be chaired by the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice.

Conclusion

At the peak of the migration crisis in 2016, Nigeria was listed among the top 5 origin countries arriving in Europe through irregular routes. The various efforts being made to develop an effective coordination framework and instruments for migration governance in Nigeria were and are still in various stages. Some policy documents have been developed, validated and adopted, some others are undergoing evaluation and validation; while there are some documents that are at the budding stage of development. The target is to achieve a complete system that would pave the way for the mainstreaming of migration into the nation’s development agenda. However, arrivals of Nigerians into Europe via unsafe migration has been on the steady decline since 2017[6]. In a recent report of UNHCR Nigerians were not amongst the top 10 nationalities of arrivals by land or sea into Greece, Spain or Italy in 2019. Currently, IOM data reveals that Nigeria is not within the top 10 nationalities of those registered with IOM in Libya. This may not have been due to any direct impact from the migration governance framework, but what is clear is the opportunity offered through elaboration process that contributed and continues to contribute to the high level of awareness.

The need for more effort there is, but Nigeria has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to an effective management of migration for the benefit of all. The adopted migration governance processes have facilitated the mainstreaming of migration into national development programmes and plans. Indeed, Nigeria has taken its place, sometimes a leading position among comity of nations in all matters and areas of migration governance. Other countries have come to Nigeria to learn from her experiences.

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[1] At the time, Nigeria had just returned to democracy from a prolonged military rule, and the Obasanjo tour was to restore international confidence to the new democratic dispensation

[2] Nigeria has domesticated the 1951 Convection Relating to the Status of Refugee, the 1967 Protocol and the OAU/AU instrument relating to refugees protection and assistance

[3] In Oreva Olakpe: The Evolution of EU-Africa Migration Partnerships: Lessons in Transnational Migration Governance, Working Paper No. 2020/13 October 2020

[4] Kwaku & Zanker, 2019

[5] Key informant interview with technocrat members of the TWG on migration.

[6] https://pathfindersji.org/are-nigerians-still-the-problem-in-europes-migrant-crisis/

CHAPTER 12 - PRINCIPAL ACTORS OF NIGERIAN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Martha C. Egenti & Sunday Onazi

Introduction

The cross-cutting nature of migration requires the involvement of many stakeholders. Consequently, diverse stakeholders are involved in the coordination of Nigerian migration framework and management of migration-related activities with defined roles and responsibilities as well as operational boundaries. The roles of these key players in migration governance help to classify them into the various thematic groups. These roles may be primary or secondary depending on their direct or indirect involvement in migration related activities. These actors include the State actors comprising the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs); and the Non-State actors such as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the academia, the private sector, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) and development partners, as delineated in the National Migration Policy and other relevant policy documents.

The contributions of the institutional framework in line with the emerging global dialogue on migration, is very crucial for migration management, hence there is the need to examine the roles, contributions and operational challenges of these principal operators in developing and implementing, strengthening and improving migration governance in Nigeria. This is more so considering that operational activities at the local, national, regional and international levels have a lot to contribute to socio-economic development. It is essential to state that the actors share overlapping roles in migration-related activities. This has resulted at times in lack of clear delineation of responsibilities and authority, and duplication of effort… ([i]). This explains why scholars like Arhin-Sam and Zanker have argued that there is low synergy among different actors; and limited and unclear roles of the civil society organization (CSOs) and NGOs in the implementation framework….([ii]) It is against this backdrop that this chapter highlights the roles of the key players as well as the contributions of development partners in building sustainable institutional framework and strengthening migration governance in Nigeria.

Subsequent to this introduction, the chapter is presented in the following sections: review of the roles of State Actors: the MDAs; the Non-State Actors such as the CSOs, Academia and Private Sector; the contributions of various international partners in the migration framework at the bilateral and multilateral levels; the challenges and prospects, and the conclusion.

State Actors: Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs)

There are various government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) that are given different responsibilities in migration management. They engage in these roles for efficient migration management at the national and international levels. For effective coordination and implementation of the National Migration Policy, the different MDAs and the non-state actors in the field of migration are grouped into thematic areas that address the mandates of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Migration and Development. The National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) coordinates the TWG. The thematic classification generates five sectorial groups with specific area/s in migration matters. Comprehensive discussion on these thematic groups has been undertaken in the preceding chapter. They are repeated here again because they avail us the framework to discuss the roles of the MDAs for a better understanding since they are clustered based on the migration-related roles they perform. Thus emphasis is laid more on the roles of the MDAs rather than the working groups. While some of the agencies have lead roles, other actors play co-lead and/or support roles. Some of the roles of these principal actors can be classified as primary or secondary depending on their migration-relatedness. They include the following ([iii]):

Standing Committee on Diaspora Matters (SCDM)

There are MDAs whose focal role is to address migration issues relating to diaspora mobilization, diaspora contributions to national development, remittances and diaspora engagements generally. The former lead agency in diaspora matters was the Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS) with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) as co-lead. With the establishment of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM) by the Federal Government Act in 2017, as an effort to expand and strengthen the institutional framework for involving the Diaspora in the affairs of the country, NiDCOM assumed the lead role of the SCDM. The Commission is empowered by the Act to provide a direct link for Nigerians in Diaspora to participate in the development of the nation ([iv]). On the other hand, the NNVS is a volunteer management institution set up by the Federal Government in 2003 to facilitate the engagement of the Diaspora in the development process at home, as well promote volunteering in the country. That is to say, the institution complements national development effort through encouraging, harnessing, managing and effectively deploying volunteer services and activities of both Nigerians in Diaspora and those at home. It has a clear mandate to sensitize and mobilize Nigerians in the Diaspora, individuals, groups, associations, organizations and corporate bodies. NNVS’s mandate was quite broad and centers around handling Diaspora mobilization including registration and observatory roles of the Nigerians in Diaspora,([v]).

The other key players who perform indirect/or secondary roles and provide relevant services include the Federal Ministries of Education, Health, Industry, Trade and Investment, Interior, Labour and Employment, and Youth Development, Central Bank of Nigeria, National Universities Commission, Nigeria Immigration Service, Civil Society Organizations, the Academia, etc. The Central Bank of Nigeria, for instance, is involved in diaspora trade and investment and facilitation of cost effective remittance procedures as well as creating support system to facilitate transfer of fund between Nigeria and destination countries; the National Universities Commission in collaboration with the academia, design, regulate and facilitate the role of the diaspora in educational development and academic exchange programmes for students, teachers and lecturers; Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) provides information regarding database of migrants in the diaspora; diaspora organizations; and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) whose interests border on the diaspora collaborate with relevant MDAs through advocacy and support programmes.

Labour Migration Working Group (LMWG)

MDAs and stakeholders who are grouped under the Labour Migration Working Group are involved in matters relating to labour exchanges and the protection of migrant workers. The Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment (FMLE) is the lead agency and the custodian of National Policy on Labour Migration (NPLM) which focuses on the promotion of regular migration, expatriate quota, labour exchange and protection of migrant workers, employment matters, among others. The FMLE is charged with the responsibility of creating enabling environment for employment generation, labour migration management, skill development and certifications, productivity enhancement, intermediation in the use of best practices in labour administration and promotion of peaceful and productive industrial relations, safe and decent work, social security and job-matching through the National Electronic Labour Exchange (NELEX) and International Labour Migration Desk (ILMD). It is also responsible for collecting data on international labour migration both into and out of the country. ILMD is the Secretariat for the Technical Working Committee on Labour in Nigeria ([vi]). Among the key stakeholders include: Federal Ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs, Health; Interior; Justice; Youth Development; Information; Finance and Women Affairs; Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS); National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP); National Bureau of Statistics (NBS); National Population Commission (NPC); National Planning Commission – now Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning; National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI); Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS); social partners including Nigeria Labour Congress, Trade Unions Congress, Nigeria Employers’ Consultative Association, Human Capital Providers’ Association of Nigeria (HUCAPAN) which is the umbrella body for all registered Private Employment Agencies in the country, and representative of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

Migration Data Management Working Group (MDMWG)

Migration data is very crucial to evidence-based decision making and formulation of a regulatory framework, policy and program formulation, and national development planning. The data governance framework is constituted for easy access, management, use and maintenance of data across the MDAs. There are about eleven MDAs in the TWG that are charged with the primary production of migration data in Nigeria: National Population Commission (NPC), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI), Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment (FMLE), Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS), National Planning Commission (NPC), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).([vii]) Six of these―NPC, NBS, NIS, NCFRMI, FMLE and NNVS―constitute the Migration Data Management Working Group (MDMWG) which is charged with the responsibility of developing strategy for adequate migration data management and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on migration data sharing between the members. The role of the MDMWG is to harmonise and manage migration data across relevant MDAs within the Migration Data Management Strategy.

It is also worthy of note that the administrative data collected regularly by these MDAs form the major migration data. Their roles are basically collecting, analyzing relevant migration data in their different divisions, and publishing them on the relevant categories of migrants that they deal with ([viii]). In other words, these MDAs generate primary migration data. Some of them are also lead agencies in other thematic groups. The Lead agency in migration data thematic group is National Population Commission (NPC) supported by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). They generate and disseminate updated reliable migration statistics for planning and policy formulation in Nigeria.

The mandates of some agencies like NPC and NBS in managing national dataset are clearly defined. For instance, while NPC focuses on demographic data, NBS focuses on socio-economic data. Hence NPC is responsible for conducting census, sample surveys, collecting, collating and publishing data on migration as well as ensuring the registration of vital events throughout the federation. The NBS on the other hand has the mandate of producing and disseminating statistical information on all aspects of development in Nigeria. NIS is another agency that is basically involved in border control management, they collect regular administration and retrieval of entry and exit cards at the nation’s border posts, in addition to monitoring of expatriates and other immigrants in Nigeria. NCFRMI ensures the overall coordination of all migration-related issues in Nigeria, in addition to the designation for management and protection of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) ([ix]). It has been mentioned earlier that Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment (FMLE) among other responsibilities, collects data on international labour migration.

Forced Migration and Return, Readmission and Reintegration Working Group (FMRRR)

The thematic area which borders on Forced Migration and Return, Readmission and Reintegration (FMRRR) is chaired by NCFRMI. The commission in conjunction with the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) leads on matters relating to forced migration and in the development of return, readmission and reintegration manual of operations (RRR). The latter specifically, enforces government policies in monitoring, preventing and combating trafficking in Persons. Besides NCFRMI’s general migration coordination role; its operational activities also involve the protection and assistance of Refugees and IDPs. Other members include: MoFA, NIS and SMEDAN.

Stakeholders Forum on Border Management (SFBM)

The management of the borders is chaired by the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), supported by the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP). This thematic group focuses on issues bordering on Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Free Movement Protocol, border security, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and related matters. Both agencies provide controls and manage the border for free movement of persons regarding points of departure and arrival. Other Stakeholders of the Forum on Border Management (SFBM) include: Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and other relevant security agencies, the Nigeria Customs Service, Ports Health Authority, border communities, NCFRMI and CSOs. The NIS essentially regulates the inflow of non-Nigerians into the Country, while the Nigeria Custom Services whose function is also border related, essentially deals on material goods coming into the country. In discharging their responsibilities, both agencies have concerns regarding the security of our society ([x]). The security agencies play a secondary role, alongside assisting in tracking down trafficking in persons.

Following the discussions of the MDAs above, it was noted that some of these agencies play primary roles because of their direct link to a particular thematic area, or secondary roles due to their indirect link with the group. The interwoven nature of this grouping enables the agencies with similar thematic area to interface. This is why Federal Ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs, Health and Interior are secondary stakeholders in Labour matters just like the CSOs can be relevant in one, two or more thematic areas. This kind of interrelationship and clustering of MDAs’ activities into different relevant thematic groups is also seen in the Framework and Action Plan for the national Implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. ([xi]) It is also clear that due to the evolving nature of migration, the TWG which designates different roles to stakeholders is not a closed group since MDAs with relevant thematic areas are added to the group as the need arises. The next section is a discussion of the non-government actors.

Non-State Actors: Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Academia & Private Sector

Actors such as civil society groups, humanitarian agencies, academic institutions and related stakeholders in the field of migration and development are classified as the non-government organizations or non-state actors. They mediate and collaborate with the MDAs in addressing and implementing migration-related matters at the local levels. We shall first discuss the Academia, before moving over to the CSOs, INGO, and other private sectors.

Academia

The Academia is one of the actors identified by the National Migration Policy (NMP). Their participation has been limited owing to the fact that the issue of migration has not been prioritized in the educational system. Until recently, the involvement of the academia in policy formulation, evaluation, and debates on emerging migration issues has been limited to the contributions of individual scholars. However, their recognition in the NMP is a step in the right direction towards filling this gap. This section highlights some of the significant roles of the academia as actors in the migration governance structure. Detailed discussion of the role of the academia in migration management in Nigeria is explored in another chapter of this book.

The Academia as used in this study refers to academic institutions indivual academics. The academia plays a significant role in migration governance by providing the conceptual and theoretical interrogation and articulation of policy development and formulation; implementation, analysis and review as well as other community services responding to migration dynamics and the mandates of the university and educational system.([xii]) For instance, the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS), Nnamdi Azikiwe University, is an academic institute that offers academic and professional postgraduate programmes in migration. It is an establishment devoted to migration studies, as an effort geared towards bringing migration-related issues to the limelight in our academic institutions. Other universities and higher academic institutions in Nigeria, following the Nnamdi Azikiwe University, example have started establishing Centres and Institutes devoted to migration studies.

On the other hand, academics/scholars are intellectually involved in the national and international migration discourses and governance through their contributions in the articulation of policies and strategies, and responses to the dynamics of migration and emerging issues as it affects the country. As such, they contribute to migration governance through their books, articles, reviews, policy analysis, dialogue, monitoring, capacity building and advocacy. The relationship between the institution and the academic comes into play in academic exchanges and internship. While the institution helps to facilitate academic exchanges, the academic contributes impactful research on migration through multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholder collaborations as well as mainstreaming migration studies into the curriculum.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Private Sector

There are also international non-governmental organizations and implementing partners that contribute immensely to strengthening migration governance in Nigeria. To these we now turn.

Roles and Contributions of Some Development Partners at the Bilateral Levels

There are various development partners involved in not only providing intervention and advisory roles, but also in developing and strengthening migration governance in Nigeria. The level of partnership ranges from bilateral to multilateral engagements. In this section, we shall discuss some of these relationships and their contributions towards improving migration governance in Nigeria.

Multilateral -UN and International Organizations Implementing Agencies

At the multilateral level, the United Nations Organization and other international organizations and agencies are engaged in migration-related issues in Nigeria. Such agencies include International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), etc.

IOM is the UN agency that coordinates migration-related issues, promotes and ensures the protection of the rights of migrants anywhere in the world. Based on the 2002 Programme Cooperation Agreement with the Federal Government of Nigeria, IOM, as an implementing agency, has been at the forefront in supporting migration governance in Nigeria through capacity-building, provision of advisory services and technical assistance. With her four broad thematic areas of engagement in migration management namely: migration and development, facilitating migration, regulating migration and addressing forced migration, IOM has strong collaboration and partnership with governmental, intergovernmental, non-governmental agencies and other local and international stakeholders in bridging the gap, and meeting the operational challenges of migration management. It has also contributed to the understanding of migrants’ issues, social and economic development through migration border management, reduction of trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling and irregular migration as well as mainstreaming of migration in the country’s development plans. This is in line with IOM overall goal of making migration beneficial to all through facilitating safe, humane and orderly migration and upholding human dignity and wellbeing of migrants.

IOM has contributed immensely to migration governance in Nigeria in partnerships with, and funding from donor institutions/partners. One of their outstanding contributions is provision of technical supports in developing and strengthening of migration policies in Nigeria from the evolvement of migration management in Nigeria until date. The successful implementation of innumerable projects and programs in Nigeria with supports from international donors has enabled the IOM contribute to the development and strengthening of Nigerian Migration Governance by providing policy frameworks and offering direction and assistance. Some of the IOM partners in this regard are European Union (EU) and its member states as well as other countries and agencies such as The Federal Foreign Office of Germany and German Cooperation, Government of Switzerland, GIZ, the Netherlands, Government of Denmark, European Union Trust Fund, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Swedish Government Agency for Development Cooperation (SIDA), United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Nigerian Humanitarian Fund (NHF), European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), France, Canada, Norway etc.([xviii])

Other areas of assistance from IOM in Nigerian migration governance include; establishment of Technical Working Group on Migration and Development, establishment of sectorial Groups to guide various thematic areas of migration, development of sectorial policies and strategic implementation documents guiding the activities of the sectorial groups. Some of such policies include; The National Migration Policy, National Policy on Labour Migration, National Migration Profile, National Border Management Strategy, National Diaspora Policy and Action Plan, Standard Operating Procedures for Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Assistance, National Migration Data Management Strategy and Action Plan for the National Implementation of the GCM. Extending to Nigeria its project on Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) Programme developed in 2001 sponsored by European Union Trust Fund contributed to improving migration governance and reintegration in Nigeria, including the successful review and adoption in 2014 and 2015, the National Policy on Labour Migration and National Migration Policy respectively.([xix])

Also, in collaboration with the MDAs, non-state actors and other international organizations, IOM has helped to strengthen NIS capacity to oversee and manage cross-border movements at the country’s land and sea borders and in line with the Free Movements of Persons and Migration (FMM) in West Africa. It has provided the Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS), a framework to facilitate digital data collection and storage at the land and sea borders, and installed solar-power in nine border control posts which was sponsored by EU, Japan and Switzerland.([xx]) Also, the Federal Foreign Office of Germany and German Cooperation has sponsored the IOM implemented project on Nigeria’s National Biometric Identification Card (NBIC) for intra-ECOWAS travel and for registration of foreign Nationals as well as land and sea Border Data Systems in Nigeria II (ELSBDS II). Through the sponsorship of the government of Switzerland in 2015, IOM was able to support NIS to develop “corporate” training strategy through the NIS training strategy implementation programme. The IOM’s Air Border Data Systems (EABDS) in Nigeria project was funded by GIZ, the Netherlands, and Government of Switzerland.

Through the funding support from the Government of Denmark, IOM contributed to the implementation of the Labour Migration Policy Action Plan. IOM awareness raising projects such as the one funded by the Swiss Government, i.e, the Awareness Raising to Combat Irregular Migration from Nigeria through a Television Mini-series called The Missing Steps has created a lot of impacts. IOM has also fared well in the aspects of Operation and Emergencies and migration health, one of the sustainable development goals. Through the goal of migration health, IOM provides health services at its Migration Health Assessment Centers (MHAC) in order to facilitate migration to various countries. It is also worthy to note the funding of European Union Trust Fund (EUTF), through which the project, “EUTF-IOM Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Nigeria” contributed to strengthening the governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning Nigerian migrants.

Another migration partner of Nigeria at the multilateral level is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Agency whose major concern are Refugees, migrants who have been forced to flee their homes and country to another country. UNHCR started work in Nigeria in 1982. The Agency collaborates with NCFRMI and the ECOWAS commission to address issues on mixed movements in Nigeria and in the ECOWAS sub-region.([xxi]). UNHCR engages in capacity building of stakeholders on the asylum component of migration and identification of persons in need of international protection, among others. Through its Telling the Real Story (TRS) initiative, it is also involved in sensitization programme geared towards informing the public on the dangers of irregular migration and the difficulties they might face upon arrival in their host countries. The TRS campaign has reached out to different individuals in several countries such as Somalis, Eritreans, Sudanese and Nigerian women and men in countries of asylum, transit and origin. In Nigeria, UNHCR carried out this campaign in Edo state, reaching out to young girls and boys.

The UNHCR in supporting and strengthening Nigerian migration governance, contributes in conducting trainings and capacity building for national stakeholders who are involved in the asylum component of migration and international protection of refugees and victims of trafficking. It also provides support for their engagement through the UNHCR’s asylum migration strategy. The Agencies of government that collaborate with UNHCR include; NIS, NCFRMI and NAPTIP. Besides these MDAs, UNHCR also collaborates with non-state actors. In Edo State, the UNHCR partners with the following: Taskforce Against Human Trafficking (ETAHT), National Orientation Agency, Edo State Chapter, the Migrant Resource Centre of FMLE in Edo State, Great Esan Returnees Association (GERA), Uromi, Greater Returnees Foundation (GRF), Benin City, Justice Development and Peace Caritas initiative (JDPCi) Uromi, Centre for Gender Studies and Institute for Benin Studies at the University of Benin, State Council for Islamic Affairs & UNIBEN Central Mosque, KU FM. UNHCR also collaborates with International Labour Organization (ILO) in providing Research and Advocacy Initiative for Mixed Migration Strategies in Nigeria and the ECOWAS sub regions. The initiative seeks to proffer solutions to improve the functioning of the labour market by focusing on enhanced migration governance while improving conditions of work in labour intensive sectors and creating more decent jobs for migrants.([xxii])

Another implementing agency is the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). The ICMPD is one of the implementing agencies that have played a major role in migration governance in Nigeria. With the commencement of ICMPD in Nigeria in 2013, it has become an implementing partner of the Free Movement of Persons and Migration (FMM) Project. ICMPD specializes in the following thematic areas; migration policy, migration and development, border management, irregular migration, international protection, visa facilitation, return and reintegration, labour migration, migration data management, diaspora engagement. The agreement between ICMPD and Nigeria on 16^th January 2020 opened up a bilateral relationship and various EU-ECOWAS funded project supports to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa (FMM West Africa). The project supporting ECOWAS through the implementation of the FMM Demand-Driven Facility (DDF) provides technical support to ECOWAS member states on migration issues. It has through its Anti-Trafficking Programme adopted the ECOWAS Plan of Action to combat Trafficking for 2018-2022 and other subcontract financed under 11^th European Development which is coordinated by GIZ. The growing challenges related to return of irregularly staying third-country nationals is addressed by developing the Reverse Migration/College of Practical Pilot Project. It has also contributed to Nigeria’s Foreign Direct Investment through encouraging capital investments from European businesses, including job creations and training and contributing to the operationalization of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) through the Mobility Partnership Facility, a European Union-funded initiative.([xxiii]).

ICMPD collaborates and partners with various MDAs in providing support and strengthening migration governance. For instance, it not only supported the NCFRMI to organize capacity building activities for various field actors via the Migrants in Countries in Crises (MICIC) project, but also has provided technical support in the annual national migration dialogue. With regard to developing working structure and processes to strengthen Diaspora engagement thematic group of the migration governance framework, NiDCOM has been supported. And as well ICMPD’s support is provided to NIS on Border management thematic. Directly or indirectly, it has also implemented various projects with the collaboration of other stakeholders via its Demand-Driven Facility (DDF) as in the following ([xxiv]):

DDF Regional Multi-Country Action: Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS)
DDF Nigeria (TIP/SOM): NAPTIP, Ministry of Education, NCCE and NERDC
MIEUX Blue Border (Maritime Security): NIS
MIEUX Labour Market and Migration Information System (LMMIS): Ministry of Labour and Employment
Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC): NCFRMI

International Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP) is another international organization partnering with Nigeria in the area of migration governance. In June 2018 FIIAPP began the implementation of a European Union funded project with the 11^th EDF on “The Action against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (A-TIPSOM).” The overall focus of the project is on governance and capacity building in the area of migration specifically from Trafficking in Persons & Smuggling of Migrants perspective. Through these activities it hopes to achieve “A-TIPSOM Project’s main objective: to reduce trafficking in persons (TIP) and smuggling of migrants (SOM) at national and regional levels, and between Nigeria and the European Union, with specific emphasis on women and children. The specific objective is to enhance the ability of the Government of Nigeria to address trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.” (FIIAPP, Migration Governance Partnership Information Template: FIIAPP, 2020)

Within the project, FIIAPP collaborates with the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), Nigeria Immigrations Service (NIS), Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and the Network of CSOs against Child Trafficking, Abuse and Labour (NACTAL).

Since inception the A-TIPSOM project has recorded varied projects that directly impact Nigerian migration governance. The project currently supports NAPTIP in the review of its National Policy document on Protection and Assistance to Trafficked Persons in Nigeria and also a research to support NAPTIP and NIS on the Trends, Patterns and Magnitudes of TIP and SOM respectively. Due to A-TIPSOM, a number of people and organizations such as NURTWs, Female Drivers Association, Airport workers, LEAs etc, have been sensitized on the dangers involved in TIP and SOM. Also, victims of trafficking have received support and assistance from this project through their Shelter Managers coordinated by NAPTIP and other NGOs.

Bilateral migration partners

At the bilateral level, there are several partnerships between Nigeria and other countries. One of such partnerships is the Nigeria-Swiss partnership. The Migration partnership between the Government of Switzerland, represented by the Swiss Embassy and the Government of Nigeria began in February, 2011 with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The goal of the partnership is to foster collaboration and co-operation between Nigeria and Switzerland in responding practically to the challenges of national migratory experience and devise better strategies in the delivery of migration related services.([xxv])

Switzerland collaborates with Nigeria to address challenges as well as tap into opportunities of migration-related matters. Through this partnership, it applies its expertise in addressing migration issues bothering on policy, border management, return and reintegration, labour migration, data management, diaspora engagement and capacity building. These multiple areas of cooperation are specified in the MoU ([xxvi]). Also, the 2014 Pact on Migration between NCFRMI and the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) supports the Commission in institutionalizing the National Migration Dialogue as a platform for effective and inclusive migration governance. In other words, Switzerland supports Nigeria through the NCFRMI as the coordinating agency for migration and development issues in Nigeria, to ensure collaboration, cohesion and coordination in the implementation of the National Migration Policy and further institutionalization of the Technical Working Group.

Switzerland has contributed immensely to Nigerian migration governance especially in its collaboration with different stakeholders and implementing partners and actors at various levels, towards bridging the gap in migration concerns. This collaboration cuts across various levels such as state: MoFA, NIS, NCFRMI, NAPTIP, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA); non-state: Women’s Aid Collective (WACOL), Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and CSOs; and International level: International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), ECOWAS, International Labour Organization (ILO), etc.

A lot of projects have been completed and many ongoing projects and activities focusing on migration governance are carried out through the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), an agency of the Swiss Government/The Global Programme on Migration and Development (GPMD). SDC supports NCFRMI in strengthening her institutional, technical and operational processes, and building capacity which is targeted at local governance structures, the decentralization of migration governance, institutionalization of the annual National Migration Dialogue and enhancing coordination of the Technical Working Group on Migration. This project also supports the CSOnetMADE, a network designed to promote the participation of CSOs in the local implementation of national migration management processes and policies. The Network also aims at strengthening collaboration and coordination among CSOs and migration/development stakeholders, in order to enhance their voices in the migration governance debate in Nigeria. Through the Human Security Division (HSD) project, The Swiss address the emergent concerns of Human Trafficking and Irregular Migration in Nigeria through partnership with IOM, National Emergency Management Agencies (NEMA), State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs), NAPTIP, Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (MoWASD), UN Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in fostering improved prevention and protection of the mental health and psychosocial wellbeing of trafficked persons in Northeast Nigeria. Recently, it collaborates with UNODC/NAPTIP to strengthen the policy framework and response to trafficking in persons in Nigeria through the development and adoption of a reviewed National Action Plan against human trafficking (NAP) ([xxvii]).

Suffices to mention that Nigeria maintains migration-related bilateral relationships with many other countries not discussed in this work. The next section highlights some of the challenges and prospects of migration partnerships.

Challenges and Prospects

In migration partnership with Nigeria, both states and international organizations, have faced different challenges towards bridging the gap in migratory roles across national and international boundaries, in addition to designing policy response towards addressing the global migration challenges.

One of the major challenges encountered by these international actors of migration governance is the bureaucracy and administrative bottlenecks in the MDAs and public service in Nigeria. These have contributed to the long delays especially in getting information on salient and urgent issues from the MDAs. The delayed response has affected the timely execution of a lot of sponsored projects.([xxviii]) Also, the instability of key staff as a result of incessant transfers has a negative impact on program/project implementation, as it often retards the pace of activities due to new inexperienced officers.([xxix]) The continuing inadequate skills and expertise also contribute to delayed projects. There is also the issue of inter-agency rivalries and lack of inter-sectorial coordination, resulting in duplication of efforts and inadequacies in resources in several MDAs as well as the fact that there is no clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities for some agencies. This lack of synergy is also observed among the UN agencies and other international agencies and partners which create mere duplications, thereby resulting to some level of global competition among implementing agencies engaged in similar projects. The challenge of the lack of wide range of relevant actors both at the federal/ state levels and civil society, and a strong risk of duplication of efforts, ineffective referral mechanisms in place, an apparent lack of comprehension of the concept of asylum seeking in migration discourse by key stakeholders and limited information with regard to safe and regular pathways are part of the hindrances ([xxx]).

Also, the complex nature of migration management and the federal structure of Nigeria which requires the involvement of the states and local authorities/actors in the development and implementation of migration policies and strategies, pose a huge challenge in the bilateral migration governance agreements between Nigeria and other countries. As such, there is need for multiple levels of involvement, thus, the migration partnership requires constant dialogue so as to balance interests, needs and foster mutual understanding. ([xxxiv]) It has also been observed that there are situations where the operational definitions of some MDAs are the same, but with different variables and measurements. For instance, Akinyemi and Beltrame noted that just as NIS and NCFRMI are charged with data collection responsibilities on cross-border migrants, there is a clear-cut divergence in the data orientation. For instance, NIS may be interested in regular and irregular cross border migrants, while NCFRMI focuses on forced migrants and refugees. Similarly, remittances of data constitute a major focus of interest for CBN, NPC and NBS. It is obviously in view of this kind of overlapping relationships and definitional inconsistencies in migration concepts and variations within the MDAs, which differ from the international definitions, that the authors recommended a standardized definition and measurement so as to allow data harmonization and comparability. ([xxxv])

Similarly, with regard to the CSOs, despite the fact that provisions are made in the National Migration Governance architecture for their participation, part of the reasons why they have limited involvement and, sometimes unclear roles, is inadequate knowledge of who they are and in some cases, some of them lack the adequate knowledge and the capacity to effectively engage in national migration management. In addition, some of them could not be classified according to the TWG thematic grouping because a good number are new in the migration field. ([xxxvi]) In order to deal with the issue of clarity of mission and coordination, CSOnetMADE, a network of CSOs in migration, was established to assist in the coordination and participation of CSOs in the local implementation of migration processes and policies.

Despite the challenges affecting the efficiency of the principal actors in Nigerian migration governance at all levels, there are lots of prospects that the engagements of these actors will facilitate the improvement of the governance mechanism. An example of such is strengthening and enhancing bilateral/multilateral migration governance partnerships through the collective efforts of stakeholders in addressing migration concerns. The various migration intervention programmes and development partnerships have contributed to strengthening the migration governance framework and provided the needed sustainable platform for capacity-building and improved generation and access to accurate and relevant migration data. It is the hope that these efforts will be consolidated for improved migration management.

Summary and Conclusion

As long as societies exist, migration will continue to dominate the global political discourse. To ensure the sustainable management of migration in Nigeria, there is need for active participation of the Nigerian government in migration matters through government initiatives to address migration concerns. It is not enough to have sophisticated migration governance framework, but the implementation strategies provided by international and non-government partners should be consolidated by taking proactive measures. Empowering the roles, interests and overlapping responsibilities of the key players especially the non-state actors within the larger framework and the overall migration management is necessary so that their efforts will not be relegated to the background.

The need for strong monitoring and coordination programme that will enhance cooperation among the MDAs, and mechanisms where shared problems and challenges can be addressed cannot be overemphasized. Given the dynamic and complex nature of migration management, there is need for regular capability-building through training and retraining of the desk officers at the national level so as to improve the overall management of migration activities. This is paramount for the acquisition of technical skills required for the operational activities involved in migration.

Also, the lead agencies in the migration framework should collaborate with relevant agencies to ensure that the MDAs charged with various migration responsibilities provide the necessary monthly and/or quarterly reports so as to build an effective information portal for sustainable management and socio-economic development.

Endnotes

[i] IOM. Draft National Diaspora Policy, IOM, 2019, p. 15.

[ii] Arhin-Sam & Zanken. Nigeria at a crossroads: The Political Stakes of Migration Governance, 2019https://www.medam-migration.eu/en/publication/nigeria-at-a-crossroads-the-political-stakes-of-migration-governance, (accessed November 2020)

[iii] National Migration Policy 2015, pp. 84-85 & National Migration Dialogue 2014 Maiden Report, series one National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, Abuja, 2015, pp. 17-18

[iv] IOM. P. 14.

[v] Akinyemi A. & Damiano B, Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria FED/2012/National Migration Data Management Strategy, submitted to International Organization for Migration, 2012, pp.10-13.

[vi] Akor G., National Migration Governance – Data Management Perspective: The Role of CSOs (n. p.).

[vii] Akinyemi A. & Damiano B., pp. 10-13

[viii] Adepoju A. and Arie van der Wiel, Seeking Greener Pastures Abroad – A Migration Profile of Nigeria Safari Books Ltd, Ibadan, 2010), p. 57.

[ix] Anaelo C. N. NCFRMI Profile and activities in the Management and Co-ordination of Migration in Nigeria paper presented at Technical Workshop: NCFRMI-SDC/GPMD, 2015

[x] Anaelo C. N.

[xi] Obiezu E. X. Framework and Action Plan for the National Implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 2020-2023, 2020.

[xii] Centre for Migration (CMS) – Nnamdi Azikiwe University (NAU) at a Glance. https:// www.unizik.edu.ng/cms/ (accessed November 2020)

[xiii] Akor G.

[xiv] Obiezu Emeka X. Report on the Mapping and Development of Database of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) working with Migration in the six geographical zones of Nigeria (NCFRMI), 2019

[xv] Obiezu Emeka X. Round Table Strategic Advocacy Meeting Towards the Adoption of National Policy on the Internally Displaced Persons. An Imperative for IDPs National Policy Now! Abuja, October 2018

[xvi] Obiezu Emeka X. Memorandum in Support of National Commission for Refugees Act, Cap N21 LFN 2004 (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill, 2017 (SB.335). March, 2018.

[xvii] Arome Salifu. Policy Brief/Outcome on the webinar titled: National Summit on Youth Skills, Entrepreneurship and Financing, 15^th July, 2020

[xviii] IOM. A brief on IOM Nigeria’s Projects, https://nigeria.iom.int.2018 (accessed November 2020)

[xix] IOM. Migration governance Partnership Information Template: IOM, 2020

[xx] IOM. A brief on IOM Nigeria’s Projects,

[xxi] UNHCR. Migration Partnership Information Template – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2020

[xxii] UNHCR.

[xxiii] ICMPD. Migration governance Partnership Information Template: ICMPD, 2020

[xxiv] ICMPD.

[xxv] NMG. National Migration Dialogue 2014 Maiden Report (Series one): National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displayed Persons. Federal Secretariat Complex, Abuja, 2015, p. 9.

[xxvi] ICMPD. Migration Governance Partnership between Nigeria and Switzerland: Information Template, 2020

[xxvii] ICMPD. Migration Governance Partnership between Nigeria and Switzerland.

[xxviii] A-TIPSOM –Action Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Nigeria. Migration governance Partnership Information Template: International Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP), 2020

[xxix] IOM. 2020

[xxx] UNHCR.

[xxxi] ICMPD.

[xxxii] IOM. A brief on IOM Nigeria’s Projects, https://nigeria.iom.int. (accessed November 2020)

[xxxiii] Arhin-Sam & Zanken. Nigeria at a crossroads.

[xxxiv] ICMPD. Migration Governance Partnership between Nigeria and Switzerland.

[xxxv] Akinyemi A. & Damiano B. Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria.

[xxxvi] Obiezu E. X. Report on the Mapping and Development of Database of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

CHAPTER 13 - HIGHPOINTS OF NIGERIAN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE: THE NATIONAL MIGRATION DIALOGUES

CHAPTER 14 - EMERGENCE OF THE ACADEMIA IN NIGERIAN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Chidozie Edwin Nwafor & Chiamaka Joe-Akunne

Introduction

The process of drafting the Nigerian National Policy on Migration (NPM) had brought to the limelight the enormity and dynamics of migration and the need for inter-institutional inter-agency cooperation and coordination. It also highlighted the need for evidence-based research and accurate data to guide policy makers in understanding challenges and opportunities presented by migration as well as developing a guiding framework for comprehensive migration governance in the country.

This chapter examines the emerging and increased visibility of one of these important institutions in the migration governance architecture: ‘the academia’. It therefore, explores how academic institutions’ programmes, activities and participation can contribute to the enhancement of the Nigerian Migration Governance (NMG). The model for the chapter discussion is drawn from the strides of the Centre for Migration Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University (CMS-NAU). The discussion will be developed using the origin, vision, mission, philosophy, objectives and activities of the Centre as guiding posts.

Recognizing the Role of Academia in National Migration Governance (NMG)

Notwithstanding the recognition mentioned above, there was no specific provision in the National Policy on Migration for the roles of academia in the NMG (2) apart from the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Education and National Universities Commission that were included in the Standing Committee on Diaspora Matters (SCDM). (3) Though these agencies regulate the educational and academic institutions, they are definitely not the academia, as such, their inclusion in the NMG does not represent the academia.

It must be noted however that although the remote and personal participations of individual academics may not be said to qualify as the presence of the academia, such participation was to yield dividend in making the case for more institutional recognition and organizational visibility of the academia in the NMG. During the 2017 National Migration Dialogue (NMD) the academia were invited to participate in the ‘Dialogue’. The inputs of the academia during the dialogue formed part of the resolutions of the 2017 NMD report which reiterated the need to engage the educational sector in NMG. Some of the key issues highlighted in the report were the need for mainstreaming of migration studies in educational curricula, campaign for attitudinal change and orientation beginning from the early stages of educational formation and engaging expert academia as foot soldiers to help in developing and implementing relevant migration policies (4).

Although there is a general understanding that policy making is a core task of government, yet good policies require openness to external ideas, including ones from the academia (5). Sasse & Haddon argue that the academia offers deep expert knowledge and research that can help to inform, design, improve, test and scrutinize government policies (6).

The then Commissioner of NCFRMI, Sadiya Umar Farouq understood this reality, and on 28th August, 2018 she commissioned the first university based centre for migration studies in Nigeria, the “Centre for Migration Studies, Nnamdi Azikiwe University (CMS-NAU)”. This was to prove a defining moment in the history of migration discourse and governance in Nigeria because it established and energized a platform for participation of Nigerian academics in migration management and governance at the institutional level. It also set the foundation for collaboration between the town and the gown on matters of migration in Nigeria. From inception therefore, CMS-NAU assumed a leading role in articulating and projecting the contributions of Nigerian academics and researchers to the national migration discourse. The Centre also perceived from the cradle that it will grow by developing and maintaining robust collaboration with kindred centres in the African region and other parts of the world as well as by partnering with the relevant governmental agencies, local and international organizations concerned with migration (7). It must be noted that some form of studies on migration-related issues had been existing in different disciplines, as well as in some specialized programmes in a number of Nigerian universities prior to the founding of CMS-NAU. The programme on refugee studies of the Peace and Conflict Institute of the University of Ibadan and the diploma programme on refugee studies of Usman Dan Fodio University merit mention here. These programmes, as it were, served as forerunners to the establishment of CMS-NAU as a university Centre solely devoted to migration studies and research.

Contributions of Academia in Migration Governance: Some Evidence from Literature

There are ample national and international evidence showing that the academia is increasing its visibility in migration discourse. In a report, IOM (8) showed that research and publication feature prominently among the emerging contributions of the academia to migration discourse. According to the report, over 130 migration-related journals are published in English, French or Spanish. The long-term trend shows a gradual increase in academic publication on migration, which is likely to be related to both the general expansion of academic literature production, and the increased prominence of migration research and academia involvement in migration discourse.

Specifically, evidence from the Philippine’s Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI) project showed that collaboration with academic institutions and the academia yielded many benefits for migration governance in that country including: mainstreaming migration into local development planning, awareness-raising on migration dynamics, multiple stakeholders’ interest and involvement in migration related issues, more beneficial partnership, advanced and reliable data collection and sustainable capacity building. Similarly, in Nigeria’s National Policy on Migration (NMP), 2015 and the validated Nigeria Migration Profile 2019, the benefits of collaboration with academic institutions, educational stakeholders and diaspora in harnessing the opportunities in migration for better migration governance were highlighted. This recognition underscores the value of the earlier establishment of the special programme, ‘Linkages with Experts and Academics in the Diaspora Scheme’ (LEADS) by the National Universities Commission (NUC) aimed at supporting the Federal Government’s efforts in transforming the education sector. The major aims of LEADS are:

To attract experts and academics of Nigerian extraction in the Diaspora on short term basis, to contribute to the enhancement of education in the Nigerian University System.
To create appropriate engagement-positions and job satisfaction for Nigerian academics and experts, so that they are not attracted away or wasted internally.
To encourage healthy staff movements, interaction and collaboration across and between Nigerian Universities and other sectors of education and National development, and
Among other benefits, to encourage experts in industry to participate in teaching and research in Nigerian Universities (9).

While there is scarcity of data on the latest update and evaluation of the LEADS programme from other independent sources so far, the available data from the NUC (10) showed that there are 62 scholars on the Scheme out of which 16 are serving in NUC as Consultants and 46 are serving in various Universities. Also, out of the 62 scholars, 34 are from the USA, 16 from UK, 3 from Canada, 2 from Ireland, 2 from Trinidad and Tobago, 2 from Netherland, 1 from Russia and 2 from West Indies.

Part of an earlier study by IOM assessed the LEADS programme and identified five key challenges facing the scheme. These are inadequate funding, unsatisfactory facilities for teaching, research and learning, unpredictability and irregularities in the academic calendar and negative attitude towards the diaspora.

The CMS-NAU handbook shows that the Centre’s comprehensive focus on the study and research on the gamut of migration issues is of immeasurable value to intent of migration governance – the systematic framework for coordinating migration dynamics. The study and research cover issues including internal displacement or forced migration, local and international migration, refugees and asylum seekers, regular and irregular migration, brain drain, brain gain, brain waste, brain circulation, remittances, return and reintegration, migration and development, etc.

CMS-NAU: Setting the Pace for an Ideal Academia Involvement in MG

Since inception, CMS-NAU has worked to enhance Nigerian migration governance through the growth and coordination of the contributions of the academia in Nigeria to migration discourse. In all, the actions and activities of the Centre are guided by well-designed vision, mission, philosophy and objectives (11) that reflect the model of what academia can contribute to MG. These fundamentals are summarized in the Centre’s resolve to think and talk migration, teach and sensitize people about the dynamics of migration through designing programmes that will promote regular migration while discouraging irregular migration, participate in development of policies that can harness the potentials of migration and mitigate problems arising from same, and providing evidence through research on the connection between migration and sustainable development.

Evidently, the Centre has so far operated within the framework of its mandate in the areas of research, teaching, training, capacity building, involvement in policy development, assessment, implementation, monitoring and review of migration programmes and documents. The postgraduate programmes of the Centre are designed to produce the critical manpower for professional handling of the burgeoning issues of migration. In both research and postgraduate programmes, the Centre blends the robust academic culture of Nnamdi Azikiwe University with a collaborative thrust that brings academics and professionals together thus promoting a multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder approach to the study and understanding of migration (12).

In keeping with the Centre’s mandate of reflecting a model of what academia can contribute to the advancement of migration governance, CMS-NAU has been involved in various conversations with national and international agencies, institutions and organizations that partner with the Nigerian government in advancing migration governance for better outcomes. In 2018 the Centre showcased that the academia is needed in the area of sensitization and advocacy by organizing a sensitization programme for increasing the awareness of the Dangers of Irregular Migration. A similar migration sensitization programme was organized again in 2019 for the graduating students of the University in collaboration with the Student Affairs Department, the UNIZIK Branch of Academic Staff Union of the Universities (ASUU-NAU) and Ama Ijele Theatre. This is the kind of vibrancy and limitless scope that academia is capable of and has brought to national migration dialogue and indeed national migration governance.

Through the conceptual and theoretical interrogation and articulation of issues in its participation in the TWG, the Centre has projected a strong image of the academia and expanded the frontiers of academic contribution to the development and review of various migration policies such as the NMP Action Plan, the Nigerian Diaspora Policy and Action Plan, etc. In 2018, its first year of existence, the Centre participated in the National Migration Dialogue. By 2019, the Centre had introduced a major innovation in the NMD by presenting the dangers of irregular migration in dramatic strokes that captured more than ever before the entire message and weight of the dangerous journey through the Sahara Desert.

The Centre has also made strides in the area of mainstreaming of migration studies into the tertiary education curriculum. In August 2019, with the support of the IOM, CMS-NAU organized a module development retreat and workshop for prospective lecturers in its new postgraduate programmes on migration studies. Subsequently, in October, 2019 the Centre unveiled its new academic programmes in a public presentation ceremony that showcased and announced to the world the emergence of the academia on the Nigerian migration management stage.

Recently, the Centre demonstrated another unique and invaluable role of academia in migration discourse and governance. Between 16th July and 17^th September 2020 the Center successfully organized a global webinar on Migration Perspectives on COVID-19 in collaboration with ASUU-NAU. The webinar was an academic response to the global lockdown occasioned by the COVID-19 Pandemic, considering the cross-cutting impacts of migration on our lives and in consonance to the Centre’s mandates to teach, research and serve the human migrant community. The Webinar series provided forum for scholars, scientists, migration experts and migrants to present their reflections on the COVID-19 pandemic from various disciplinary and experiential perspectives but fundamentally highlighting the relations, impacts and implications for human mobility and migration. It was an opportunity for them to tell the tales and discover the narratives, to expose the facts and debunk the fictions, to explore the relations and examine the interweaving implications of COVID-19 pandemic and migration with particular focus on their policy implications. The papers presented at the webinar have been reviewed and published in an online publication series.

The areas covered in the webinar and the online volume include the intersections of migration and the COVID-19 pandemic from the perspectives of the impact on environment; preventive measures and the implications of lack of knowledge of such measures; the experience of irregular migrants in the wake of the pandemic; the workers’ perspective to the protection of migrant workers’ rights during the pandemic; the socio-economic dimension of the brain drain problem in the context of the pandemic; the implications for food security and nutrition of the effects of COVID-19 on agricultural migrant labour; the health challenges posed for migrants by the pandemic; and the gender dimension to the effects of COVID-19 on migrant labour; etc. The scope and focus point to the dimension of the contribution of the academia to migration management and governance.

Key areas of academia contribution in NMG

Another important aspect here is to identify and itemize the areas academia will enhance the Nigerian migration governance. Drawing on the programmes and activities of CMS-NAU and qualitative observation of migration experts and professionals, it is obvious that academic institutions’ programmes and activities will bring enormous benefits to Nigerian migration governance.

Research and Publication: The academia can engage in applied or basic research that target extant societal needs revolving around migration. This will yield great benefits when done in collaboration with relevant government agencies, organizations and civil societies working on migration-related issues. The advantage of this partnership is that reliable data are collected from the right sources, using current theories for designing, analyzing and interpreting. The relevant audience is finally reached globally and locally through various forms of dissemination and publication.

Sensitization This is a systematic process of increasing awareness and response to migration matters or events through gradual but consistent presentation and representation of the issues to a target population. The process is expected to enhance the response to a whole class of stimuli in addition to the one that is repeated. Thus the core of sensitization is creating awareness and making people respond to certain issues in order to enhance active participation, increase understanding and public knowledge, enhance social skills, change popular attitudes, help communities make informed decisions, build profitable social support, and shore up confidence. This can be achieved by organizing academic forums such as seminars, symposia and conferences. Again, through surveys and longitudinal studies of societal response to sensitization programmes, the academia can help in isolating the most effective programmes and strategies for specific groups. This will certainly improve the effectiveness of migration management and governance.

Training and monitoring: The collaboration of the academia with policymakers and field actors in migration ensures a synergy that results in seamless information flow. The benefit is also more from the angle of providing professionals in the field with the theoretical, conceptual and analytical expertise for their practical activities. Balance of the two provides for enhanced governance. Through this collaborative engagement emerging problems in migration can easily be conceptualized and thematized for further education through trainings. Such trainings can be organized as short courses to address such specific problems. The Rain School programme of CMS-NAU is exactly designed for this purpose. This will ensure that the academics are always informed of the latest development in policy and practice while the policy makers and field officers are always acquainted with the extant theoretical solutions to practical problems that confront them in their engagement with migration issues.

Policy Development and Review: Policies are principles and rules that guide the activities of any organization. They are courses of action adopted and pursued by organizations which have short and long term impact on the advancement and sustenance of such organizations. Policies are usually derived from verifiable data, sound rational and empirical analysis and are statistically tested for validity and significance before adoption and implementation. And because policies are meant to guide the activities of existential situations characterized by change, both policy enunciation and implementation call for periodic review. All these are the mandates of the academia which they can bring to bear beneficially on migration policies.

Data analysis and interpretation: Knowledge is evolving and the duty of the academia to research and publish makes them more equipped to update their knowledge of emerging trends. Data analysis and interpretation are aspects of knowledge process that change very fast. These changes often accompany or eventuate a shift in paradigm on what constitutes norm or standard. For instance, all the data analysis managers or packages are updated virtually every year to accommodate new ideas. As noted above, the need to publish makes the academia update their data analysis tools. Thus, they can contribute this currency of knowledge in analyzing migration data.

Teaching and mainstreaming: Teaching is one of the primary responsibilities of the academia. It is also that part of the functions of the school whereby the wealth of knowledge of a people is formally transferred from one generation to another. Through this means, the values, norms and cultural heritage of a people are preserved. The involvement of the academia in migration discourse and governance will mean the mainstreaming of migration issues in the education curricula. The teaching of such curricula will ensure mass literacy on migration issues. It will also guarantee dissemination and preservation of migration knowledge.

Advocacy: This is conceived as any action that speaks in favor of, recommends, argues for a cause, supports or defends, or pleads on behalf of others. Advocacy is effective when it is based on evidence and sound, well-articulated and constructive knowledge. Advocacy includes activities and publications to influence public policy, laws and budgets by using facts, their relationships, the media, to create awareness and educate the relevant officials and the public. The academia can be involved in migration advocacy through the following:

Presenting the right information about migration from their research and questioning the way policy is administered;
Volunteering and participating in agenda-setting as they raise significant issues;
Calling the government of the day to order if the political systems are not responding to people's needs;
Calling for more inclusive and engaging process in policy development;
Proposing policy solutions based on established facts and evidence derived from research;
Creating forums for public debates on migration matters.

Partnership and Collaboration: A partnership is an arrangement where parties, known as partners, agree to cooperate to advance a common cause that promotes their mutual interests. This is similar to the term ‘collaboration’ which is the process of two or more people or organizations working together to complete a task or achieve a goal. Migration is multidimensional crosscutting various aspects of individual and societal lives. Collaborative efforts are therefore required to harvest and harness all the potentials of migration. The University system stands out clearly as a beautiful bride for such partnership and collaboration considering the immense competencies the system parades. Partnership and collaboration between the academia and other stakeholders in the migration industry should be a symbiotic relationship which will help the universities gain from the policy makers and field officers to produce well equipped graduates who will in turn ensure continued improvement of migration governance in policy development and practice.

CMS-NAU has explored some partnership opportunities with a lesson for a model of insight academia brings to effective partnership. The Swiss Embassy in Nigeria has been a leading partner in the collaborative engagements of the Centre. The conversation that started on the 12^th of March, 2019 with His Excellency, Georg Steiner, Ambassador of Switzerland to Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Libya and ECOWAS has grown steadily supporting the activities of the Centre through presence and inspiration. The meeting at the Embassy noted that the involvement of academia in migration discourse in Nigeria will surely bring a new dimension of approaching migration governance. The hints at opportunities for partnership and collaboration between the Embassy and Centre have grown into major indicators of great things to come. The first of such great things was the meeting later that year on 4^th May with the visiting team of the Swiss Federal Commission on Migration (FCM) led by the President of the Commission, Prof. Walter Leimgruber. The visiting delegation emphasized that, as a university-based institution, CMS-NAU should be in the forefront of designing, and leading important research for development and assessment of existing migration programmes and policies.

The Centre has also developed a conversation and engagement with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) which led to a fruitful visit of GIZ delegation to Nnamdi Azikiwe University in March, 2019; and subsequent sponsorship of an expert scholar, Dr. Christiana Idika for a working visit at the Centre. The Centre has also hosted a Carnegie African Diaspora Fellow, Prof Phil Okeke-Ihejirika of the University of Alberta whose contributions have enhanced the development of the academic programmes and teaching modules of the Centre. Currently, the Centre is participating in an international exchange programme, the Queen Elizabeth Scholars sponsored by Ridaeu Hall Foundation and Universities Canada. The programme, termed “QES Advanced Scholars – West Africa: On the Path of Social Responsibility and Global Leadership” involves CMS-NAU, University of Alberta, Canada, University of Ghana and University Cheikh Anta Diop, Senegal.

Conclusion and recommendations

Coordinating migration dynamics in a safe, orderly and regular way that can benefit all is a task that requires the collaboration of multidisciplinary experts within a well-designed framework. Interestingly, the Nigerian National Migration Policy adopted the governance framework that acknowledged the role of the academia among the pool of actors in actualizing the goals of the policy.

Elsewhere across the globe, the Philippine JMDI (14) reports how mainstreaming migration and local development issues into school programmes and academic activities enhanced understanding and awareness of both negative and positive aspects of migration and prepared prospective migrants to harness the developmental potentials of migration. This Philippine project buttressed the importance of the academia in contributing to migration policy and action. It further showed how creating awareness and developing capacities of the academia for research in the area of migration can enhance national policy making in migration and development (15). In the project, the regional government engaged the academia for the creation of a support system within the academic and school institutions to respond to the needs of children of migrants, generate local migration data, and bring more awareness to youth and children on the risks and benefits of migration and how these are linked to development (16).

Academics are known for their ability to generate new knowledge supported by strong evidence through their researches. These research findings are produced for, and disseminated to different target audiences. Researchers analyzing policy-relevant issues are often keen to engage with policymakers to impart knowledge that can inform policy deliberations and help shape policy making – this is especially the case with migration. As was rightly acknowledged by IOM (17) migration research and analysis output have been growing. There is sustained increase in the number of migration-related academic publications, with the largest ever academic output recorded in the last two years. There was significant output from international organizations on a wide range of migration issues. Academic output on migration is dominated with perspectives from destination countries, especially in relation to Europe. A geographic comparison of the primary affiliations of authors in selected Journals shows that most are from institutions in developed countries.

The establishment of CMS-NAU and its emergence in the national migration governance circle have provided the opportunity for critical engagement of the Nigerian academia. The numerous awareness, teaching and advocacy programmes of the Centre have paved way for mainstreaming migration into the nation’s formal educational system as well as bringing migration governance to its primary beneficiaries.

Finally, in order to achieve the partnership and collaboration envisaged by the NMP through improved engagement between government and the academia, the seven-point recommendation by Sasse & Haddon (18) must be taken seriously by all stakeholders. And we conclude with a recall of those vital points: encouraging expert networks, including the academia in the advisory committees, inviting the academia during important policy reviews, exchanging and increasing experiences through secondments and student internships, commissioned research, statements of research needs, and supporting migration research centres. While this pioneer Centre for Migration Studies in Nigeria has made significant strides in projecting the roles of the academia in migration management and governance, sustaining the progress requires collaboration of all stakeholders and adequate recognition and support of government.

Endnotes

World Migration Report 2020. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf (accessed November 2020); IOM. Migration and the 2030 Agenda: A Guide for Practitioners, 2020 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/sdg_en.pdf (accessed November 2020).
National Migration Policy, 2015 https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/national_migration_policy_2015.pdf (accessed November 2020)
National Migration Policy, 2015
Report of 2017 National Migration Dialogue. https://content/uploads/2018/06/NATIONAL-MIGRATION-DIALOGUE-min.pdf (accessed November 2020).
Sasse, T. and Haddon, C. How Government can Work with Academia, 2018 https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG_go vernme pdf (accessed November 2020)
Sasse, T. and Haddon, C. How Government can Work with Academia, 2018.
CMS-NAU. 2018).
World Migration Report 2020.
Brief update on linkages with experts and academics in the diapora scheme (leads), 2007 https://www.nuc.edu.ng/project/leads/ (accessed November 2020)
Brief update on linkages with experts and academics in the diapora scheme (leads), 2020 https://www.nuc.edu.ng/project/leads/(accessed November 2020)
CMS-NAU. Centre for migration studies Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka At a glance. Fab Anieh Nig. Ltd, 2019.
CMS-NAU
Sasse, T. and Haddon, C. How Government can Work with Academia, 2018.
JMDI (2016)
JMDI
JMDI
World Migration Report 2020.
Sasse, T. and Haddon, C.

References

CMS-NAU (2019). Centre for migration studies Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka at a Glance. Fab Anieh Nig. Ltd.

IOM (2020). World Migration Report 2020. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf

IOM (2018). Migration and the 2030 Agenda: A Guide for Practitioners. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/sdg_en.pdf

IOM (2015). National Migration Policy https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/national_migration_policy_2015.pdf

IOM (2014a). Migration in Nigeria A country profile 2014. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mp_nigeria.pdf

IOM (2014b). Needs assessment in the Nigerian Education Sector. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/needsassessmentnigerianeducsector.p df

JMDI (2016). Mainstreaming migration and development in the governance of local authorities in Bicol Region (JMDI Bicol). http://www.migration4development.org/fr/node/46904

NMD (2017). Report of 2017 National Migration Dialogue. https://ncfrmi.gov.ng/wp- content/uploads/2018/06/NATIONAL-MIGRATION-DIALOGUE-min.pdf

NUC (2020). Brief update on linkages with experts and academics in the diapora scheme (leads). https://www.nuc.edu.ng/project/leads/

NUC (2007). Brief update on linkages with experts and academics in the diapora scheme (leads) https://www.nuc.edu.ng/project/leads/

Sasse, T. and Haddon, C. (2018) How Government Can Work with Academia. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG_go vernme nt_academia_June_2018_vb.pdf

Important web-links

https://unizik.edu.ng/cms/about/vision-and-mission/

https://unizik.edu.ng/cms/about/aim-and-objectives/)

https://unizik.edu.ng/cms/about/activities/).

CHAPTER 15 - EPILOGUE TO NIGERIAN MIGRATION DYNAMICS AND GOVERNANCE

Ike Odimegwu & Emeka Xris Obiezu

This tapestry, Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance situates Nigerian and indeed African migration dynamics within the universal discourse that acknowledges migration as an age long reality akin to the nature of humanity and its civilizations. Migration conditions and is conditioned by human civilization, providing opportunities and posing challenges for individual growth and wellbeing and national sovereignty and development. This reality revealed in the study of its dynamics makes it self-contradicting for any suggestion that management of migration intends an effort at stopping migration.

Nigeria has and is having its fair share of migration impact as a country of origin, transit and destination. As expected, these impacts are reflective in various aspects of the country’s life underscoring the actions and sometimes inactions of individuals and government. Management of Nigerian migration has been an ongoing process, sometimes thematic, sometimes not, following the turn of the dynamics. Despite the challenges therein, Nigerian migration management or rather governance has recorded a steady progress on all fronts: the processes, policies, and programs.

The emergence of Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance is rightly characterized as bold and timely not only in announcing the arrival of the academia in the public square of national migration discourse but more so in providing the square the bedrock to anchor all discussions and actions. The seriousness of Nigerian migration management has often been compromised by the claims by some people that it builds more on perceptions based on stereotypes, assumptions, selective observations or journalistic impressions rather than theoretically informed empirical research.

Looking at the local and external perspectives of the Nigerian migration dynamics, from the work undertaken in this volume, it is obvious that the various perspectives either internal or external, despite their similarities and dissimilarities, convergences and divergences, reveal what could be called Nigerian migration dynamics. These dynamics are seen in the root causes, typologies, processes and impacts, positive and negative of migration on the Nigerian nation and people as well as the relationships.

Though each geopolitical zone within Nigeria has its specific peculiarities yet there are common trends that cut across all the country’s migration dynamics. Sometimes these same commonalities are discernible in the external perspectives albeit the specific prodding of each region. The basic driver of higher percentage of Nigerian migration is economics or better life. A significant portion of the trend, seen more in the internal front, is due to necessities associated with factors such as violent conflicts, natural and other forms of disasters. While Nigerians would ordinarily engage in regular migration, lack of access to regular pathways has led many to irregular means of migrating. Whether internal or international, the migratory movement of Nigerians has brought significant development to host and origin communities irrespectively.

The chapters in this volume have adopted a two-prong approach: theoretical and historical analysis woven into an interactive discussion. The understanding of the national migration governance yielded by this discussion reveals that the evolution, structures and processes of Nigerian migration governance derive from numerous events, programmes and processes across the globe. Numerous actors and partners―state and non-state, local and international―have contributed immensely to the success of the Nigerian migration governance at various levels including the development and implementation of its processes, policies and programmes. Efforts at localizing migration governance through national migration dialogue and its decentralization have provided for the sustainability of the migration governance. Thus, Nigerian attempt at migration management is fitted within the overarching conceptual definition and goal of migration governance as collective effort of structured cooperation at making migration beneficial to all. This systematic enterprise involves norms, instruments, processes and actors.

Concluding with an excerpt from one of the contributions, “though still needing more effort, Nigeria has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to an effective management of migration for the benefit of all. Its adopted migration governance processes have facilitated the mainstreaming of migration into national development programmes and plans. Indeed, Nigeria has taken its place, sometimes a leading position among comity of nations in all matters and areas of migration governance. Other countries have come to Nigeria to learn from its experiences.”

Looking ahead, a number of actions and initiatives gleaned from the contributions in this volume are expedient in ensuring continuous progress of the national migration governance. These actions must necessarily stretch over different aspects of migration management within the perspectives of present and emerging trends of the Nigerian migration dynamics. The current recognition Nigeria is enjoying in the international migration governance circle provides anchor and motivation to vigorously pursue these initiatives. A few of these initiatives include conscious investment of more resources, political and financial on the national migration management that would see Nigeria legitimately own its migration processes and programmes from formulation to implementation. The starting point of demonstrating this conscious effort would be in addressing the root causes of migration from Nigeria, particularly irregular migration.

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the grey areas in the migration policies, processes and programmes from the perspective of migrants’ protection. The various academic programs and activities that examined the impact of the pandemic on the migrants and migration viz-a-viz existing instruments and processes of national migration governance were influential in this revelation. More than the neglect of this special class of the persons of concern (POCs), the COVID-19 experience underscored the collective responsibility required for an effective and efficient migration governance that would leave no one behind. There is need to balance conversation and growth of mutual respects in the forums of migration engagements and dialogues in Nigeria as well as for Nigerians in the diaspora. Improved collaboration among relevant MDAs and enhanced coordination by NCFRMI are further beacons of hope for better relationship with partners both in project management and bilateral agreements. Systems and institutions of state and local governments must be explored in order that the achievements and goals of migration governance be successfully institutionalized and sustained. Constructive review of migration partnerships with allies, bilateral and multilateral, must be pursued to ensure the winsome approach to every migration-related agreement and relationship. While Nigeria continues to collaborate with its allies in implementing return and reintegration, it should seek regularization programmes for its citizens in irregular status.

Leaning on the inspirations articulated in the prologue, we once again reiterate, Nigerian Migration Dynamics and Governance announces the arrival of the academia on the stage of migration discourse “not just as an invitee but as a convener and collaborator joyfully, proudly and inclusively hosting the discourse.” “The volume arrives as a forerunner in the series of responses and engagements from the stables of CMS-NAU to tell, in narrative and thematic styles, the story and stories of Nigerian and African migration dynamics and governance; to extol the strengths and provide for the weaknesses; to announce the achievements and fill the gaps, and ultimately to understand the dynamics and proffer recommendations for the improvement of our migration governance.”